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Abstract
The Productivity Dynamics of the UK Economy: A Micro Data 
Perspective
by
Raffaella Sadun
Chair: John Van Reenen
This dissertation analyzes two factors which may lie behind the recent productivity 
surge in the US, the lack of productivity growth in Europe and, ultimately, the 
persistence of significative differences in the levels of productivity across the two 
macro areas. First, we analyse the role played by Information Technologies (IT). 
Second, we study the impact of specific regulatory policies, focusing on the 
consequences of regulations which constrain the entry of large and peripheral retail 
stores (“big-boxes”). These issues are explored in the context of the UK economy, 
whose recent economic performance is consistent with the overall European picture of 
sluggish productivity growth (Basu et al., 2003). Furthermore, the questions are 
approached from a micro data perspective, using a series of novel establishment and 
firm-level datasets drawn from Census data sources.
In the first two essays I focus on the role played by Information Technologies 
(IT), which appear to have played a substantial role in driving the recent productivity 
surge of the US economy. Chapter I sets out a theoretical and empirical context in which 
to study the impact of IT on productivity. Chapter II discusses the effects of IT on a
large panel of firms active in the UK economy, observed between 1995 and 2003. A key 
finding of the study is the apparent ability of US multinationals to obtain higher 
productivity than non-US multinationals (and domestic UK establishments) from their 
IT capital.
Chapter III, IV and V are dedicated to the study of the retail industry, which 
accounts for a large part of the European productivity gap vis a vis the US over the past 
decade. In particular, we study the effect of entry regulations against large retail stores 
(“big-boxes”). In Chapter III, it is shown that the recent introduction of entry 
regulations against large stores in the UK has paradoxically increased the competition 
faced by mom and pops retailers. Chapter IV show evidence that entry regulations have 
also significantly lowered the productivity of UK retail chains, forcing them to operate 
at a lower scale of retail activity. This result is set in an international context in Chapter 
V, where the market structure and the productivity dynamics of the UK retail industiy 
with that of the US and Japan are compared using novel Census data sources.
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Introduction
One of the most remarkable stylized facts of the last decade has been the rapid growth 
of labour productivity in the US economy, represented in Figure 1. This has continued 
despite the high tech crash and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and reversed a period of slow 
US productivity growth that set in after the Oil Shocks of the mid-1970s. Figure 1 also 
shows productivity growth in Europe. European productivity growth over the whole 
period since the Second World War has outstripped US productivity growth, generating 
a convergence in productivity levels. Since 1995, however, European productivity 
growth, unlike the US, has shown no acceleration, and productivity levels have started 
to diverge again.
There has been much discussion over this productivity difference between the 
US and Europe, but no consensus has emerged. Some authors claim it is simply a matter 
of time before Europe resumes the catching up process (Blanchard 2004) while others 
point to more long-term structural problems in Europe such as over-regulated labour 
and product markets (Gust and Marquez 2004).
This dissertation analyzes two factors which may lie behind the recent 
productivity surge in the US, the lack of productivity growth in Europe and, ultimately, 
the persistence of significative differences in the levels of productivity across the two 
macro areas. First, we analyse the role played by Information Technologies (IT).
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Second, we study the impact of specific regulatory policies, focusing on the 
consequences of regulations which constrain the entry of large and peripheral retail 
stores (“big-boxes”). These issues are explored in the context of the UK economy, 
whose recent economic performance is consistent with the overall European picture of 
sluggish productivity growth (Basu et a l , 2003). Furthermore, the questions are 
approached from a micro data perspective, using a series of novel establishment and 
firm-level datasets drawn from Census data sources.
IT played a crucial role for the US productivity acceleration. The importance of 
IT intensive sectors for the US has been carefully quantified in a series of macro 
studies. For example, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) examine the sources of output 
growth in the 1974-90 period and the 1995-99 periods1. Output growth in the early 
period was 3.13 percentage points per annum. The contribution of IT was relatively 
small -  about 0.37 percentage points per year or about 10 per cent (=.37/3.13) of the 
total. In the later period, the contribution made by IT is more prominent. Output growth 
rose to 4.76 percent per year, 20 per cent (1.01 per cent) of which was due to IT. 
Furthermore, there was a significant increase in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth 
from a third of a percent per year to just less than 1 per cent per year. Some of this TFP 
growth was concentrated in the IT producing sectors (semi-conductors, computers, etc.). 
Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002) corroborate Jorgenson’s results that IT made an 
important contribution to US productivity acceleration. By splitting the economy into
1 The 1990-95 period covered a deep recession and therefore was not included; however, its inclusion 
does not have much effect.
IT producing and using sectors they found that there were important contributions made 
by IT in both sectors2.
In comparison with the US experience, IT seems to have played a negligible role 
in Europe. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts a comparison of productivity 
growth between sectors, when the economy is divided into IT producing sectors, IT 
using sectors (those that use IT extensively, for example, retail, wholesale, and finance), 
and the rest of the economy (excluding public administration, health, and education). 
The bars show the acceleration of productivity. In the US economy, illustrated on the 
left hand-side of the diagram, we can see that the productivity acceleration was 
strongest in the IT using sectors (up from 1.2 per cent per annum in the early 1990s to 
4.7 per cent per annum after 1995). There is also a smaller acceleration in the IT 
producing sectors (up by 1.9 percentage points). Outside these sectors, there was a 
deceleration in productivity of about half a percentage point. The right hand side of the 
diagram shows the picture for the European Union (the 15 members pre-2004). Again, 
there is productivity acceleration in the European IT producing sectors, and a 
deceleration in the non-IT sectors, but unlike the US, no acceleration of productivity in 
the IT using sectors.
There is little doubt that the increased importance of IT in the US economy has 
been facilitated by the dramatic decline of IT prices since the early 90’s onwards, when 
the technology cycle for semi-conductors appears to have speeded up, leading to a fall 
in quality-adjusted prices for IT goods (Jorgenson 2001). What is surprising, however, 
is that European economies seem to have somehow been unable to exploit the 
opportunities arising from falling IT prices. There are at least two broad classes of
2 Some authors do not agree with the view that IT has played a crucial role for the US productivity 
growth. In a provocative series o f articles, Gordon (2000, 2003) takes issue with the view that IT use 
played an important role in US productivity growth post 1995. He is skeptical about the ability IT to 
affect productivity growth and in Gordon (2000), he claims that outside the IT producing sector, 
productivity growth in the US economy was entirely cyclical. Despite the inherent problems o f  knowing 
exactly how to correct for the cycle, this view had some plausibility in the late 1990s. It seems very 
implausible at the end o f  2005. The US economy has suffered some cyclical downturns with the stock 
market crash o f 2000, 9/11, the Iraq War, high oil prices, etc. but productivity growth has continued to 
power ahead. Furthermore, Stiroh (2002a) produced econometric evidence based on industry data that 
there was significant productivity growth in the intensive IT using sectors, even after controlling for 
macro-economic shocks.
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explanation of this puzzle. First, there may be some “natural advantage” to being 
located in the US, enabling firms to make better use of the opportunity that comes from 
falling IT prices. These natural advantages could be, for example, better access to risk 
capital, more educated or younger workers, larger market size or greater geographical 
space. A second class of explanations stresses that it is not the US environment per se 
that matters but rather the way that US firms are organised or managed that enables 
better exploitation of IT.
These explanations are not mutually exclusive. N evertheless, one 
straightforward way to test whether the “US firm organisation” hypothesis has any 
validity is to examine the IT performance of US owned organisations in a non-US 
environment. If US multinationals export their business models outside the US then 
analysing the IT performance of US multinational establishments in Europe should be 
informative. Chapters I and II of this dissertation focus precisely on this task. Chapter I 
illustrates the main conceptual issues related to the estimation of the productivity impact 
of IT, and the measurement of IT assets. Chapter II analyses the productivity of IT in a 
large panel of establishments located in the UK, examining the differences in IT-related 
productivity between establishments owned by US multinationals, establishments 
owned by non-US multinationals and domestic establishments.
A key finding of the study is the apparent ability of US multinationals to obtain 
higher productivity than non-US multinationals (and domestic UK establishments) from 
their IT capital. This finding is robust to a number of tests, including an examination of 
establishments before and after they are taken over by a US multinational versus a non- 
US multinational. Prior to takeover by a US firm, the establishment’s IT performance is 
no different from that of other plants that are taken over by non-US firms. After 
takeover, the American establishment’s productivity of IT capital increases substantially 
(while the productivity of non-IT capital, labor, and materials does not).
Overall, these findings suggest that higher IT productivity in the US has 
something to do with specific characteristics of US establishments, which can be 
defined as their “internal organisation”. Consistently with this idea, novel survey data
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relative to a large sample of manufacturing firms observed in Europe and the US shows 
that US firms are organised differently to non-US firms and that they can change their 
organisational structure more quickly.
What drives the organizational differences between US and European 
establishments? A possible explanation for these differences is that specific labor and 
product market regulation policies prevalent in certain European countries may have 
played a crucial role in determining the organizational structure of European firms and, 
therefore, their ability to exploit the full potential of IT assets. Consistently with this 
hypothesis, we show that establishments belonging to multinationals headquartered in 
countries with more restrictive labor market regulations tend to under invest in IT 
assets.
The importance of specific product market regulations is the main theme of 
Chapters III, IV and V, which study the effects of entry regulations in the retail industry. 
This sector accounts for a large part of the European productivity growth gap vis a vis 
the US over the past decade. According to Van Ark et al (2003), for example, the retail 
sector alone contributed approximatively 0.33 point less to aggregate productivity 
growth in Europe than in the United States. This represents slightly less than a third of 
the overall productivity differential of 1.1 percentage points between the US and the 
Europe from 1995 to 2000.
Several authors have argued that these startling productivity differences may be 
attributed to the restrictive entry regulations adopted by several European countries to 
protect small and urban retailers (“mom and pop stores”) from the competition of large 
and peripheral stores - “big-boxes”. These policies, it is argued, harm the efficiency of 
the retail industry. First, they may inhibit the exploitation of scale economies. Second, 
more generally, they may reduce the productivity gains arising from the reallocation of 
resources across firms3.
3 Foster et al (2006) show that reallocation dynamics (entry and exit o f stores) account for about 90% o f  
the overall US labour productivity growth over the 90’s.
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The exceptional degree of variability shown by entry regulations in the UK 
allows us to study the validity of these claims with standard econometric tools. The 
main regulatory change occurred in 1996 when, after a long period of laissez-faire 
promoted by Mrs Thatcher, new and restrictive criteria of admissibility for retail stores 
above 2,500 square meters were introduced. Furthermore, the reforms delegated to local 
government bodies (Local Authorities) the implementation of the new planning rules. 
Local Authorities were encouraged to follow general guidelines, but could make their 
planning decisions in a regime of almost complete independence from the central 
government. This institutional setting generated variation in the restrictiveness of the 
new entry regulations both within and across Local Authorities. I use this variation to 
explore three specific questions. First, did the introduction of entry restrictions against 
big-boxes effectively protect the employment of small retailers? Second, did these 
regulations affect the productivity of UK chains? Third, more generally, did the 
regulations generate a divergence between the structure of the UK retail industry and 
that of other major developed countries?
Since the planning reform targeted exclusively peripheral big-boxes, it increased 
the attractiveness of alternative store strategies. In particular, the post-1996 period was 
characterized by an unprecedented diffusion of small and central stores belonging to 
national retail chains, and by a strong decline in the big-box openings (Griffith and 
Harmgart, 2005). Chapter III argues that the competitive effects generated by the 
substitution of peripheral big-boxes with small and urban chain stores was so strong to 
paradoxically accelerate the decline of “mom and pop” stores.
I illustrate this point with a unique dataset, which allows us to study the 
relationship between planning grants and mom and pop stores’ growth at the Local 
Authority level between 1998 and 2004. In the estimation, I adopt an instrumental 
variable approach to abstract from the variation in planning grants determined by local 
demand conditions. Following Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), the involvement of locally 
elected politicians in the concession of planning grants is exploited to construct the 
instruments. In particular, I document that planning grants decrease with increases in the
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share of Conservative councillors in the Local Authority, even controlling for the time 
varying socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate, and looking both across and 
within planning boards over time. This finding is consistent with the fact that middle- 
class homeowners and small retailers enjoy a significant political weight in the UK 
Conservative party, which ends up influencing the planning decisions of Conservative 
councillors.
The key finding of the essay is that in Local Authorities where more big-boxes 
were allowed to enter in the post-reform period, mom and pop stores experienced 
higher rates of employment growth. The positive effect of planning grants on the 
employment of mom and pop stores holds both with OLS and when using changes in 
local political composition as an instrument to deal with the endogeneity of big-box 
entry. We decompose the positive effects of big-boxes along the different margins of 
adjustments (entry, exit and incumbents) of mom and pop stores, and show that most of 
the positive effect is driven by a reduction in exit rates. According to the estimates, the 
sharp decline in big-box entry - which followed the 1996 reform -accounts for about 8% 
of the decline experienced by independent retailers between 1998 and 2004.
Chapter IV investigates if the movement towards small stores had an impact on 
the productivity of UK retail chains. Several authors have emphasized the importance of 
scale economies for the activity of retail firms. Oi (1998), for example, discusses the 
role of fixed inputs such as parking and advertisement as sources of economies of scale 
at the store level. Others, like Holmes (2002) and Basker et al (2007) discuss the 
complementarity between store size with investments in bar codes and integrated 
distribution networks and, more generally, with the ability of retail chains to coordinate 
the activity of multiple stores.
I look at the relationship between store size and productivity using a series of 
micro datasets drawn from the UK Census, which provide detailed firm and store level 
information for a large sample of chains active in the UK, observed between 1997 and 
2003. Detailed information on output, inputs and store characteristics is used to analyse
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the relationship between the TFP of retail chains and the typology of stores they own - 
as summarized by the median and the variance of their stores’ distribution.
The analysis shows a consistent and statistically significant association between 
chain TFP and median store size, even controlling for a full set of firm level fixed 
effects. Interestingly, the relation is particularly strong in the Non-Specialised retail 
(SIC 521, supermarkets), the industry which accounts for most of the movement 
towards small stores in the aftermath of the reform. The coefficients suggest that the fall 
in within-chain shop sizes lowered annual TFP growth in retailing by 0.4%. This is, 
about 40% of the post-1995 slowdown in UK retail TFP growth of about 1% (as 
documented by Basu et al, 2003). This finding suggests that the introduction of tight 
planning regulations had a significant impact on the productivity of the UK retail sector, 
constraining the entry of high TFP outlets.
Chapter V studies the implications of the UK planning reform for retail market 
structure. For this purpose, comparable micro data on static and dynamic market 
characteristics of the retail sectors in Japan and the United States is assembled. This set 
of countries provides an ideal setting to analyse the importance of entry regulations, 
since Japan and the US are, respectively, characterized by stronger and weaker 
restrictive regulatory settings compared to the UK. A common research protocol is 
applied to confidential micro data on retail firms and establishments for all three 
countries. The data is collected by national statistical offices, which uses it in compiling 
the national accounts and other official statistics. The analysis is performed on 
comparable and disclosable aggregations of the national micro records, or in similar 
empirical exercises conducted at the firm or establishment level within each country for 
the 1997 to 2002 period.
The analysis reveals significant differences in terms of store frequency and 
average size across the three countries. Japan has a relatively large number (per head of 
the population) of small stores (10 per head), with the US many fewer (4) and the UK in 
between (5). In terms of store size, the US has bigger stores all round (average sizes are 
13 in the US, 9 in the UK and 6 in Japan), and chains are bigger in the US at all points
8
in the size distribution of stores within the chain. Moreover, between the mid-1990s and 
early-2000s, the median store size in a US supermarket belonging to a chain rose from 
about 140 to 155 employees, while in the UK it fell from about 80 to 40. Since the US 
is typically associated with milder regulatory restrictions against big-boxes. these 
differences are consistent with the idea that stricter entry regulations inhibit the 
diffusion of large retail stores, as discussed in Chapter IV.
Differences in terms of store and firms’ dynamics are particularly stark. In the 
US, entrants either gain market share or exit. In the UK, they are much more likely to 
stick where they are, typically in the bottom of the market share distribution and not 
exit. Finally, in the US - as in the UK - the median store size of a typical retail chain is 
statistically associated with higher chain productivity. To the extent this is causal, this 
suggests that the UK trend to smaller stores within chains would have lowered UK 
retailing productivity and the US trend to larger will have raised it.
The overall picture emerging from the three essays focusing on the retail sector 
are consistent with the hypothesis that entry regulations have had a significant impact 
on the structure and the productivity of the UK retail industry. Interestingly, entry 
regulations appear to have induced significant distortions not only for retail chains, but 
also for mom and pop stores, which are generally considered among the beneficiaries of 
these policies. These findings suggest that a reduction in the regulatory restrictions 
against big-boxes which are currently in place in the UK and in several other European 
countries could generate important productivity and employment gains.
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Figure 2: US and European acceleration in productivity growth (market sector)
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(02); Fishing (05); Mining and quarrying (10-14); Electricity, gas and water supply (40-41); Construction 
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Chapter I: Information and Communication Technologies and 
Productivity: A Review of the Evidence1
I. Introduction
For many years ‘we could see computers everywhere but in the productivity statistics’. 
Nobel Laureate Robert Solow (1987) made this remark in response to the simultaneous 
apparent widespread adoption of computers and slowdown in US productivity growth 
from the mid 1970s. Much research effort has been devoted since that time to 
addressing this ‘Solow Paradox’ and analysing the impact of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) on productivity.
In recent years, a series of macro and micro studies have started documenting 
the importance of ICT for productivity. This explosion of research has involved 
academics, statistical agencies and international bodies. The work of private sector 
organizations and consultancies has also contributed significantly to the debate. In 
addition to the intrinsic interest of researchers in this question, the availability of very 
large longitudinal datasets following the same firms and industries over many years has 
enabled significant progress in research. These large electronic datasets would have 
been virtually possible to compile and analyse if the ICT revolution had not occurred.
1 This paper draws on joint work with Mirko Draca and John Van Reenen
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This chapter offers a guided tour to some of the main aspects of ICTs and 
productivity. Section II discusses a neoclassical theoretical framework that has been 
extensively used (either explicitly or implicitly) by most of the studies surveyed in this 
chapter. Section III details some of the econometric issues involved in estimating the 
productivity of information technology (IT). This requires some consideration of the 
estimation of production functions, an area where there has been considerable 
econometric advance in recent years. Section IV discusses issues relating to the data; 
both ideal and actual. The final section discusses the results of the empirical studies 
covering econometric approaches at both the industry and firm level.
This chapter does not attempt to survey the large case study literature, which has 
thrown up some interesting insights on the role of organizational factors (for example, 
the McKinsey Global Institute studies). Furthermore, within the class of econometric 
studies, the focus is on the estimation of cross industry production functions. There are 
several econometric studies of particular types of IT in particular sectors, such as 
trucking (Baker and Hubbard 2004); emergency medical care (Athey and Stem 2002) 
and schools (Angrist and Lavy 2002; Machin, McNally, and Silva 2006).
II. Theory
II. A Basic approach
The basic neoclassical approach begins with a production function (F  (.)), which relates 
output, Y, to inputs. One of these inputs is capital; the components of capital are IT 
capital (denoted Q , and non-IT capital K  (which includes, for example, buildings). 
There are also factors of production such as hours of labour Z, and materials Afi. The 
approach is compatible with different levels of efficiency, A (Hicks neutral technology). 
Consequently:
Y=AF(L,K, C, M) (II.l)
2 O f course, we could consider multiple sub-divisions o f  the capital stock and other factors o f  production.
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It is often assumed that the production function can be written in Cobb-Douglas form 
(although the results discussed are suitable for much more general forms of the 
production function). In natural logarithms the production function can be written as:
y=a+ail+akk+acc+amm (II-2)
where lower case letters indicate that a variable has been transformed into a natural 
logarithm (e.g. y  = InY). In discrete time, the growth rate of output can be written as:
where P, is Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth and the other terms are the growth
rates of the inputs. Usually, one can think of A as the first difference transformation (e.g. 
Ayt = yt — yt-i) but it is also possible to consider longer differences (e.g. the average 
annual growth rate between 1995 and 2000 is Ay —( y t - y t - 5  )/5). Equations II.2 and II.3 
have often been used to analyse the impact of IT on productivity. In the next sections we 
discuss some of the possible extensions of the basic model which have been adopted in 
the literature to include the complementarity between IT and additional factors of 
production.
11.B Some extensions to the basic model 
Complementary organizational capital and IT
There has been considerable discussion in the literature that the measured ICT may be 
only the tip of the iceberg. Successful implementation of an ICT project requires 
reorganization of the firm around the new technology.3 Reorganization incurs costs, 
whether in the shape of fees paid to consultants, management time, or expenditure on 
the retraining of workers. There is much anecdotal evidence supporting this view, and it 
has been claimed that the total cost of an ICT project can be four or more times the
3 Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998); Yang and Brynjolffson (2001).
Ay=Aa+aiAl+aicAk+acdc+amAm (II.3)
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amount paid for the equipment and software. Yang and Brynjolffson (2001, Table 2) cite 
evidence that the total start-up cost (that is, the costs incurred within the first year) of an 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) suite is five times the cost of the hardware and 
software licenses. Based on econometric evidence of the effect on stock prices of ICT 
investment, Brynjolffson, Hitt, and Yang (2002) suggest that as much as $9 of total 
investment is associated with SI of ICT investment. This additional expenditure could 
be interpreted simply as adjustment costs, which are perhaps particularly high in the 
case of ICT. These adjustment costs can be estimated econometrically.
More generally, a production function can be estimated, where there are 
interactions between organizational capital, O, and ICT capital (the previous discussion 
was in terms of perfect complementarity - a firm has to spend $9 extra on organization 
when it buys IT). One form of the production function could be (cf. Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002)
y  (Xll “I” Clkk~\~ (XcC~f~ Q.mWl (XoO (Xoc (c*o) (II.4)
where the hypothesis is aoc>04. Note that this is different from the situation where the 
firm may simply have more organizational capital in general, and this is positively 
correlated with ICT capital ( a 0c = 0, but cov(C,O)>0). In this case, the importance of ICT 
capital will be overestimated if organizational capital is not properly measured.
In another scenario, O is essentially fixed and exogenous to the firm. For 
example, entrepreneurs establish firms that have a distinctive managerial culture, which 
it is extremely difficult to change unless the firm (or plant) closes down or is taken over 
(for models of this type see Syverson 2004). A differenced version of this equation 
would be:
Ay=Aa+aiAl+aicAk+acAc+anu4m+aoc(dc*o) (II.5)
4 Note that finding a positive coefficient on the interaction is not sufficient to establish that the two factors 
are complementary in the Hicks-Allen sense. A positive coefficient makes Allen elasticity more likely, 
however.
15
There will be systematic variation in the ICT coefficient depending on whether firms 
have a high or low value of O. For example, if US multinationals have systematically 
greater organizational capital than non-US multinationals this implies a positive 
estimate of the interaction between ICT capital and a dummy for whether the firm was a 
US multinational (see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2005 for evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis).
Skills
There is much evidence to show that technology and skills are complementary (for 
example, Chennells and Van Reenen, 2002, Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). Failure to 
account for skills in equation (II.2) could also bias upwards the estimated effects of IT, 
just as would the omission o f organizational capital. Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) 
examine an extended version of the production function allowing for interactions 
between IT, organizational capital, and skills. They find that the complementarity 
between IT and organization is not significant when organization, skills, and the 
interaction between them are controlled for.
General purpose technologies and spillovers
It is frequently argued that ICT is a ‘general-purpose’ technology (GPT). This has 
several implications; first, adoption of a GPT entails experimentation that may lead to 
innovation by the adopting firms, which in turns shows up as TFP growth. Second, as 
well as innovating themselves, firms can learn from the (successful or unsuccessful) 
innovation efforts of others, so there are spillover effects (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 
1995). Thirdly, there may be network effects specific to the widespread use of ICT: ICT 
may be more effective when many firms in a region or industry are using similar levels 
or types of ICT.
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These considerations cause researchers to look for spillovers from ICT in the 
same way that researchers looked for R&D spillovers. 5 The method generally 
employed is to augment the production function with a spillover term (denote this 
SPILL), which is the ICT of some of the other firms in the economy, i.e.:
y=a+ail+akk+acC+amm+nSPILL (IL6 )
The object of interest is whether p>0.
The main problem here is how to construct the SPILL measure. In general, this 
requires the specification of weights or ‘distances’ (dy) between firms i and j .  So in
general SPILL = V  d C . The distances could be based on industry -  for example, all
1 V }jj*j
the other firms in my industry are given a weight of unity {dy= 1), while firms outside 
firm i’s industry are weighted zero (di/=0). If spillovers come from forward or backward 
linkages, input-output matrices or trade matrices could be used. Alternatively, weighting 
can be based on geography or technology class.
It should be emphasized however, that IT, unlike R&D, is embodied, and 
therefore knowledge spillovers will be less likely. Network effects may be more 
important, but these might apply to specific forms of ICT (like operating systems or 
communication networks) rather than ICT in general.
III. Econometric models
There are many problems involved in estimating the production function for ICT. Some 
of these are generic issues related to the estimation of production functions. For 
instance, unobserved heterogeneity: there are many factors correlated with productivity 
that are not measured. If unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time then panel data
5 See Griliches (1992); Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2005).
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can help. The unobserved factor can be treated as a fixed effect and then the estimation 
can proceed with either dummy variables for each firm (that is, the within groups 
estimator) being included, or by differencing the data (for example, first differences). 
Another problem is endogeneity. The factor inputs (such as IT) are chosen by firms and 
are not, therefore, exogenous when included on the right-hand side of the production 
function. One solution to this is to find external instruments that affect the decision to 
invest in IT, but do not affect the productivity of the firm directly.6
The literature has not followed up this solution, however, and most studies 
ignore these issues and simply estimate a production function using ordinary least 
square (OLS) methods. However, some studies examine various approaches for dealing 
with these problems and a minority7 actually compare the results derived from 
alternative advanced econometric techniques. Below three approaches are discussed: 
TFP-based, General Method of Moment (GMM), and Olley Pakes (OP).
III.A TFP-based approaches
A common approach in the ICT literature dealing with this issue is to consider a 
transformation that constructs a measured TFP growth term. For example, Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (2003) estimate the following forms of equations
Aa=p,Ac (III1)
where the dependent variable is measured TFP (or ‘four factor’ TFP’)
Aa=Ay-siAl -SkA k -S cA c  -SmArn  (III.2)
6 Such as changes in the tax price, see Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen for examples from R&D.
7 Stiroh (2004); Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2005) and Hempell (2005).
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If ICT earned ‘normal returns’ then the estimated coefficient in equation (HIT) would 
equal zero (J3i=0). Unfortunately, although this resolves the endogeneity problem for the 
non-ICT factor inputs by moving them from the right-hand side to the left-hand side of 
the equation, the endogeneity of ICT remains a problem. In fact, it is likely to be 
exacerbated as the construction of measured TFP involves the variable of interest on the 
right-hand side of the equation. Any measurement error in ICT will be transmitted into a 
biased coefficient on /?y8.
An additional problem is that classical measurement errors in ICT will generate 
an attenuation bias towards zero for /?/. This is one reason for turning to longer 
differenced models, the approach adopted by Brynjolffson and Hitt (2003) (although 
they interpret their increasing coefficients as being due to unmeasured organizational 
capital rather than measurement error). In general, the attenuation bias should be less for 
longer differences than for shorter differences as the transitory shocks will be averaged 
out increasing the signal to noise ratio for the ICT measure (Griliches and Hausman 
1986). Unfortunately, in econometrics as in life there is no free lunch. Although long- 
differencing the data reduces the random measurement error, endogeneity problems are 
exacerbated because the transformed error term now includes more time periods.
III.B General method o f moment (GMM) approaches
For notational simplicity, re-consider the basic production function as
yit=0Xit+Uit (III.3)
where 0 is the parameter of interest on a single factor input, jc . Assume that the error 
term, uu, takes the form
un-tji +  T/ +  co u
8 Although note that the bias will be towards zero and researchers in the micro literature generally find IT 
coefficients that are higher than we would expect.
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(Ojt=p(Dit-l+ Vit (in.4)
rt represents macro-economic shocks captured by a series of time dummies, rji is a 
correlated individual effect, and vu is a serially uncorrelated mean zero error term. The 
other element of the error term, con is allowed to have an AR(1) component (with 
coefficient p), which could be the result of measurement error or slowly evolving 
technological change. Substituting (III.4) into (III.3) gives the dynamic equation:
yit^ 7T]yit-l+K2Xit+K3Xit-]+ri*i+T*i+Vit (III. 5)
The common factor restriction (COMFAC) is 7x1 1x2  =-7 1 3 . Note that z*t = xt -p Tt-i and 
rj*i=(l-p)rii.
Blundell and Bond (2000) recommend a system GMM approach to estimate the 
production function and impose the COMFAC restrictions by minimum distance. If the 
inputs are allowed to be endogenous, then instrumental variables are required. . A 
common method is to take first differences of (III.5) to sweep out the fixed effects:
Ayu=7tiAyu-i +7X2Axn+7X3Axn-i +Ax*t+Avn (III.6 )
Since v,t is serially uncorrelated the moment condition:
E(xit-2,Avn)=0 (III.7)
ensures that instruments dated t- 2  and earlier9 are valid and can be used to construct a 
GMM estimator for equation (3.6) in first differences (Arellano and Bond 1991). A 
problem with this estimator is that variables with a high degree of persistence over time 
(such as capital) will have very low correlations between their first difference (Ax,t) and 
the lagged levels being used an instrument (for example, xu-2 ). This problem of weak
9 Additional instruments dated t-3, t-4, etc. become available as the panel progresses through time.
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instruments can lead to substantial bias in finite samples. Blundell and Bond (1998) 
point out that under a restriction on the initial conditions another set of moment 
conditions is available:10
E(Axn-i (rji +vu))=0 (III.8 )
This implies that lags of first differences of the endogenous variables can be used to 
control for the levels in equation (III.5) directly. The econometric strategy is to combine 
the instruments implied by the moment conditions (III.7) and (III.8 ). Consistent 
estimates of the coefficients can be recovered and used to recover the underlying 
structural parameters.
III.C The Olley-Pakes method 
Reconsider the basic production function11 as:
yit=ailit+akkit+acCii+ammit+coit+rjit (IB-9)
The efficiency term, con is the unobserved productivity state that will be correlated with 
both output and the variable input decision, and 77,7 is an independent and identically 
distributed error term. Assume that both capital stocks are predetermined and current 
investment (which will react to productivity shocks) takes one period before it becomes 
productive, that is, Kit=lKu.i+(l-dK)Ku-i and Cit=lcu-i+(1 -Sc)Cu-i..
It can be shown that under certain regulatory conditions the investment policy 
functions for ICT and non-ICT are monotonic in non-ICT capital, ICT capital, and the 
unobserved productivity state.
10 The conditions are that the initial change in productivity is uncorrelated with the fixed effect 
E(Ayi2T|i)=0 and that initial changes in the endogenous variables are also uncorrelated with the fixed effect 
E(AXi2T|i)=0.
11 For notational simplicity we abstract from plant age, but we implement this in the estimation routine 
along the same lines as Olley and Pakes (1996).
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iKu=iK(kit, cu, con) (III. 10)
icit=ic(kit,at, con) (III. 11)
The investment policy rule, therefore, can be inverted to express con as a function of 
investment and capital. Focusing on the non-IT investment policy function it can be 
inverted to obtain the proxy: aj^(iKn,ht,cn). The first stage of the OP algorithm uses this 
invertibility result to re-express the production function as:
yn=ailn+akkn+accn+ammn+ coK(iKn,kn,cn) +rjn
= ailn+ammn+ y(iKn,kn,cn) +rjn (111.12)
where q>(iKn,kn,cn)= cp, = coK(iKn, kn, cn)+akkn+accn.
This function can be approximated with a series estimator or non-parametric 
approximation and use this first stage results to get estimates of the coefficients on the 
variable inputs. The second stage of the OP algorithm is:
yn= yn - ailn - ammn =akkn+acCn+con+rjn (III. 13)
Note that the expectation of productivity, conditional on the previous period’s 
information set (denoted Qt.j) is:
(Oit | Xit=,=E[G)it | C0it-1 , Xit =l]+£it (III. 14)
where %jt=l indicates that the firm has chosen not to shut down (a selection stage over 
the decision to exit can be incorporated in a straightforward manner). This expression 
for productivity state is based on the assumption that unobserved productivity evolves 
as a first order Markov process. Again, this relationship can be approximated with a
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high order series approximation g(coit-i). Substituting this in to the second stage, and 
making expectations conditional on the previous period’s information set gives:
E(yit|£}t-i)=akkit+acCit+g[(p(iKit-i ,kjt-i ,Cit-i)-akkit+acCit] (III. 15)
Since the estimates of the function qpit-i have already been obtained, this amounts to 
estimating by Non-Linear Least Squares (NLLS).12
IV. Data issues: Measuring ICT
IV. A Ideal measures o f  capital in a production function context
The ideal measure capturing the economic contribution of capital inputs in a production 
theory context is the flow of capital services. Building this variable from raw data 
entails non-trivial assumptions regarding: the measurement of the investment flows in 
the different assets and the aggregation over vintages of a given type of asset.13 
Assuming for the moment that investments in the specific asset can be measured 
without error,14 we investigate the latter point.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that one type of capital is used for production. 
Output will depend on the aggregation of the different vintages of investments made 
over the years, after allowing for the fact that the capacity of earlier investments decays
12 Numerous extensions to the basic OP methodology have been suggested. First, we consider the 
additional selection correction originally suggested by the authors. Second, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
suggest using intermediate inputs as an alternative proxy for the unobserved productivity term. This has 
attractions for plant level data where investment is zero in a non-trivial number o f cases. Ackerberg, 
Caves, and Frazer (2005) and Bond and Soderbom (2005) emphasize the identification problems 
underlying the original OP set up, which implicitly requires variation in firm specific input prices. Bond 
and Soderbom argue for the GMM approach discussed in the previous sub-section, which is identified in 
the presence o f differential adjustment costs.
13 If one is willing to work with an aggregate measure o f capital, extra care must be taken in aggregating 
the different asset types, but we will abstract from this issue in this context. For a detailed treatment o f the 
issue see Oulton and Srinivasan (2003).
14 The main issues involved in the measurement o f IT flows with industry and firm level data are 
discussed in detail in the next paragraphs.
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after installation. Defining the decay factor for an investment of s years old ds, and I,.s 
as the real gross investment of vintage s, the aggregate capital stock can be written as:
^5 (IV.l)
If it is assumed that the rate of decay is constant over time (geometric rate of decay), 
then equation IV.l takes the very simple form:
Kt=It+(l-d)Kit-i (IV.2)
In the case of geometric decay, the rate of decay is equal to the depreciation rate
(5) (Oulton and Srinivasan 2003). Depreciation measures the difference between the
price of a new and a one-year old asset at time t. Defining the price of a specific asset of 
age j  at time s as p SJ, then the depreciation rate is:
s  _ ipu  -  P ij*\)
P'J (IV.3)
Assuming that the depreciation rate of the asset does not vary over time, the 
time subscript can be omitted. A concept related to depreciation rate is the capital gainI 
loss (/) associated with the investment in the specific asset. The capital gain/loss is 
defined as the change in the price of a new asset between periods t-1 and ty that is:
/ j  = (ptj ~ Pt-\j ) (IV.4)
Both depreciation and capital gain/loss affect the definition of the rental price ptj for the 
capital services of a capital input of age j  at time t. This is defined as:
Ptj=rtpt-ij+Sptj-fij (IV. 5)
where rt is the actual nominal rate of return during period t. The rental price is what the 
company would pay if instead of buying the capital good, it rents it from another firm. 
A profit maximizing firm will hire the capital good up to the point when the rental price
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equals the marginal revenue of the product of the capital good. Under perfect 
competition, the rental price will be equal to the value of the marginal product of the 
asset. In this case, the asset is said to deliver normal returns. When the marginal product 
is higher than the rental price, then the asset is said to deliver excessive returns.15
Basic capital theory applies equally to both ICT and non-IT assets. As this brief 
description suggests, empirical implementation of the theory of capital measurement is 
far from simple. This seems to be particularly true for ICT assets, as they entail several 
problematic issues related to the measurement of investment flows, and of depreciation 
rates and price deflators. The next two sections explore how the research has dealt with 
these issues, focusing first on industry level data, and then looking at firm level studies.
IV.B Measurement o f  ICT capital at the industry level
This section describes the main sources and methodologies used to measure ICT assets 
in an industry level framework, with a specific focus on the methodologies developed 
within the main US statistical offices -  the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BEA and BLS are the major data sources for 
studies that apply industry data to examine the productivity impact of ICT in the US 
economy. Moreover, US methodologies represent the frontier for ICT capital 
measurement and have been widely applied in non-US contexts16 to derive industry 
level measures of ICT capital.
15 Rental prices are also very important in constructing Tomqvist aggregate service flows o f  assets o f  
different types. Rental prices rather than asset prices are used as weights to account for differences in the 
rate o f return to capital, the rate o f  economic depreciation, the rate o f nominal appreciation o f  assets and 
their tax treatment.
16 Oulton and Srinivasan (2003), O’ Mahony and de Boer (2002), van Ark et al. (2002))
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US data
Both the BEA and the BLS develop data on capital stocks, by asset and industry, 
applying the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) to real investment figures. The BEA 
publishes basic industry level data on ICT spending for the US economy.17 These 
estimates are derived using a top down approach. First, gross investments in ICT for the 
total US economy are computed starting from micro data - produced monthly by the 
Census Bureau -  on computer shipments. Exports, intermediate, households, and 
government purchases18 are deducted from this total, and imports are added. Second, 
industry totals on overall investments are built from micro data on establishments from 
the Economic Census and the Annual Capital Expenditures Survey (ACES) (since 1992) 
or the Plant and Equipment Survey (before 1992). To obtain series of ICT (and non-IT 
investments) by industry, the industry and asset totals are combined and distributed 
across the different industries using an occupational-employment-by industry matrix 
developed by the BLS, as documented in Bond and Aylor (2000), (implicitly) assuming 
a labour-capital fixed coefficient technology. BEA publishes the estimated asset-by- 
industry flows of all assets in the Capital Flows Table (CFT) and the Fixed 
Reproducible Tangible Wealth Investment Matrix (FRTW).19
Measuring nominal ICT flows is the first of a series of adjustments needed to 
obtain proper ICT capital. A basic step is the creation of appropriate deflators - to 
convert nominal flows into real flows. This issue is of particular relevance for ICT 
assets, which have experienced dramatic price and quality changes over the years. The 
BEA and the BLS, in concert with academic and computer industry economists, have 
made significant improvements in developing quality-adjusted prices for computer
17 In this framework IT is defined as the aggregation o f the different IT investment series produced by the 
BEA, i.e. mainframe computers, personal computers (PCs), direct access storage devices, printers, 
terminals, tape drivers, storage devices.
18 The BEA also makes adjustments to reflect trade costs and transportation margins (to convert into 
purchaser value).
19 These two tables represent the main sources for the construction o f  the IT capital stocks used in 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000a, 2000b), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (1999), Stiroh (2002a, 2002b, 2004), 
Oliner and Sichel (2000), Bosworth and Triplett (2002), Basu et a l (2003), Nadiri and Mun (2002), Chun 
and Nadiri (2002), Bemdt and Morrison (1995).
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equipment.20 Since the early 1990s, the deflators used by BEA for computers and 
peripheral equipment have been derived from the producer price index (PPI) and the 
import price index, quality adjusted by BLS using hedonic techniques (briefly described 
in Holdway 2001) 21
Another component is the creation of appropriate depreciation schemes -  to take 
account of the rate of decay of the different vintages of investments. BEA’s depreciation 
schemes differ from those used by the BLS. Since 1997, the BEA has used age-price 
depreciation for its weights, the assumption being that the depreciation pattern of most 
assets declines geometrically over time.22 In contrast, the BLS uses a hyperbolic age- 
efficiency function.23
European Data
European statistics offices’ published industry data on ICT assets lag behind the US. 
They have produced various country specific industry level data sets on ICT investment 
flows.24 The dataset developed by van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2002) is an example 
of combining official statistics on ICT flows at industry level for EU economies with
20 The IT deflators are described in Grimm, Moulton, and Wasshausen (2002).
21 The basic principle o f the hedonic deflators is as follows. The estimated prices o f specified 
characteristics (e.g. speed for PCs) are used to quality adjust the price o f a newly introduced model so that 
it is consistent with the discontinued model. For software the deflators are derived from PPI's, a BEA cost 
index, and a BLS employment cost index (ECI) and are applied to three subcategories (pre-packaged, 
own account, and custom software). A detailed description o f the methodologies can be found in 
Landefeld and Grimm (2000).
22 This is fully described in Fraumeni (1997). Until the 1999 revision, the estimated depreciation rates for 
computers were cohort and asset specific, taken from studies by Oliner. With the 1999 revision o f the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) a new depreciation rate was introduced for PCs only. The 
value is 0.3119, based on Lane (1999), assuming that the value o f a PC declines to 10 per cent o f  its 
initial value after 5 years. As noted by Dorns et al. (2004), this schedule incorporates the full loss in PC 
value as it ages, capturing both depreciation and revaluation. Starting from the 2003 revision of the NIPA 
- and based on new evidence in Doms et al. (2004), the depreciation rate for PCs has been changed to 
0.34.
23 Other differences between the BEA and the BLS estimates relate to the construction o f the aggregate 
capital stock measures. The BLS uses the Jorgenson methodology to build a service measure of capital 
stocks (also defined as an estimation o f  ‘productive capital stocks’) instead o f  the BLS wealth measure 
(the methodology is summarized in http://www.bls.gov/web/mprcaptl.htm).
24 Note for the UK O’Mahony and de Boer and the Bank o f  England dataset introduced in Oulton and 
Srinivasan (2003).
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US methodologies (especially on depreciation patters and hedonic prices), to produce 
broadly comparable estimates of ICT stocks from the late 1970s to 2003.25 In order to 
build series for real ICT investments, they applied country specific data deflators 
obtained through the price index harmonization method developed by Schreyer (2002), 
using US deflators adjusted for each country's general inflation. Once the flows are 
obtained, capital stocks are derived applying PIM to US depreciation rates taken from 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
Discussion
Despite the major effort made by US statistical offices in the context of ICT 
measurement, and especially the development of robust ICT deflators based on hedonic 
techniques, the construction of the asset-by-industry investment matrix from which 
capital stocks are derived seems to suffer from potentially problematic measurement 
issues26 (Becker et a l 2005). Similarly, available European data rely on interpolation 
techniques, as, for most European countries, the investment series are available only for 
specific years.27
Crepon and Heckel (2002) give examples of some of the problems that can arise 
when using industry level estimates of ICT stocks developed in a national accounting 
framework. In their work, measures of ICT capital at the two-digit level are built using
25 In this context IT is defined very broadly as comprising the whole category o f office and computer 
equipment - including peripherals such as printers, photocopiers, etc - radio, TV and communication 
equipment, and software.
26 Since the information on occupational activities by industry is used to produce an asset by industry 
matrix, this embedded relationship between industry IT flows and employment may introduce dangerous 
spurious correlations. For example, this issue may put at risk studies that use the data to investigate 
correlations between capital mix and employment mix choices (Chennells and Van Reenen, 2002). 
Moreover, the specific occupational categories used to break down the IT flows by industry are not 
published. Bosworth and Triplett (2002) note that the latest year for which the BEA flow table was used 
to allocate IT capital by industry is 1992. Another problematic issue is the measurement o f software 
investments especially custom-made software (Dedrick, Gurbaxani, Rraemer (2003).
27 The country specific matrices o f IT investments by industries are interpolated for intermediate years. 
For longer gaps in the data the Commodity Flow Method is employed. This supply side method first 
computes the total amount o f ICT commodities available in a specific year by talcing the value o f total 
ICT production plus the net value ICT imports less ICT exports). Then the shares o f investments across 
the different industries are allocated using as weights the shares o f  total investments over production 
minus exports plus imports computed from the input output tables
28
firm level data on ICT assets declared by firms in their tax returns. The industry data are 
built for an average of 300,000 firms per year over the period 1984-1998, and compared 
to the figures reported by Cette, Mairesse, and Kocoglu (2000) based on National 
Accounts. The share of ICT capital in value added, obtained through the aggregation of 
firm level data, is 1.7 per cent, while the share derived from National Account sources is
0.5 per cent. This stark difference may be due to the more detailed data entries obtained 
from micro sources, but also could be due to the different assumptions related to the 
PIM employed in the National Accounts’ estimations.28
IV. C Measures o f  ICT capital at firm level
Using micro data rather than industry data allows the well-documented firm level 
heterogeneity in productivity and investment patterns to be taken into account, which is 
particularly relevant in the context of ICT assets. ICT frequently is found to have a 
differential impact on firm level productivity according to characteristics such as 
organizational structures and skills that are likely to differ even across firms within the 
same industry.
Micro context, private surveys
The first attempts to estimate the role of IT assets on firm level productivity data were 
made by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995, 2003). The data they used typically refer to 
volume measures of firms’ hardware stocks on site, collected through telephone surveys 
organized and managed by private organizations such as the Computer Intelligence
28 Interestingly, the higher shares reported by Crepon and Heckel does not seem to be related to selection 
issues.
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Intercorp (CII). These volume measures are translated into value measures of hardware 
stocks using price and computing capacity information provided by CII.29
There are two advantages of such data. First, the detailed information collected 
(hardware stocks by type of equipment) provides a very precise snapshot of the type of 
IT stocks existing at a specific site, and does not require PIM. Secondly, as many of the 
firms in these surveys were sampled in different years, the data are suitable for 
longitudinal productivity analysis.
However, there are also some problematic aspects to their use. First, for the 
purposes of productivity analysis the IT data -  collected at site level -  needs to be 
matched with data from other financial information sources (such as Compustat for the 
US or Amadeus for several European countries), which refer to firms rather than sites 
within a firm. This implies that the IT data need to be adjusted by aggregation if 
multiple sites belonging to a single firm are sampled, or by applying weighting schemes 
to project the site level information to firm level. Secondly, as these type of IT surveys 
target very large firms (for the US the sample is Fortune 1000 firms), there might be a 
selection issue biasing the productivity results.
Micro context, census based data
In the last decade statistical offices have played a major role in collecting IT 
information at firm level. These data now represent a valid alternative to the micro level 
IT measures collected by private organizations, and are typically matched to other
29 Several adjustments are made to apply the data in a production function framework. In Brynjolfsson, 
Bresnahan, and Hitt (2002) the nominal values are deflated using price information. Brynjolfsson, 
Bresnahan, and Hitt (2002) use prices developed by Robert Gordon (19.3% yearly changes). In 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) the data are transformed from wealth stocks (market value o f the assets) into 
productive stock (the value o f assets based on output capability) multiplying the wealth stocks by the 
annual aggregate ratio o f  the productive stock to the wealth stock o f computer assets computed by the 
BLS (1,2). The CII data have been extensively used in other research on productivity. Some recent 
examples include Lehr and Lichtenberg (1999) - where CII data are combined with additional census 
based data on firm level IT investments - and Gilchrist, Gurbaxani, and Town (2001) -  where CII data are 
used in the context o f TFP growth regressions. More recently, Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2005) 
used a similar type o f data (detailed information on the volume o f  IT equipment existing in a specific site 
o f a firm, collected via telephone survey) to analyse the impact o f IT on productivity in the UK economy.
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census based information on output and inputs, or to publicly available databases (such 
as Compustat), which contain firm level financial information.
In most cases, statistical offices collect information related to the use of IT 
equipment, rather than precise measures of IT expenditure or IT stocks. The surveys are 
at the employee level (that is, an employee of a specific firm is surveyed about his/her 
own particular use of IT), as in Greenan and Mairesse (1996),30 or at firm level (that is a 
representative of the firm is asked about the number of employees using IT in general, 
about a specific type of IT equipment or procedure, such as broadband or e-commerce), 
as in Maliranta and Rouvinen (2004).31 Using a similar approach, Atrostic and Nguyen 
(2005) for the US, and Atrostic et al. (2004) for Japan, employ firm level information 
on IT infrastructures (a dummy variable taking value one if  the firm uses computer 
networks) to explore how firms use IT,32 rather than how much they spend on it.
More recently, statistical offices have begun to collect micro level information 
on investment expenditures in IT. This type of information has the clear benefit of 
providing a direct measure of investment that can be quite easily used in a production 
function context. However, the IT investment data typically have been collected on a 
cross sectional basis, requiring the use of different approximations to recover measures
30 Greenan and Mairesse (1996) use the questions on IT use by workers collected in the framework o f  the 
French survey TOTTO (Enquete sur les techniques et 1’Organisation du Travail) to build firm level 
measures on computer use, which they match with the INSEE firm database. Clearly, the worker- level 
information requires specific assumptions regarding the degree o f representativeness o f the employees 
surveyed.
31 Maliranta and Rouvinen (2004) use as IT measures the percentage o f employees in Finnish firms using 
computers and/or LAN and Internet systems. These data are collected in the framework o f Statistics 
Finland’s Internet use and e-commerce in enterprises surveys. A similar measure is collected in the UK in 
the E-Commerce survey (Criscuolo and Waldron 2003).
32 These studies combine basic information on the existence o f computer networks within a firm with 
more detailed data on specific types o f  IT resources such as fully integrated ERP software.
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of productive stocks of IT equipment for use in a production function context from 
flows.33
The existence of detailed information on IT flows over consecutive time periods 
allows researchers to build measures of IT stocks more closely following the procedure 
established in the PIM (see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2005; Hempell 2005).34 
However, estimating capital stocks using PIM implies specific assumptions regarding 
the starting point of the PIM recursion.35 This introduces a degree of measurement error 
in the estimates of stocks, especially when the time series is short. This problem is 
partially offset for IT assets, as they typically have a very high depreciation rate (-30 
per cent).
Discussion
Compared to IT data collected by private organizations, the census based data yield 
larger and more representative samples. Moreover, although the IT measures and the 
data collection criteria were generally determined independently by each country, 
recently there has been some multi-national collaboration (such as the OECD 
International Micro Data Initiative), which it is to be hoped will facilitate cross country
33 These data require very specific assumptions on the depreciation or the growth patterns o f  the capital 
stocks. If we assume full depreciation then the investment flows represent a valid proxy for capital stocks. 
This is the choice implicitly made by Doms et al. (2002) in a study focusing o f the role o f IT in US retail 
sector productivity, where the ratio o f IT investments over total investments (drawn from the 1992 Asset 
and Expenditures Survey) is used to proxy for IT capital intensity for some 2000 retail firms. The same 
type o f measure (IT investment share in total investments) is employed by Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Schank (2003) in a comparison o f IT effects in the US and Germany. Wilson (2004) uses a slightly more 
sophisticated framework to exploit the 1998 ACES on detailed firm level investments in IT (and in 54 
other types o f assets) in a production function context. He rewrites the PIM formula as: Kt-i~(gt+S)*I, 
with gt=AKt/Kt-i. He then assumes that in the steady state g  should be approximately equal to zero, and 
states a direct proportionality between stocks and flows, running through the depreciation rate.
34 Bloom et al. (2007) use four different surveys on micro level IT investments in the UK economy 
collected by the Office o f  National Statistics for the years 1995-2003. Hempell (2005) employs IT 
investment data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel in Services (MIP-S), collected by the ZEW on 
behalf o f the German Federal Ministry o f Education and Research since 1994.
35 Bloom et al. (2007) build the initial conditions o f the PIM assuming a direct proportionality between 
industry and firm level capital stocks. Defining the first time a firm appears in their sample as Y, they 
allocate the industry level capital stock to each firm according to investment weights, i.e. K>i,r=(Pi,r/Pr) *Kj r 
where A?r and P r represent respectively total IT capital stock and investment for industry j  in year r. For
all periods following year r, they follow the standard PIM recursion.
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comparisons of IT studies. The main issues in the use of these data are the scant 
availability of time series information (for both categorical variables and expenditure 
information) and the problems related to software measurement.
IV.D. Conclusions on data
Despite recent improvements, the gap between the theoretical conception of IT capital 
services and empirical measures of IT assets is still wide. This applies to industry level 
data where the estimation of the IT stocks may be undermined by problems related to 
the imprecise allocation of flows across different industries (US) and to the use o f heavy 
interpolation techniques (Europe). The problem also applies to firm level data where 
information about investments is often not available, and if it is, it often covers a very 
short (or no) time series. In fact, many of the studies discussed below rely on even 
cruder indicator variables whose connection with the theory is likely to be even looser. 
Software continues to be a major problem as, below the macro level, it is rarely 
measured directly.
V. Econometric results for IT and productivity
In this section we review the main empirical finding related to the effects of ICT on 
productivity.
V.A Industry level
Early industry studies (for example, Bemdt and Morrison 1995) found no significant 
relationship between IT and productivity. Industry level studies using more recent data, 
found significant returns to IT capital over the 1987-2000 period, based on a study of 58 
industries (Stiroh 2004). Stiroh’s study looked at IT capital as a whole, and at the 
individual sub-components (computers and telecom). Although Stiroh (2002a) found 
there was faster productivity growth in the IT intensive sectors post 1995, Stiroh (2004) 
found no evidence that the coefficients on IT capital rose in 1996-2000 (compared to
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1987-1995). The absence of effects from earlier studies may be due less to the time 
period and more to the combination of noisier data and IT being a much smaller 
proportion of total capital.
However, when Stiroh (2004) looks at econometric estimators that attempt to 
control for fixed effects (for example, through differencing the data) and/or endogeneity 
(for example, through GMM) there are few significant results. This may be due to 
genuine misspecification and the absence of an IT effect or, more plausibly, because the 
industry data are too coarse for some of the more sophisticated econometric approaches. 
Most of the other studies in the industry level literature focus on TFP growth equations 
of the type discussed above in the TFP approaches section. Overall, the results mirror 
Stiroh’s findings. The IT coefficients tend to be generally insignificant, unstable across 
time, and across countries (for example, Basu et al. 2003, Table 8). The TFP regressions 
have the problems of the aggregate industry data and the problems discussed in the 
section on TFP approaches, that IT is included on the left hand-side and the right hand- 
side of the estimating equations. Given concerns about aggregation and other biases 
attention has shifted to the more micro-level.
V.B Firm level
Most firm level studies do reveal a positive and significant association of IT with 
productivity. This is reassuring as many were undertaken in response to the Solow 
paradox, which suggested there was no productivity impact from IT. In most cases, the 
magnitude of the IT coefficients is larger than might be expected from the standard 
neoclassical assumptions underlying the growth accounting framework. A well-known 
example here is Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003). The explanation that the high magnitudes 
are due to organizational capital gets some support from Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and 
Hitt (2002) who conducted a survey containing explicit questions on decentralization 
within firms. Black and Lynch (2001, 2004) and Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) do not 
find support for interactions between IT and organization, but they have less 
sophisticated measures of IT capital than Brynjolfsson and his colleagues. There is also
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a very wide range of estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to IT capital. The 
Stiroh (2004) meta-study is very useful for comparing the sub-set of studies considered 
here. He finds that the mean of the estimates across studies is about 0.05, which is well 
above the share of the IT stock in revenue as noted above. However, the estimates range 
from an upper end of over 25 per cent to minus 6 per cent. This wide variation is in part 
driven by methodological choice, but also is strongly suggestive of heterogeneity in the 
IT coefficient by country, industry, and type of firm. Finally, the evidence for spillovers 
is very weak. Most studies struggle to find convincing impacts from spillover effects. 
This suggests that the GPT effects stressed by the theorists may be somewhat 
exaggerated. While the spillover mechanism is pretty clear for innovation or R&D it is 
much less clear for ICT.36
VI. Conclusion
There has been significant progress made since the mid 1990s in the analysis of IT and 
productivity. The fall in the quality-adjusted price of computers has enabled researchers 
to build and analyse very large-scale databases that have revolutionized our 
understanding of the role of ICT and productivity. The proliferation of databases 
covering thousands of firms and decades of data has enabled significant intellectual 
advance. This chapter presents a very basic neoclassical framework (with a few 
extensions), which we think is helpful in considering the problem. There does seem to 
be some reasonable evidence of a strong firm level association between IT and firm 
performance (although causality has still to be convincingly demonstrated).
36 Griliches’ (1992) survey and some recent contributions (e.g., Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reneen 
2005) provide compelling evidence about the importance o f spillovers from R&D.
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Chapter II: ICT, Multinationals, and the US Productivity Miracle1
I. Introduction
IT seems to have played a crucial role for the reversal in the long-standing catch-up of 
Europe’s productivity level with the United States. American labor productivity growth 
slowed after the early 1970s Oil Shocks but accelerated sharply after 1995. Although 
European productivity growth experienced the same slowdown, it has not enjoyed the 
same rebound (see Figure 1). Decompositions of US productivity growth show that the 
great majority of this growth occurred in those sectors that either intensively use or 
produce IT (information technologies)2. Closer analysis has shown that European 
countries had a similar productivity acceleration as the US in IT producing sectors (such 
as semiconductors and computers) but failed to achieve the spectacular levels of 
productivity growth in the sectors that used IT intensively (predominantly market
1 This paper draws from joint work with Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen
2 See, for example, Kevin Stiroh (2002). Dale Jorgenson (2001), Stephen Oliner and Daniel Sichel 
(2000). In the 2002-2004 period Oliner and Sichel (2005) find that US productivity growth remained 
strong, but there was a more widespread increase in productivity growth across sectors. See Robert J. 
Gordon (2004) for a general discussion.
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service sectors, including retail, wholesale and financial services)3. Consistent with 
these trends, Figure 2 shows that IT intensity appears to be substantially higher in the 
US than Europe and this gap has widened over time. Given the common availability of 
IT throughout the world at broadly similar prices, it is a major puzzle why these IT 
related productivity effects have not been more widespread.
There are at least two broad classes of explanation4 of this puzzle. First, there 
may be some “natural advantage” to being located in the US, enabling firms to make 
better use of the opportunity that comes from rapidly falling IT prices. These natural 
advantages could be tougher product market competition, lower regulation, better 
access to risk capital, more educated or younger workers, larger market size, greater 
geographical space, or a host of other factors. A second class of explanations stresses 
that it is not the US environment per se that matters but rather the way that US firms are 
organized or managed that enables better exploitation of IT.
These explanations are not mutually exclusive. In the final section of this chapter 
we present a model that has elements of both (i.e. organizational practices in US-based 
firms are affected by the US regulatory environment and some of these practices are 
transplanted overseas through foreign affiliates of American multinationals). 
Nevertheless, one straightforward way to test whether the “US firm organization” 
hypothesis has any validity is to examine the IT  performance o f US owned 
organizations in a non-US environment. If US multinationals at least partially export 
their business models outside the US -  and a walk into McDonald’s or Starbucks 
anywhere in Europe suggests that this is not an unreasonable assumption -  then
3 Mary O’Mahony and Bart Van Ark (2003) decompose productivity growth for the same sectors in the 
US and Europe under common measurement assumptions. Compared to the 1990-1995 period, US 
productivity growth in sectors that intensively used IT accelerated by 3.5 percentage points between 1995 
and 2001 (from 1.2% per annum to 4.7% per annum). In Europe, productivity growth in these sectors 
showed no acceleration (it was 2% per annum pre and post 1995). Productivity growth accelerated in the 
IT producing sectors by similar amounts in the US (1.9 points) and Europe (1.6 points). In the other 
sectors there was no acceleration in either the US or Europe.
4 Another possibility is international differences in productivity measurement (Olivier Blanchard, 2004). 
This is possible, but the careful work o f  Mary O’Mabony and Bart Van Ark (2003) focusing on the same 
sectors in the US and EU, using common adjustments for hedonic prices, software capitalization and 
demand conditions, still find a difference.
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analyzing the IT performance of US multinational establishments in Europe should be 
informative. Finding a systematically better use of IT by American firms outside the US 
suggests that we should take the US firm organization model seriously. Such a test 
could not be performed easily only with data on plants located in the US because any 
findings of higher efficiency of plants owned by US multinationals might arise because 
of the advantage of operating on the multinational’s home turf (“home bias”).
In this chapter, we examine the productivity of IT in a large panel of 
establishments located in the UK, examining the differences in IT-related productivity 
between establishments owned by US multinationals, establishments owned by non-US 
multinationals and domestic establishments. The UK is a useful testing ground for at 
least two reasons. First, it experiences extensive foreign ownership with frequent 
ownership change. Second, the UK Census Bureau has collected panel data on IT 
expenditure and productivity in both manufacturing and services since the mid-1990s. 
Therefore, we have arguably constructed the richest micro-dataset on IT and 
productivity in the world.
We report that the key fact in understanding productivity differences is the 
apparent ability o f  US multinationals to obtain higher productivity than non-US 
multinationals (and domestic UK establishments) from their IT  capital. These findings 
are robust to a number of tests, including an examination of establishments before and 
after they are taken over by a US multinational versus a non-US multinational. Prior to 
takeover by a US firm the establishment’s IT performance is no different from that of 
other plants that are taken over by non-US firms. After takeover, the American 
establishment’s productivity of IT capital increases substantially (while the productivity 
of non-IT capital, labor, and materials does not).
Overall, these findings suggest that the higher productivity of IT in the US has 
something to do with specific characteristics of US establishments, which we define as 
their “internal organization” (we discuss other possible explanations as well). We also 
show that US firms are organized differently to non-US firms and that they can change 
their organizational structure more quickly. We suggest that the organizational
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inflexibility of European firms may be linked to different institutional characteristics 
such as, for example, the prevalence of restrictive labor market regulations.
This analysis is related to several other areas of the literature. First, there is a 
large literature on the impact of IT on productivity at the aggregate or industry-level.5 
Second, there is growing evidence that the returns to IT are linked to the internal 
organization of firms. On the econometric side, Tim Bresnahan, Erik Brynjolfsson and 
Lorin Hitt (2002) and Eve Caroli and John Van Reenen (2001) find that internal 
organization and other complementary factors, such as human capital, are important in 
generating significant returns to IT. On the case study side, there is a large range of 
evidence6. For example, Larry Hunter et al (2000) describe how IT radically changed 
the organization of US banks in the late 1980s. The introduction of ATMs substantially 
reduced the need for tellers. At the same time, PCs and credit-scoring software allowed 
staff to be located on the bank floor and to directly sell customers mortgages, loans and 
insurance, replacing bank managers as the primary sales channel for these products. 
Along with the IT enabled ability of regional managers to remotely monitor branches, 
this led to a huge reduction in branch-level management and much greater decentralized 
decision-making for the front-line staff. This re-organization of banks did not happen in 
much of Europe, however, until much later because of strong labor regulation and trade- 
union power. Third, in a reversal of the Solow Paradox, the firm-level productivity 
literature describes returns to IT that are larger than one would expect under the 
standard growth accounting assumptions. Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt (2003) argue 
that this is due to complementary investments in “organizational capital” that are 
reflected in the coefficients on IT capital. Fourth, there is a literature on the superior 
establishment-level productivity of US multinationals versus non-US multinationals, 
both in the US (Mark Dorns and Bradford Jensen, 1998) and in other countries, such as 
the UK (Chiara Criscuolo and Ralf Martin, 2005). We suggest that the main reason for
5 See, for example, Basu et al. (2003) or Stiroh (2004).
6 Olivier Blanchard, Martin Bailey, Hans Gersbach, Monika Schnitzer and Jean Tirole (2002) discuss a 
large number o f industry-specific examples.
40
this difference is the way in which US multinationals use new technologies more 
effectively than other multinationals7. Finally, the paper is linked to the literature on 
growth and regulation.8 One of the unintended consequences of labor market regulation 
in the model is that it slows down the ability of firm’s to re-organize. When faced by a 
radical technological shock (such as the big fall in IT prices), these adjustment costs can 
have serious consequences in terms of technological diffusion and productivity growth.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section I describes the empirical 
framework, Section II the data and Section III presents the main results. In Section IV 
we sketch a simple model that can account for the stylized facts we see in the data and 
Section V concludes.
II. Empirical Modelling Strategy
II.A. Basic Approach
We assume that the basic production function can be written as follows 
<?„ = a„ + « " « „  + a!,l„ + <***„ + « , 'c„ (II 1)
Q denotes gross output of establishment i in year t. A denotes (total factor) productivity, 
M  denotes materials, L denotes labor, K  denotes non-IT fixed capital and C denotes 
computer/IT capital. Lower case letters indicate that a variable is transformed into 
natural logarithms, so q^\nQi\, etc.
We are particularly interested in the role of IT capital and whether the impact of 
computers on productivity is systematically higher for the establishments belonging to
7 In a similar vein, John Haltiwanger Ron Jarmin and Torsten Shank (2003) suggest that differences in the 
productivity distribution of Germany and American plants could be due to greater experimentation in the 
US.
8 For example, Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei 
Schleifer (2004).
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US firms. With this in mind, consider parameterizing the output elasticities in equation 
(1) as:
J M N E
(II.2)
where DUSA>t denotes that the establishment is owned by a US firm in year t and DMNEit 
denotes that the establishment is owned by a non-US multinational enterprise (the base 
case is that the establishment belongs to a non-multinational domestic UK firm), the 
sub-script h denotes sector (e.g. industries that use IT intensively vs. all other sectors) 
and the super-script J  indicates a particular factor of production (M, L ,K y C). We further 
assume that establishment-specific efficiency can be parameterized as:
where z  are other observable factors influencing productivity - establishment age, region 
and whether the establishment is part of a multi-plant group. The &  are industry-time
where xM = m, etc. Note that the industry*time interactions (&*) control for output 
prices, demand and any other correlated industry specific shock.
9 We also experimented with year-specific four digit dummies and explicit measures of output prices (up 
to the five-digit level) which generated very similar results to the baseline model with year-specific three- 
digit industry dummies.
(II.3)
specific shocks that we will control for with a full set of three-digit industry dummies9 
interacted with a full set of time dummies. So, (combining equations (II. 1) through (II. 
3)) the general form of the production function that we will estimate is:
(II.4)
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Although we will estimate equation (II.4) in some specifications, most of the 
interactions between factor inputs and ownership status are not significantly different 
from zero. One interaction that does stand out is between the US ownership dummy and 
IT capital: the coefficient on computer capital is significantly higher for US 
establishments than for other multinationals and/or domestic establishments. 
Consequently, the preferred specifications are usually of the form:
= a h 'm i, +«»/„ + a f  +a c'°c + a w "h Cit D usac .it  ^ i t
. . s  USA r^USA c MNE r\M N E  t  0 r \0  t ,+ ai +oh Dit + 0A Dit +ohDit + yh zu +$ki +uhJl
where the key hypotheses are whether
c,usa n usA _  n 
ULh EJi{ -  U
and/or
C,USA p^USA _  C,MNE p.M N E  
U h U it h it
(i.e. whether the output elasticity of IT is significantly greater for US establishments).
II. B. Sub-sample o f establishments who are taken over
One concern with the identification strategy is that US firms may “cherry pick” the best 
UK establishments. In other words, it is not US multinational’s internal organization 
that helps improve the productivity of IT but rather the ability to recognize (and take 
over) UK establishments that are better at using IT capital. To tackle this issue, we focus 
on a sub-sample of UK establishments that have been taken over by another firm at 
some point in the sample period. We then estimate equation (5) before and after the 
takeover to investigate whether the IT coefficient changes if a US multinational versus a 
non-US multinational takes over a UK plant. We also investigate the dynamics of 
change: because organizational changes are costly, we should expect to see change 
taking place slowly over time (so we examine how the IT coefficients change one year 
after the takeover compared to two years later, and so on).
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The identification assumption here is not that establishments that are taken over 
are the same as establishments that are not taken over. We condition on a sample of 
establishments who are all taken over at some point in the sample period. We are 
effectively making two assumptions here. First, we assume that US multinationals are 
not systematically taking over plants that are more (or less) productive in their use of 
IT than non-US multinationals. We can empirically test this assumption by examining 
the characteristics (such as the IT level, IT growth and IT productivity) of 
establishments who will be taken over by US multinationals in the pre-takeover period 
(relative to non-US multinationals). We will show that there is no evidence of such 
selection10. Second, we are assuming that US multinationals are not systematically 
better than non-US multinationals at predicting (pre-takeover) the higher future 
productivity of IT for statistically identical British establishments. Although we regard 
this assumption as plausible it is not directly testable. If US managers did possess such 
foresight (and we will show that it is only for post-takeover IT productivity that the US 
takeovers appear to be different than non-US multinational’s takeover), we cannot 
identify this separately from the more general superiority of American firms’ IT usage.
II. C. Unobserved Heterogeneity
In all specifications, we choose a general structure of the error term that allows for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation over time. But, there could still be 
establishment-specific unobserved heterogeneity. So, we also generally include a full set 
of establishment-level fixed effects (the “within-groups” estimator). The fixed-effects 
estimators are more rigorous, as there may be many unobservable omitted variables 
correlated with IT that generate an upwards bias for the coefficient on computer capital.
10 If US multinationals have higher IT productivity why do we not observe some systematic selection o f  
US firms taking over particular UK establishments? In the model we sketch in section IV, for example, 
US firms would want to take over firms who were organized in a similar fashion to themselves (as 
indicated by their prey’s higher IT productivity). It is likely this incentive, however, is small compared to 
the many other causes o f international merger and acquisition activity we observe in the data (which we 
confirm empirically in section III). Allowing for endogenous takeovers is an interesting area for future 
work. Identification o f such a model o f  course requires some instrument which affects takeover 
probabilities without directly affecting productivity.
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II. D. Endogeneity o f  the Factor Inputs
We also were concerned about the endogeneity of the factor inputs attributable to 
unobserved transitory shocks. We take several approaches to deal with this issue. We 
experiment with the “System GMM” estimator of Richard Blundell and Stephen Bond 
(1998) and with a version of the Steve Olley and Ariel Pakes (1996) estimator.
III. Data
The dataset is a panel of establishments covering almost all sectors of the UK private 
sector, called the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). It is similar in structure and content to 
the US Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), which contains detailed information on 
revenues, investment, employment and material inputs. Unlike the US LRD though, the 
ABI can be matched to establishment-level IT expenditure data for several years and it 
also covers the non-manufacturing sector from the mid-1990s onwards. This is 
important, because the majority of the sectors that intensively use IT, such as retailing 
and wholesaling, are outside manufacturing. The dataset is unique in containing such a 
large sample of establishment-level longitudinal information on IT and productivity. A 
full description of the datasets appears in Appendix A.
We build IT capital stocks from IT expenditure flows using the perpetual 
inventory method and following Dale Jorgenson (2001), sticking to US assumptions 
about depreciation rates and hedonic prices. The dataset runs from 1995 through 2003, 
but there are many more observations in each year after 1999. After cleaning, we are left 
with 21,746 observations with positive values for all the factor inputs. There are many 
small and medium-sized establishments in the sample11 - the median establishment 
employs 238 workers and the mean establishment employs 811. The sampling 
framework of the IT surveys means that the sample, on average, contains larger 
establishments than the UK economy as a whole. At rental prices, average IT capital is 
about 1% of gross output at the unweighted mean (1.5% if weighted by size) or 2.5% of
11 Table A2 sets out the basic summary statistics o f the sample.
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value added. These estimates are similar to the UK economy-wide means in Susanto 
Basu et al (2003).
We also considered several experiments by changing the assumptions 
concerning the construction of the IT capital stock. First, because there is uncertainty 
over the exact depreciation rate for IT capital, we experimented with a number of 
alternative values. Second, we do not know the initial IT capital stock for ongoing 
establishments the first time they enter the sample. The baseline method is to impute the 
initial year’s IT stock using as a weight the establishment’s observed IT investment 
relative to the industry IT investment. An alternative is to assume that the plant’s share 
of the industry IT stock is the same as its share of employment in the industry. Finally, 
we use an entirely different measure of IT use based on the number of workers in the 
establishment who use computers (taken from a different survey). Qualitatively similar 
results were obtained from all methods.
We have large numbers of multinational establishments in the sample. About 8% 
of the establishments are US owned, 31% are owned by non-US multinationals and 
61% are purely domestic. Multinationals’ share of employment is even higher and their 
share of output higher still. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the different 
types of ownership, all relative to the three-digit industry average for a typical year 
(2001). Labor productivity, as measured by output per employee, is 24% higher for US 
multinational establishments and 15% higher for non-US multinational establishments. 
This suggests a nine percentage point productivity premium for US establishments as 
compared to other multinationals.12 But US establishments also look systematically 
larger and more intensive in their non-labor input usage than other multinationals. US 
establishments have 14 percentage points more employees and use about 8 percentage 
points more materials/intermediate inputs per employee and 10 percentage points more 
non-IT capital per employee than other multinationals. Most interesting for the purposes 
of this study, though, the largest gap in factor intensity is for IT: US establishments are
12 This is consistent with evidence that the plants o f multinational US firms are more productive both on 
US soil (Mark Doms and Bradford Jensen, 1998) and on foreign soil (Chiara Criscuolo and Ralf Martin 
(2004)).
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32 percentage points more IT intensive than other multinationals. Hence, establishments 
owned by US multinationals are notably more IT-intensive than other multinationals in 
the same industry; this alone could be the reason for their higher productivity in 
previous studies (as they have not been able to control for IT capital). In the 
econometric analysis, we will show that this is not the lull story because for a given 
amount of IT capital US productivity appears to be higher.
IV. Results
IV.A. Main Results
One key result in the paper is that US establishments’ IT use is associated with greater 
productivity than non-US establishments’ IT use. Some indication of this can be seen in 
the raw data. In the first row of Table 2.2 we show that the mean value added per 
worker (normalized by the industry average) in establishments with high IT intensity 
(defined as above the sample median IT capital per worker) compared to those with 
lower IT intensity (below the sample median) is 34% higher among the US owned 
establishments. In the second row, we show that the equivalent “IT premium” is only 
24% for establishments owned by non-US multinationals. The implied “difference in 
differences” effect is a significant US premium in IT productivity of 10%. There are a 
host of reasons why this comparison might be misleading, of course, but as we 
investigate them below it will become clear that the basic contrast in Table 2 turns out to 
be remarkably robust.
In Table 3 we examine the output elasticity of IT in the standard production 
function framework described in Section II. Column (1) estimates the basic production 
function, including dummy variables for whether or not the plant is owned by a US 
multinational (“USA”) or a non-US multinational (“MNE”) with domestic 
establishments being the omitted base. US establishments are 7.1% more productive 
than UK domestic establishments and non-US multinationals are 3.9% more productive. 
This 3.2% difference between the US and non-US multinationals coefficients is also
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significant at the 5% level (p-value =0.02) as shown at the base of the column. This 
implies that about two-thirds (6 percentage points of the 9 percentage point gap) of the 
labor productivity gap between US and other multinationals shown in Table 1 can be 
accounted for by the observables, such as greater non-IT factor intensity in the US 
establishments, but a significant gap remains.
The second column of Table 3 includes the IT capital measure. This enters 
positively and significantly and reduces the coefficients on the ownership dummies. US 
establishments are more IT intensive than other establishments; this explains some of 
the productivity gap. But it only accounts for about 0.2 percentage points of the initial 
3.2% (= 0.0712 - 0.0392) productivity gap between US and non-US establishments. 
Column (3) includes two interaction terms: one between IT capital and the US 
multinational dummy and the other between IT capital and the non-US multinational 
dummy. These turn out to be very revealing. The interaction between the US dummy 
and IT capital is positive and significant at conventional levels. According to column (3) 
doubling the IT stock is associated with an increase in productivity of 5.35% (= 0.0449 
+ 0.0086) for a US multinational but only 4.5% (= 0.0449 + 0.0001) for a non-US 
multinational. Note that non-US multinationals are not significantly different from 
domestic UK establishments in this respect: we cannot reject the possibility that the 
coefficients on IT are equal for domestic UK establishments and non-US multinationals. 
It is the US establishments that are distinctly different. Furthermore, the linear US 
dummy is not significantly different from zero. Interpreted literally, this means that we 
can “account” for all of the US multinational advantage by their more effective use of 
IT. Hypothetically, US establishments with less than about £1,000 (about $2,000) of IT 
capital (i.e. ln(C) = 0) are no more productive than their UK counterparts (none of the 
US establishments in the sample have IT spending this low, of course).
To investigate the industries that appear to account for the majority of the 
productivity acceleration in the US we split the sample into “high IT using intensive 
sectors” in column (4) and “Other sectors” in column (5). Sectors that use IT intensively 
account for most of the US productivity growth between 1995 and 2003. These include
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retail, wholesale and printing/publishing13. The US interaction with IT capital is much 
stronger in the IT intensive sectors, in that it is not significantly different from zero in 
the other sectors (even though we have twice as many observations in those industries). 
The final three columns include a full set of establishment fixed effects. The earlier 
pattern of results is repeated with a higher value of the interaction than in the non-fixed 
effects results. In particular, column (7) demonstrates that US establishments appear to 
have significantly higher productivity of their IT capital stocks than domestic 
establishments or other multinationals. A doubling of the IT capital stock is associated 
with 1% higher productivity for a domestic establishment and 1.6% for a non-US 
multinational, but 3.9% higher productivity for an establishment owned by a US 
multinational14.
The reported US*IT interaction tests for significant differences in the output-IT 
elasticity between US multinationals and UK domestic establishments. However, note 
that in the key specifications the IT coefficient for US multinationals is significantly 
different from the IT coefficient for other multinationals. The row at the bottom of Table 
3 reports the p-value of tests on the equality between the US*IT and the MNE*IT 
coefficient (i.e. \{o:aE,USA D t^SA = a E,MNE D ^ E )•
IV.B. Robustness Tests
Table 4 presents a series of tests showing the robustness of the main results - we focus 
on the fixed effects specification, which is the most demanding, and on the IT intensive
13 See Appendix Table A l for a full list. We follow the same definitions o f  the sectors that intensively use 
IT as Kevin Stiroh (2002). We group the IT producing sectors (like semi-conductors) with the “Other 
Sectors” because we could not find significant differences in the IT coefficient between US and non-US 
firms. This is consistent with the aggregate evidence that the productivity acceleration in these sectors 
was similar in Europe and the US.
14 The linear US dummy is negative and significant, implying that US multinationals with very low IT 
stocks are less productive than domestic establishments. However, using the estimates o f column (4) only 
2% o f  the employees o f  US multinationals are in these plants (5% using column (7)). Moreover, we show 
that when US firms take over an establishment’s productivity can remain low for a year or two during the 
restructuring process, explaining the negative direct US dummy given the short time dimension o f the 
sample.
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sectors, which we have shown to be crucial in driving the result. The first column 
represents the baseline production function results from column (7) in Table 3. The 
results were similar if we use value-added-based specifications (see column (2)), so we 
stay with the more general specification using gross output as the dependent variable.
Transfer Pricing - Since we are using multinational data, could transfer pricing be a 
reason for the results we obtain? If US firms shifted more of their accounting profits to 
the UK than other multinationals this could cause us to over-estimate their productivity. 
But this would suggest that the factor coefficients on other inputs, particularly on 
materials, also would be systematically different for US establishments. To test this, 
column (3) estimates the production function with a full set of interactions between the 
US multinational dummy and all the factor inputs (and the non-US multinational 
dummy and all the factor inputs). None of the additional non-IT factor input interactions 
are individually significant, and the joint test at the bottom of the column of the 
additional interactions shows that they are jointly insignificant (for example, the joint 
test of the all the US interactions except the IT interaction has a p-value of 0.48). We 
cannot reject the specification of equation (5) in column (1) as a good representation of 
the data versus the more general interactive models of equation (4) in column (3).15 This 
experiment also rejects the general idea that the productivity advantage of the US is 
attributable to differential mark-ups, because then we would expect to see significantly 
different coefficients on all the factor inputs, not just on the IT variable (Tor Klette and 
Zvi Griliches, 1996).
Another piece of evidence against the transfer pricing story is that the results are 
strongest in the IT-using sectors, which are mainly services, like retail. Manipulating the 
transfer prices of intermediate inputs is more difficult in services than manufacturing, as 
intermediate inputs generally are purchased from independent suppliers. If we estimate
15 The p-value = 0.33 on this test. We also investigated whether the coefficients in the production function 
regressions differ by ownership type and sector (IT intensive or not). Running the six separate regressions 
(three ownership types by two sectors) we found the F-test rejected at the 1% level the pooling o f  the US 
multinationals with the other firms in the IT intensive sectors. In the non-IT intensive sectors, by contrast, 
the pooling restrictions were not rejected. Details from the authors on request.
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the model solely for the retail sector, for example, the coefficient on the US*IT 
interaction is 0.0509 with a standard error of 0.0118 (the interaction of other 
multinationals with IT has a coefficient of -0.0142 with a standard error of 0.0096).
Systematic mismeasurement o f American establishments ’IT  capital stock - One concern 
is that we may be underestimating the true IT stock of US multinationals in the initial 
year: this could generate a positive coefficient on the interaction term, because of 
greater measurement error of IT capital for the US establishments. This also could be 
due to transfer price concerns, causing the US firms to underestimate their IT 
expenditure for some reason.
To tackle this issue we turn to an alternative IT survey (the E-commerce Survey, 
described in the Appendix) that has data on the proportion of workers in the 
establishment who are using computers. This is a pure “stock” measure so it is 
unaffected by the initial conditions concern16. In Column (4) the IT capital stock 
measure is replaced with a measure of the number of workers using computers. 
Reassuringly, we still find a positive and significant coefficient on the US interaction 
with computer usage.
Functional Forms - We tried including a much broader set of interactions and higher 
order terms (a “translog” specification) but these were generally individually 
insignificant. Column (5) shows the results of including all the pair-wise interactions of 
materials, labor, IT capital, and non-IT capital and the square of each of these factors. 
The additional terms are jointly significant but the key US interaction with the IT term 
remains basically unchanged (it falls slightly from 0.0278 to 0.0268) and remains 
significant.
16 The IT capital stock measure is theoretically more appropriate as it is built analogously to the non-IT 
stock and is comparable to best practice existing work. The E-Commerce Survey is available for three 
years (2001 to 2003), but the vast majority o f the sample is observed only for one period, so we do not 
control for fixed effects.
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Selection o f US establishments into sectors with high IT  productivity - Another possible 
explanation for the apparently higher productivity of IT is that US multinationals may 
be disproportionately represented in specific industries in which the output elasticity of 
IT is particularly high. The interaction of IT capital with the US dummy then would 
capture omitted industry characteristics rather than a “true” effect linked to US 
ownership. To test for this potential bias, the regression includes as an additional control 
the percentage of US multinationals in the specific four-digit industry (“USA IND”)17 
and its interaction with IT. The interaction was positive but statistically insignificant 
(see column (6)), and the coefficient on the IT*US interaction remains significant and 
largely unchanged.
Skills - In column (7), we considered the role of skills. The main control for labor 
quality in Table 3 was the inclusion of establishment-specific fixed effects which, so 
long as labor quality does not change too much over time, should control for the omitted 
human capital variable. As an alternative, we assume that wages reflect marginal 
products of workers, so that conditioning on the average wage in the establishment is 
sufficient to control for human capital18. The average wage is highly significant and the 
interaction between the average wage and IT capital is positive and significant at the 
10% level, consistent with technology-skill complementarity. The interaction between 
the US dummy and average wages in the establishment is insignificant (a coefficient of 
0.0365 and a standard error of 0.0403)19. Nevertheless, even in the presence of these
17 The variable is constructed as an average between 1995 and 2003 and is built using the whole ABI 
population.
18 The problem is that wages may control for “too much”, as some proportion o f wages may be related to 
non-human capital variables. For example, in many bargaining models, firms with high productivity will 
reward even homogenous workers with higher wages (for example, see John Van Reenen, 1996, on 
sharing the quasi-rents from new technologies).
19 As an alternative we matched in education information by aggregating up individual level survey (the 
Labor Force Survey) into industry by regional cells. In the specifications without fixed effects, there was 
some evidence for a positive and significant interaction between skills and IT consistent with 
complementarity between technology and human capital. The US*IT capital interaction remained 
significant. Including fixed effects, however, renders the skills variables and their interactions 
insignificant (even though US*IT interaction remains significant). Interactions between the US dummy 
and skills were insignificant in all specifications.
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skills controls, the coefficient on the US ownership and IT interaction remains 
significantly positive.
Stronger selection effects fo r  US multinationals because o f greater distance from the 
UK - A further issue is that US firms may be more productive in the UK because the US 
is geographically further away than the average non-US multinational’s home base (in 
the data most foreign multinationals are European if they are not American) and only 
the most productive firms are able to overcome the fixed costs of distance. To test this 
we divide the non-US multinational dummy into European versus non-European firms. 
Under the distance argument, the non-European firms would have to be more 
productive to be able to set up greenfield establishments in the UK. According to 
column (8) though, the European and non-European multinationals are statistically 
indistinguishable from each other; again, it is the US multinationals that appear to be 
different.
Unmeasured software inputs fo r  US establishments - Could the US*IT interaction effect 
reflect greater unmeasured software inputs for US establishments? Although this is 
certainly possible when we compare US multinationals with domestic establishments it 
is less likely when we compare US multinationals with non-US multinationals because 
a priori there is no reason to believe that they have higher levels of software. It could, 
however, be a problem if US firms were globally larger than other multinationals 
(software has a large fixed cost component so will be cheaper per unit for larger firms 
than smaller firms). To address this issue, we included a measure of the “global size” of 
the multinational parent of the establishments. In the UK ABI data, US multinationals 
and non-US multinationals are similar in their median global employment size. As a 
more direct test, we introduce an explicit interaction term between the global size of the 
parent firm (defined as the log of the total number of worldwide employees) and IT 
capital in a specification identical to baseline specification in column (1) of Table 4. The 
interaction between global size and IT is insignificant and the US interaction with IT
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remained significant (at the 1% level) and significantly different from the non-US 
multinational interaction with IT at the 10% level20.
We also used a measure of software capital constructed analogously to the main 
IT capital variable (see Appendix A). In the data, software expenditure includes a charge 
for software acquired from the multinational’s parent. The IT capital interaction is 
robust to the inclusion of this measure of software capital (and its interaction with 
ownership status). For example, when we added software capital to a specification 
identical to column (1) of Table 4 the standard IT interaction with the US remained 
positive and significant21.
So the evidence does not appear to support a large role for unmeasured software 
inputs driving the superior US productivity of IT. But even if this did play some role, it 
would still leave the puzzle of why US firms have so much higher software inputs than 
other multinationals. Commercial software is available globally and is costless to 
transport. One could argue that US firms have access to a better pool of computer 
programmers, for example from Silicon Valley, and these develop more advanced in- 
house software.22 But even if this were true, market forces would rapidly provide this 
commercially if it had such a large positive effect on productivity. The model presented 
below in section IV offers one explanation of why the US may have “moved first” in 
organizational change based on lower labor market regulations: it is less clear why this 
should have been the case for software.
Controlling for endogenous inputs -  We also estimated the production functions to 
control for the endogeneity of factor inputs using the GMM “System” estimator of
20 The global size variable was only available for a sub-sample o f  3,000 observations (from the baseline 
sample o f  7,784). When we re-ran the baseline specification on this smaller sub-sample, the US 
interaction with IT was 0.032 (instead o f 0.028 in the baseline) and significant at the 5% level. When we 
include the global size term the point estimate rose to 0.036 (the point estimate on the global size 
interaction was -0.0017). We are very grateful to Ralf Martin and Chiara Criscuolo for matching in the 
data.
21 The IT hardware capital interaction had a coefficient o f 0.0263 with a standard error o f 0.0118.
22 There is, o f  course, a highly successful European software industry, including firms like SAP that 
provides global enterprise application software.
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Blundell and Bond (1998) and the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator. The full results are 
shown in Appendix Table A3. In both cases the main finding - that the output-elasticity 
of IT for US multinationals is much larger than the output-elasticity of IT for non-US 
multinationals - is robust, even though the coefficients are estimated less precisely than 
under the baseline within-groups estimates.23
IV  C. US Multinational Takeovers o f  UK establishments
One possible explanation for the results is that US firms “cherry pick” the best UK 
establishments, that is, those that already have the highest productivity of IT. This 
would generate the positive interaction we find but it would be due entirely to selection 
on unobserved heterogeneity rather than to higher IT productivity caused by US 
ownership. To look at this issue, we examined the sub-sample of establishments that 
were, at some point in the sample period, taken over by another firm. We considered 
both US and non-US acquirers. Because of the high rate of merger and acquisition 
activity in the UK, this is a large sample (4,888 observations)24.
In column (1) of Table 5, we start by estimating the standard production 
functions, for all establishments that are eventually taken over in their pre-takeover 
years (this is labelled “before takeover”). The coefficients on the observable factor 
inputs are very similar to those for the whole sample in column (2) of Table 3. Unlike 
the full sample, though, the US and non-US ownership dummies are insignificant, 
suggesting that the establishments taken over by multinationals are not ex ante more 
productive than those acquired by domestic UK firms.
23 The coefficient on the US*IT interaction in the GMM system estimator is 0.118 with a standard error o f  
0.064 and this is significantly different from the non-US multinational interaction at the 10% level. The 
underlying theoretical model o f Olley-Pakes does not allow us to simply include interactions, so we 
estimated the production function separately for the three ownership types (US multinationals, non-US 
multinationals and domestic UK establishments). The output-IT elasticity for US multinationals is twice 
as large as that o f  non-US multinationals.
24 We have a larger number o f  observations “post-takeover” than “pre-takeover” as there was a takeover 
wave at the beginning o f the sample in the late 1990s associated with the stock market bubble and high 
tech boom. For these establishments, we necessarily have a lot more post takeover information than pre- 
takeover information.
55
In column (2) of Table 5 we interact the IT capital stock with a US and a non-US 
multinational ownership dummy, again estimated on the pre-takeover data. We see that 
neither interaction is significant -  that is before establishments are taken over by US 
firms they do not have unusually high IT coefficients. So, US firms also do not appear 
to be selecting establishments that already provide higher IT productivity. In columns 
(3) and (4) we estimate production function specifications identical to columns (1) and 
(2) but on the post-takeover sample. In column (3), the non-US and US multinational 
ownership coefficients are positive and significant. Thus, a transfer of ownership from 
domestic to multinational production is associated with an increase in productivity, 
particularly for a move to US ownership.
Column (4) is the key result for Table 5. It contains the estimates of a 
specification that allows the IT capital stock coefficient to vary by ownership status for 
the /?osf-takeover sample. For the post-takeover period we indeed see that the 
interaction between IT and the US dummy is positive and significant at the 5% level but 
is insignificant for non-US multinationals. Hence, after a takeover by a US 
multinational, an establishment enjoys significantly higher IT-related productivity than a 
statistically similar establishment taken over by a non-US multinational. Note that the 
inclusion of the US interaction with IT also drives the coefficient on the linear US 
multinational term into insignificance, suggesting that the main reason for the improved 
performance of establishments after a US takeover is linked to the increased IT 
productivity (just as we saw in Table 3 for the whole sample). The fifth column of Table 
5 breaks down the post takeover period into the first year after the takeover and the 
subsequent years (note that throughout the table we drop the takeover year itself as we 
cannot determine the exact timing within the year when the takeover occurred). The 
greater productivity of IT capital in establishments taken over by US multinationals is 
revealed only two and three years after takeover (this interaction is significant at the 5% 
level whereas the interaction in the first year is insignificant). This is consistent with the 
idea that US firms take some time to restructure before obtaining higher productivity
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gains from IT. Domestic and other multinationals again reveal no pattern, with all 
dummies and interactions remaining insignificant.25
The sample in Table 5 includes some firms that are taken over by domestic UK 
firms, so a stronger test is to drop these and consider only takeovers by multinational 
firms. In column (6) we replicate the specification of column (5) for this smaller sample 
and again find that establishments taken over by US multinationals have a significantly 
higher coefficient on IT capital after two or more years than non-multinational 
takeovers.
As another cut on the cherry-picking concept we ran linear probability models of 
US takeovers where the dependent variable was equal to one for establishments taken 
over by a US firm and otherwise zero. There is no evidence that US firms are more 
likely to take over establishments that are more IT intensive, or that establishments are 
increasing their IT intensity (see Appendix Table A4 for full results)26.
V. Interpretation of the Results
We have established that foreign affiliates of US firms appear more productive than 
affiliates of other multinationals and that this productivity advantage appears to be 
linked strongly to their use of IT, suggesting an unobserved complementary input that is 
more abundant in US firms. The literature suggests that one candidate for this 
complementary input may be the internal organization of US firms.
In section V.A, we present some survey data to corroborate the idea that US 
firms have distinctive organizational features. We also suggest that a potential 
explanation for such differences can be found in specific policies - such as restrictive 
labour market regulations - which may inhibit organizational change. Some direct
25 Taken literally, the negative coefficient on the US linear term in column (4) implies a negative US 
effect for firms with IT capital below approximatively £4,500 ($9,000). Only 0.1% of employment in US 
establishments is below this threshold.
26 For example, the marginal effect o f (lagged) IT capital in the US takeover equation was 0.0029 with a 
standard error o f  0.0095 (we included controls for size, non-IT intensity, productivity, age and industry 
dummies -  none o f which were significant).
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evidence on this hypothesis using explicit measures of labor market regulation are 
presented in sub-section IV.B.
V.A. The Organization o f  US firms
In this section we consider some supporting evidence on the different internal 
organization of US versus European firms. In Figure 3, panels 3a and 3b provide new 
evidence we collected on the internal organization of over 700 firms in the US and 
Europe. These show that, on average, firms operating in the US are significantly more 
decentralized than those operating in Europe.27 This is also true when looking at US 
multinationals in Europe compared to non-US multinationals in Europe, with the US 
firms again being significantly more decentralized. In Panels 3c and 3d we use two 
other UK surveys, the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey and the Community 
Innovation Survey, to show that US multinationals also had a higher rate of change in 
organizational structure going back to the mid-1980s. So, in short, US firms are 
organized differently, both at home and abroad, and also change organizational 
structures more swiftly.
V.B. A little “direct evidence ” on the model
In this sub-section we consider some more direct evidence that the different ability of 
European firms may be linked to institutions that generate organizational inflexibility, 
such as tight labor market regulations.
Christopher Gust and Jaime Marquez (2004) show that an employment 
protection index is negatively correlated with country-wide IT expenditure as a share of 
GDP for thirteen OECD countries. We suggests that these regulations may be partially 
“exported” to the multinational’s establishments in the UK . To examine this idea we 
match in the World Bank’s measure of the flexibility of labor regulation to the 
establishments in the dataset by country of ownership, which is shown in Figure 4. So, 
for example, the Germany data point plots the labor regulation index in Germany
27 See Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) for details on the survey. Decentralization was measured in the 
same way as Timothy Bresnahan et al (2002) using questions related to task allocation and pace setting in 
order to indicate the degree o f employee autonomy.
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against the IT intensity for establishments owned by German multinationals. We find 
that the IT intensity of multinational affiliates is higher in the UK when labor market 
flexibility is greater in their home country (the correlation coefficient between IT 
intensity and labor market flexibility is 0.0579 and is significant at the 1% level)28.
More ambitiously, Table 6 presents regressions based on the multinational-only 
sample where we include interactions with labor market regulation of the 
multinational’s home country and the establishment’s IT capital. The first column 
includes only the standard production function controls (i.e. it drops the ownership 
variables) and includes the index of the flexibility of labor regulation. The coefficient on 
the flexibility index is positive and significant suggesting higher TFP for multinationals 
whose home country has more flexible labor markets. The next column repeats the 
baseline specification of column (1) in Table 4 and shows that the standard results hold 
on this sample. In particular, the interaction between the US dummy and IT capital is 
significantly positive. In column (3) we include instead the interaction between labor 
regulation (in the multinational’s home country) and IT. The coefficient on this 
interaction is also significantly positive: lighter regulations in the establishment’s home 
country appear to be associated with greater productivity of IT in the UK. We repeat the 
specifications of columns (2) and (3) including fixed effects in columns (4) and (5) and 
show the robustness of the results. Ideally, we would like to show that the US 
interaction is driven to insignificance by on the interaction of IT with the labor 
regulation index. This is not the case; in column (6) when we include both interactions 
these are positive but individually insignificant29.
VI. Conclusion
Using a large and original establishment level panel dataset we find robust evidence that 
IT has a positive and significant correlation with productivity even after controlling for
28 When we drop all the observations from US multinationals the correlation coefficient is 0.0351 
(significant at the 10% level).
29 The interactions are jointly significant at the 10% level.
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many factors, including establishment fixed effects. The most novel result, however, is 
that we can account for the US multinational advantage in productivity by the higher 
productivity of their IT capital. Furthermore, the stronger association of IT with 
productivity for US firms is confined to the same “IT using intensive” industries that 
largely accounted for the US “productivity miracle” since the mid 1990s. These results 
were robust to examining establishments that were taken over by other firms: US firms 
who took over establishments have significantly greater IT productivity relative to non- 
US multinationals who took over statistically similar establishments.
US firms appear to obtain significantly higher productivity from their IT capital 
than other multinational establishments (and domestic establishments), even in the 
context of a UK environment. This suggests that part of the IT-related productivity gains 
underlying the recent US “productivity miracle” may be related to US firm 
characteristics rather than simply the natural advantage (geographical, institutional or 
otherwise) of being located in the US environment.
There are many outstanding issues and research questions. First, according to the 
model the US is not always superior. Rather, it is the flexibility of the US economy in 
adapting to major changes (such as the IT revolution) that gives it a temporary 
productivity advantage. This model predicts that Europe will start to realize enhanced 
IT-enabled productivity growth over the next few years and resume the catching up 
process with the US that was observed until the mid 1990s. There may be some 
evidence of this occurring as Europe’s productivity growth in 2006 picked up as 
America’s slowed slightly30. Of course, if the world economy has moved into a stage of 
development where technology-related turbulence is inherently greater, then the more 
flexible US will retain an edge over Europe for the foreseeable future.
Second, it would be desirable to confront the model more directly with measures 
of organization and IT. This paper has looked at the consequences of organizational 
change on “standard” observables (although IT is also rarely observed at the micro 
level). A follow-up study to Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen (2006) has collected data
30 The Economist, April 14th 2007, Economic Focus “Making Less With More”
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from several thousand firms on internal organizational structure, management and IT 
across eleven countries. We can use this data to directly examine some o f the model’s 
implications. Thirdly, we would like to understand the determinants of decentralization 
and other organizational design features of firms in much more detail.
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Figure 1: O u tp u t p e r h our in E urope and the US, 1980-2005
inco
co
in
CM
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Notes: The dotted line is the US, the continuous line is Europe. Productivity measured by GDP per hour 
in 2005 US $ PPPs. The countries included in the “EU 15” group are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, UK, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
Netherlands. Labor productivity per hour worked in 2005 US$. Source: The Conference Board and 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database.
Figure 2: IT capital per hour in Europe and the US, 1980-2005
co
1980 1985 1990 2000 20051995
year
Notes: The dotted line is the US, the continuous line is Europe. IT capital stock (in unit dollars) per hour 
worked. IT capital stock measured using perpetual inventory method and common assumptions on 
hedonics and depreciation. 2005 US $ PPPs. The countries included in the “EU 15” group are: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, UK, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the Netherlands. Labour productivity per hour worked in 2005 US$ using PPPs. Source: 
Marcel P. Timmer, Gerard Ypma and Bart van Ark, “IT in the European Union: Driving Productivity 
Convergence?”, Research Memorandum GD-67, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, October 
2003, Appendix Tables, updated June 2005.
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Figure 3a: Organizational devolvement, 
firms by country of location
Figure 3c: Organizational change in the 
UK during 1981-1990
E uropean Firms Domestic Firms
US Firms Non-US Multinationals
US Multinationals
Figure 3b: Organizational devolvement, 
firms by country of ownership
Dom estic Firms, In Europe
Non-US Multinational 
subsidiaries, in Europe
US Multinational 
subsidiaries, in Europe
4.11
3.67
4.87
Figure 3d: Organizational change in the 
UK during 1998-2000
Domestic Firms
Non-US Multinationals
US Multinationals
0.66
0.77
Motes, in Fsguras 3a and 3b the “Organizational devolvement* score is the average score ter the 2 organization el questions for 548 firms in the US (210). 
UK (08) and France and Germany (231). The questions are taken exactly from Breanahan at al. (2002) covering *Task allocation* and “Pace salting* where 
a  higher scores indicate greater worker autonomy. Full survey details in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). In Figure 3c the source is the WIRS data (1984 
and 1980) which plots the proportion of establishments experiencing organizations! change in previous 3 years (all establishments in the UK). US MNEs 
(N»190), Non-US MNEs (N-147), Domestic (N*2848) Senior manager is asked 'whether there has been any change in work organization not involving 
new plant/equipment in the past three years*. In Figure 3d the source is the CIS date: we plot the proportion of establishments experiencing organizational 
or managerial change in previous 3 years The firm is asked "Did your enterprise make major changes m die following areas of busrness structure and 
practices during die three year period 1&9&-2001T with answers to either *Advanced Management techniques’ or 'Mafor changes in organizational 
structure' recorded as an organizational change
Figure 4: IT  In tensity  and the Flexibility of L ab o u r R egulations
#  Belgium (17)
•  Japan (153)
•  USA (781)
Switzerland (87)
.U K  (,344)
•  France (202) •  Germany (254) •D enm ark (22) • C a n a d a (27)
•  Netherlands (218)
•  Sweden (51)
^  •  Finland (15)
•  South Africa (12)
c
i-----------------------------------------------1---------------------------------------------- 1---------------------------------------------- 1----------
.4 .6 .8 1
World Bank Flexibility of Employment Index 
(0=Most Strict Labour Regulations; 1=Most Flexible Labour Regulations)
Notes: The sample includes only establishments o f multinationals in IT using sectors. Each point 
represents average IT intensity (IT capital divided by employment normalized by the three digit industry 
average) by country. Each country average is based on at least ten observations and three digit industries 
with fewer than 10 observations are excluded. The labour regulation index is the “Rigidity of 
Employment” index, drawn from the World Bank “Doing Business” report.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics Broken Down by Multinational Status 
(Normalized to 100 for the three digit industry-year average)
US
Multinatio
nals
Mean
Employme
nt
162.26
Value 
added per 
Employee
127.96
Gross 
output per 
Employee
123.63
Non IT 
Capital 
per 
Employee
129.61
Materials
per
Employee
123.81
IT Capital 
per 
Employee
152.13
St. Dev. 297.58 163.17 104.81 133.91 123.35 234.41
Obs 569 569 569 569 569 569
Other
Multinatio
nals
Mean 148.58 113.71 115.22 120.65 116.02 119.58
St. Dev. 246.35 107.87 86.50 126.83 107.63 180.34
Obs 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119
UK
domestic
Mean 68.78 89.86 89.69 86.33 89.29 83.95
St. Dev. 137.72 104.50 102.09 127.16 129.37 188.30
Obs 4433 4433 4433 4433 4433 4433
Notes: These are 2001 values from the sample o f 7,121 establishments.
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Table 2 -  Difference in Differences
Labor Productivity in establishments owned by US multinationals and by non-US
multinationals
High IT intensity 
Establishments
Low IT intensity 
Establishments
Diff
US Multinationals 3.893 3.557 0336***
(0.742) (0.698) (0.043)
1076 729
Other Multinationals 3.711 3.473 0338***
(0.756) (0.664) (0.022)
4014 2827
Diff 0.182*** 0.084**
(0.036) (0.037)
Diff in Diffs 0.098**
(0.048)
Notes: Productivity is measured as ln(Value Added per Employee). “High IT intensity establishments” are 
observations where the ratio o f  IT capital to employment (demeaned by the three-digit industry and year 
average) is greater than the median. 8,646 Observations; only multinationals considered. Standard errors 
are clustered by establishment.
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Table 3 -  Production Function Allowing the I.T. Coefficient to Differ By Ownership Status
Dependent
variable:
ln(Output)
Sectors
Fixed effects 
USA*ln(C)
USA ownership*lT 
capital
MNE*ln(C)
Non-US multinational 
*IT capital
Ln(C)
IT capital
(2)
ln(Q)
NO
(0.0024)
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Q)
All Sectors
In(Q)
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors
In(Q)
Other
Sectors
In(Q)
All Sectors
ln(Q)
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors
ln(Q)
Other
Sectors
NO NO NO YES YES YES
0.0086* 0.0196** 0.0033 0.0049 0.0278*** -0.0085
(0.0048) (0.0078) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0105) (0.0071)
0.0001 -0.003 0.0037 0.0042 0.0055 0.0034
(0.003) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0052) (0.0044)
0.0449*** 0.0399*** 0.0472*** 0.0146*** 0.0114** 0.0150***
(0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0034)
Ln(M) 0.5474*** 0.5475*** 0.6212*** 0.5065*** 0.4032*** 0.5020*** 0.3605***
Materials (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0142) (0.0104) (0.0178) (0.028) (0.0209)
Ln(K) 0.1268*** 0.1268*** 0.1108*** 0.1458*** 0.0902*** 0.1064*** 0.0664***
Non-IT Capital (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0094) (0.0092) (0.0159) (0.0229) (0.0209)
Ln(L) 0.2690*** 0.2688*** 0.2179*** 0.2869*** 0.2917*** 0.2475*** 0.3108***
Labor (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0102) (0.0076) (0.0173) (0.0326) (0.0195)
USA 0.0642*** 0.0151 -0.0824* 0.0641* -0.011 -0.1355* 0.0472
USA Ownership (0.0135) (0.0277) (0.0438) (0.0354) (0.0424) (0.0768) (0.0405)
MNE 0.0339***
Non-US multinational (0.0078)
O bservation  s 21746
Test
USA*ln(C)=MNE* 
ln(C), p-value 
Test USA=MNE, 
p-value_____________ 0.0203
0.0338** 0.0325 0.0194
(0.0161) (0.0241) (0.0214)
21746 7784 13962
0.0944 0.0048 0.9614
0.5198 0.0108 0.2296
-0.0162 -0.016 -0.0204
(0.0198) (0.0327) (0.0254)
21746 7784 13962
0.9208 0.0403 0.134
0.9072 0.1227 0.9665
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all 
columns is the log o f gross output. The time period is 1995-2003. The estimation method in all columns is 
OLS. Columns (6) to (8) include establishment level fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets under 
coefficients in all columns are clustered by establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation o f unknown form). All columns include a full set o f  three digit industry dummies 
interacted with a full set o f time dummies and as additional controls: dummies for establishment age 
(interacted with a manufacturing dummy), region, multi-establishment group (interacted with ownership 
type) and IT survey. See Appendix Table A1 for definition o f  IT using intensive sectors. “Test 
USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C)” is test o f whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C) is significantly different from 
the coefficient on MNE*ln(C), etc.
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Table 4 - Robustness Checks on the Production Function
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experiment 
Dependent var:
Baseline
Specification
Value Added All Inputs Alternative 
Interacted IT measure 
with US 
and MNE
Full
“Translog”
interactions
% USA in 
4 digit 
industry
Wages as a 
proxy for 
skills
EUand 
Non EU 
MNEs
In(Output) ln(Q) ln(VA) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q)
USA*ln(C) 0.0278*** 0.0604** 0.0328** 0.0711** 0.0268*** 0.0270** 0.0208** 0.0283***
USA ownership*IT 
capital
(0.0105) (0.0245) (0.0141) (0.0294) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.00%) (0.0105)
MNE*ln(C) 0.0055 -0.0070 0.0002 0.0056 0.0028 0.0050 0.0021 -
Non-US
multinationaI*lT
capital
(0.0052) (0.0142) (0.0065) (0.0131) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0047)
Ln(C) 0.0114** 0.0263** 0.0126** 0.0285*** 0.0327 0.0090* -0.0227 0.0114**
IT capital (0.0047) (0.0106) (0.0050) (0.0083) (0.0463) (0.0048) (0.0163) (0.0047)
Ln(M) 0.5020*** - 0.4925*** 0.6390*** 0.2779 0.5017*** 0.4455*** 0.5023***
Materials (0.0280) (0.0312) (0.0195) (0.2225) (0.0279) (0.0296) (0.0278)
Ln(K) 0.1064*** 0.2157*** 0.1075*** 0.1390*** 0.2686** 0.1070*** 0.0767*** 0.1063***
Non-IT Capital (0.0229) (0.0546) (0.0228) (0.0170) (0.1255) (0.0230) (0.0216) (0.0229)
Ln(L) 0.2475*** 0.4835*** 0.2530*** 0.2171*** 0.3002 0.2472*** 0.3958*** 0.2472***
Labor (0.0326) (0.0571) (0.0343) (0.0140) (0.2095) (0.0329) (0.0361) (0.0325)
USA -0.1355* -0.3552** -0.2734 -0.0125 -0.1419** -0.1323* -0.0967 -0.1374*
USA Ownership (0.0768) (0.1492) (0.2578) (0.1113) (0.0683) (0.0763) (0.0739) (0.0769)
MNE -0.0160 0.0733 -0.0489 -0.0087 -0.0112 -0.0148 -0.0010
Non-US multinational (0.0327) (0.0855) (0.1687) (0.0758) (0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0309)
USA*ln(M)
USA
ownership* materials
0.0335
(0.0376)
MNE*ln(M)
Non-US multinational 
•materials
0.0080
(0.0235)
USA*In(K)
USA ownership*Non 
IT capital
0.0242
(0.0368)
' ' '
MNE*ln(K)
Non-US multinational 
•Non IT capital
-0.0142
(0.0134)
USA*ln(L)
USA
ownership*Employme
nt
-0.0767
(0.0497)
MNE*ln(L)
Non-US multinational 
•Employment
- - 0.0193
(0.0239)
- - - - -
USA IND 
[% of US 
Multinationals in 
industry]
0.9194
(23378)
USA_IND*ln(C) - - - - - 0.3607 - -
[•/•of US (0.4119)
Multinationals in 
industry]*IT capital
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In(Wage)
Average wage 
ln(Wage)*In(C)
A v e r a g e  W a g e M T  
capital
EU MNE 
EU ownership
NON-EU MNE 
Non EU-NON USA 
Ownership
EU MNE*ln(C)
EU ownership*IT 
Capital
NON EU MNE*ln(C) 
Non EU-NON USA 
Ownership*IT capital
(7)
0.2137***
(0.0407)
0.0109*
(0.0056)
(8)
-0.0328
(0.0354)
-0.0066
(0.0910)
0.0065
(0.0051)
-0.0079
(0.0158)
Observations 7784 7784 7784 2196 7784 7784 7780 7784
Test
USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C 
), p-value 0.0403 0.0122 0.0224 0.0122 0.0244 0.0288 0.0575
Test USA=MNE, p- 
value 0.1227 0.007 0.3618 0.007 0.0602 0.1288 0.1982
Test on joint 
significance of all the 
interaction terms, 
excluding IT 
interactions (p-value) 0.3288
Test on joint 
significance of all tbe 
US interaction terms, 
excluding IT (p-value} 0.4837
Test on all the other 
MNE's interaction 
terms, excluding IT (p- 
value) 0.3838
Test on additional 
“translog” terms, p- 
value 0.0000
Test USA=EU, p-value - - - - - - - 0.2072
Test USA=NON EU, 
p-value 0.2500
Test
USA*ln(C)=EU*ln(C),
p-value 0.0457
Test USA*ln(C)=NON 
EU*ln(C), p-value _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0511
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all 
columns is the log o f  gross output. All columns are for the sectors that use IT intensively only. The time 
period is 1995-2003. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. All columns except (4) include 
establishment level fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets under coefficients in all columns are 
clustered by establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation o f unknown form). All 
columns include a full set o f three digit industry dummies interacted with a full set o f time dummies and 
as additional controls: dummies for establishment age (interacted with a manufacturing dummy), region, 
multi-establishment group (interacted with ownership type) and IT survey (except column (4)). The IT 
measure in column (4) is the log(number o f people using computers). We also include interactions o f  the 
US dummy (and the MNE dummy) with ln(labor) in this column. Column (5) includes all the pair-wise 
interactions o f materials, labor, IT capital, and non-IT capital and the square o f  each o f these factors. 
Column (6) includes the percentage o f  non-US multinationals in the establishment’s four digit industry. 
“Test USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C)” is test o f whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C) is significantly different 
from the coefficient on MNE*ln(C), etc.
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Table 5 - Production Functions Before and After Takeovers
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After
Sample Beforetakeover
Before
takeover
After
takeover
After
takeover
After
takeover
takeover 
(drop UK 
domestic 
acquirers)
Dependent Variable: In(Output) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q)
USA*ln(C)
USA Takeover*IT capital
- -0.0322
(0.0277)
- 0.0224**
(0.0102)
- -
MNE*ln(C)
Non-US multinational Takeover*IT capital
- -0.0159
(0.0118)
- 0.0031
(0.0079)
- -
USA
USA Takeover
-0.0031
(0.0335)
0.1634
(0.1357)
0.0827***
(0.0227)
-0.0345
(0.0550)
- -
MNE
Non-US multinational Takeover
-0.0221
(0.0226)
0.0572
(0.0598)
0.0539***
(0.0188)
0.0412
(0.0380)
- -
USA*ln(C) one year 
after takeover
- - - - 0.0095
(0.0149)
-0.0103
(0.0176)
USA*ln(C) two and 
three years after takeover
- - - - 0.0274**
(0.0115)
0.0315*
(0.0170)
MNE*ln(C) one year 
After takeover
- - - - 0.0003
(0.0109)
-
MNE*ln(C) two and 
three years after takeover
- - - - 0.0041
(0.0085)
-
Ln(C)
IT capital
0.0582***
(0.0092)
0.0593***
(0.0097)
0.0495***
(0.0061)
0.0460***
(0.0067)
0.0459***
(0.0067)
0.0806***
(0.0169)
Ln(M)
Materials
0.4949***
(0.0308)
0.4950***
(0.0306)
0.5276***
(0.0212)
0.5286***
(0.0211)
0.5287***
(0.0210)
0.5913***
(0.0448)
Ln(K)
Non-IT Capital
0.1592***
(0.0256)
0.1591***
(0.0254)
0.1145***
(0.0162)
0.1145***
(0.0162)
0.1142***
(0.0161)
0.0311
(0.0333)
Ln(L)
Labor
0.2723***
(0.0184)
0.2727***
(0.0185)
0.2927***
(0.0146)
0.2918***
(0.0146)
0.2924***
(0.0145)
0.2480***
(0.0367)
USA one year 
after takeover
- - - - 0.0591
(0.0720)
0.0466
(0.1007)
USA two and three 
years after takeover
- - - - -0.0713
(0.0641)
-0.1507
(0.0951)
MNE one year 
after takeover 
MNE two and three 
Years after takeover
- - -
-
0.0230
(0.0534)
0.0489
(0.0418)
-
Observations
Test USA*ln(C) = MNE*ln(Q, p-value 
Test USA = MNE, p-value 
Test USA one year = MNE one year, p-value 
Test USA two plus years =
MNE two plus years, p-value
Test (USA one year)*ln(C) = (MNE one
year)*ln(C), p-value
1422
0.5900
1422
0.5564
0.4430
3466
0.2216
3466
0.0880
0.2104
3466
0.6743
0.0894
0.6044
692
Test (USA two plus years)*ln(C) = (MNE two 
plus years)*In(C), p-value - - - - 0.0691 -
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Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample is o f all 
establishments who were taken over at some point (the omitted base is “domestic takeovers” - UK firms 
taking over other UK firms). The dependent variable in all columns is the log o f gross output. The time 
period is 1995-2003. The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under coefficients are 
clustered by establishment. A takeover is defined as a change in the establishment foreign ownership 
marker or - for UK domestic establishment - as a change in the enterprise group marker. The "before" 
period is defined as the interval between one and three years before the takeover takes place. The "after" 
period is defined as the interval between one and three years after the takeover takes place. The year in 
which the takeover takes place is excluded from the sample. All columns include a full set o f three digit 
industry dummies interacted with time trends and as additional controls: age, region dummies, a multi­
establishment group dummy and an IT survey dummy. “Test USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C)” is test o f  whether 
the coefficient on USA*ln(C) is significantly different from the coefficient on MNE*ln(C) , etc.
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Table 6 - IT and Labour Market Regulation
Fixed Effects
(1)
NO
(2)
NO
(3)
NO
(4)
YES
(5)
YES
(6)
YES
Sample All MNE's All MNE’s All MNE’s All MNE’s All MNE’s All MNE’s
Dependent Variable ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q)
USA*ln(C)
USA ownership*IT capital
0.0230***
(0.0081)
“ 0.0287*
(0.0161)
- 0.0161
(0.0154)
USA
USA Ownership
-0.1186***
(0.0453)
- -0.1483
(0.0988)
- -0.1600
(0.1058)
Labor Regulation *In( C ) 
World Bank Labor Regulation 
lndex*IT capita)
- 0.0439**
(0.0193)
- 0.0702**
(0.0358)
0.0295
(0.0332)
Labor Regulation 0.0968** 
World Bank Labor Regu)ation(00434) 
Index
- -0.1410
(0.0998)
- -0.3651
(0.2700)
-0.0666
(0.2451)
Ln(C)
IT capital
0.0488***
(0.0056)
0.0439***
(0.0055)
0.0134
(0.0158)
0.0152**
(0.0073)
-0.0339
(0.0270)
-0.0041
(0.0254)
Ln(M)
Materials
0.6347***
(0.0147)
0.6354***
(0.0147)
0.6352***
(0.0147)
0.5353***
(0.0340)
0.5375***
(0.0351)
0.5063***
(0.0296)
Ln(K)
Non-IT Capital
0.0995***
(0.0134)
0.0972***
(0.0134)
0.0987***
(0.0135)
0.0733*
(0.0402)
0.0738*
(0.0409)
0.0923**
(0.0395)
Ln(L)
Labor
0.2046***
(0.0140)
0.2062***
(0.0140)
0.2042***
(0.0140)
0.2529***
(0.0486)
0.2514***
(0.0485)
0.2457***
(0.0396)
Observations 3144 3144 3144 3144 3144 3144
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all 
columns is the log o f  gross output. The time period is 1995-2003. The estimation method in all columns 
is OLS. The sample includes only multinationals. Columns (4), (5) and (6) include establishment level 
fixed effects. The labor regulation index is based on the “Rigidity o f Employment” index, drawn from 
the World Bank “Doing Business” report. The index is transformed so that higher values imply more 
flexible systems. The transformation applied is y  = (1-x) (so 0=inflexible, l=most flexible). All columns 
include a full set o f three digit industry dummies interacted with a full set o f  time dummies and as 
additional controls: dummies for establishment age (interacted with a manufacturing dummy), region, 
multi-establishment group (interacted with ownership type) and IT survey. Standard errors in brackets 
under coefficients in all columns are clustered by establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation o f  unknown form). The sample is IT using intensive sectors only. See Appendix A1 for 
definition o f  IT using intensive sectors.
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Appendix: Data and Additional Results
A l ESTABLISHMENT DATASET: THE ANNUAL BUSINESS INQUIRY
The Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) is the major source of establishment level data in the UK. It 
underlies the construction o f aggregate output and investment in the national accounts and is conducted 
by the Office o f National Statistics (ONS) the UK equivalent of the US Census Bureau. The ABI is 
similar in structure and content to the US Longitudinal Research Database except that it covers non- 
manufacturing as well as manufacturing. The recently constructed US Longitudinal Business Database 
covers non-manufacturing but it does not have output or investment -  items that are necessary to 
estimate production functions.
The ABI is a stratified random sample: sampling probabilities are higher for large establishments (e.g. 
100% for all establishments with more than 250 employees). Each establishment has a unique 
“reporting unit reference number” (RUREF) which does not change when an establishment is taken 
over by a new firm. Data on the production sector (including manufacturing) is in the ABI which has a 
long time series element (from 1980 and before in some cases). Data on the non-production sector 
(services) is available for a much shorter time period (from 1997 onwards). The sample is large: in 1998 
there are 28,765 plants in the production sector alone.
The questionnaire sent out on the ABI is extensive and covers all the variables needed to estimate basic 
production functions. The response rates to the ABI are high because it is illegal not to return the forms 
to the Office o f National Statistics. The ABI includes data on gross output, value added, employment, 
the wage bill, investment and “total materials” (this includes all intermediate inputs -  energy, materials, 
etc.). Value added is constructed as the sum o f  turnover, variation o f total stocks, work o f  capital nature 
by own staff, insurance claims received minus purchases. The construction o f  the IT and non-IT capital 
stocks are described in the next section. We condition on a sample that has positive values o f  all the 
factor inputs, so we drop establishments that have zero IT capital stocks.
A2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DATASETS
Working closely with statisticians and data collectors at ONS we combined five major IT surveys and 
matched this into the ABI establishment data using the common establishment code (RUREF). The 
main IT surveys include the Business Survey into Capitalized Items (BSCI), the Quarterly Inquiry into 
Capital Expenditure (QICE) and the Fixed Asset Register (FAR). We used information on hardware 
from the BSCI, QICE and FAR in the main part o f the paper, one survey o f computer use by workers 
(the E-Commerce Survey) and one software survey (ABI supplement). O f these, only the software 
survey was designed to cover exactly the same establishments as contained in the ABI survey, but 
because there is over-sampling o f the larger establishments in all surveys the overlap is substantial, 
especially for the larger establishments. These surveys are compiled at the reporting unit level, and 
contain information on the value (in thousands o f pounds) of software and hardware acquisitions and 
disposals. Once the stocks are built within each different survey, we combine them across surveys and, 
for hardware and software separately, we build across-surveys stocks.1 In the following paragraphs we 
first describe the different surveys; we then illustrate the details o f the Perpetual Inventory Method used 
for the construction o f  the capital stocks and the procedure followed to build across-surveys variables.
A2.1 Data Sources
Business Survey into Capitalized Items {BSCI). The BSCI asks for detail o f acquisitions and disposals of 
capital in more than 100 categories, including computer hardware and software. The survey is annual 
and runs between 1998 and 2003; we dropped the 1998 cross section due to concerns over reliability 
expressed by the data collectors. There is a 100% sampling frame for businesses with more than 750 
employees and a stratified random sample o f businesses with between 100 and 750 workers. The BSCI 
contributes about 1,500 to 2,000 observations for each year between 1999 and 2003. We use the SIC92 
code 30020 defined as “Computers and other information processing equipment”. Notes to this category
1 We are careful to check for differences in coefficients due to the IT measures coming from different 
surveys. We could not reject the assumption that there were no significant differences in the IT 
coefficients arising from the fact that the IT stocks were built from different surveys.
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specify “Microcomputers, printers, terminals, optical and magnetic readers (including operating systems 
and software bundled with microcomputer purchase).”
Quarterly Inquiry into Capital Expenditure (QICE). The QICE provides information on hardware and 
software investments from 2000Q1 until 2003Q4. The inquiry selects 32,000 establishments each 
quarter. O f these 32,000 companies, all establishments with over 300 employees are selected each 
quarter. Businesses with fewer employees are selected for the inquiry randomly. Each quarter one fifth 
o f  the random sample is rotated out o f the sample and a new fifth is rotated in. The quarterly data have 
been annualized in several alternative ways and we checked the robustness o f the results across these 
methods. First, we extrapolated within year for establishments with missing quarters2. As a second 
alternative, we constructed an indicator that gives the number o f  non-missing values that exist for each 
year and establishment and included this as an additional control in the regressions. Third, we dropped 
observations constructed from less than four full quarters. The results were robust across all three 
methods and the tables report results based on the first method.
Fixed Asset Register (FAR). The FAR asks for the historic cost (gross book value) o f the fixed assets 
held on the firms’ asset register, broken down by the years o f acquisition. The survey provides 
information on IT hardware assets only, and covers the years 1995 up to 2000. The survey provides 
information for about 1,000 hardware observations.
E-Commerce Survey. The E-Commerce Survey was conducted in 2001, 2002 and 2003 with around 
2,500 establishments in each cross section. Unfortunately these were random cross-sections so the 
overlap between years is minimal (preventing us from performing serious panel data analysis). Plant 
managers were directly asked “What proportion o f  your employees uses a computer, workstation or 
terminal”. To construct an estimate o f  the number o f employees using IT we multiplied this proportion 
by the number o f  workers in the establishment. Although this is conceptually much cruder than the IT 
capital stock, it has the advantage that we do not have to rely so much on assumptions concerning the 
initial conditions. In Table 4 we discuss the results from this measure, showing very similar results to 
those obtained from using the IT capital measure.
Software questions in the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). The ABI contains a question on software 
expenditures from 2000 onwards. There are approximately 20,000 non-zero returned values for software 
investments in each year. We had some concerns about the accuracy of the establishment reports o f  
software expenditure3 so we focus in the main part o f the paper on the IT hardware stocks.
A2.2 Estimation o f IT capital stocks
We build stocks o f IT capital applying the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) to the IT investment data 
(and the non-IT investment data) described above. The basic PIM equation is Ku=lhit+(l-dh)Ku-i, where 
Ihu represents real investment o f asset type h (e.g. computer hardware, Ic) and d  is the asset specific 
depreciation rate. To construct real investment we deflate nominal investments using the economy-wide 
(asset specific) hedonic price indices for software and hardware provided by the National Institute o f  
Economic and Social Research (which are based on Jorgenson’s US price deflators). We rebased to the 
year 2000 for consistency with the other PPI deflators (see below).
Zeros
Both the BSCI and the QICE code missing values as zeros. While in the BSCI we are able to identify 
actual zero investments through a specific coding, for the QICE this is not possible. In the construction 
o f  the capital stocks we treated the zero investments observations as actual absence o f  IT investments. 
In the regressions we drop observations with zero IT capital stocks
Interpolations
In order to maximize the number o f observations over which we could apply the PIM, we interpolated 
net investment observations for a single year o f data if  we observed investment the year before and the
2 The extrapolation was done by simple averaging, but we also tried more sophisticated quarterly 
models taking into account the quarter surveyed. This made practically no difference.
3 For example, many software values are imputed and the coding for the imputation does not make it 
clear how the imputation took place and for which establishments.
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year afterwards. This affected only 2.8% of the observations in the regression sample and results are 
robust to dropping these observations.
Initial Conditions
In order to apply the PIM methodology, we need to approximate a starting value to start the recursion. 
We apply a similar methodology as the one devised by Martin (2005) to construct establishment level 
capital stocks in the ARD. For each firm, we first build two digit industry-specific IT Investment/ 
Capital ratios using the NISEC02 industry level data-set provided by the National Institute o f Economic 
and Social Research, which contains separate time-series data on IT capital stocks and runs up to 2001 
(these are based on the input-output tables starting in 1975). We then use the ratio o f the establishment’s 
IT investment flow to the industry investment flow to impute the IT capital stock (i.e. we are assuming 
that the establishment’s share o f the IT capital stock in the industry is equal to the establishment’s share 
o f IT investment in the industry in the initial year). More precisely, we assume that for t = 0 only the 
initial establishment level IT capital stock C,0 is Cj0=(Iit Up) Cp where j  represents an industry so a j  sub­
script represents an industry total -  i.e. Ip is total industry IT investment and Cp is the total IT capital 
stock in time t. We apply this approximation to determine our initial condition in the first year that the 
establishment appears in our sample. For greenfield sites this is not an issue as their capital stock is 
zero. After the first year, we simply apply the Perpetual Inventory Method.
Some o f the establishments that we observe only for the first time may be investing systematically at a 
different rate from the industry average. To check whether our results were driven by the methodology 
used to build the initial conditions, we considered an alternative methodology based on employment 
weights to calculate the starting value, Cid={Lu-i ILp-i) Cp.] (l-d)+ Icp. So this is assuming that the 
establishment’s share o f the industry IT stock in the initial period is equal to the establishment’s lagged 
share of employment.
Depreciation
For all IT capital we chose a depreciation rate o f 36%. This choice is consistent with the analysis by 
methodology followed by the BEA which, in turn, derives from the study by Dorns, Dunn, Oliner and 
Sichel (2004). In this study, the depreciation rate for PCs is estimated at approximately 50%, this value 
including both obsolescence and revaluation effects. Since -  as the BEA - we use real IT investments we 
have to use a lower depreciation rate to avoid double counting o f the revaluation effect, included in the 
price deflators. Basu et al (2003) argue that the true geometric rate o f  depreciation should be, in fact, 
approximately 30%. The significance and the magnitude o f the coefficient obtained for IT capital is not 
affected by the exact choice o f the alternative depreciation rate.
Across-Survev Stocks
Following the steps described above, we obtain hardware and software stocks within each different 
survey. We then matched our constructed IT dataset with the ABI sample. In order to simplify the 
empirical analysis, we combined all the information o f the different the surveys constructing overall 
across-surveys IT stocks for both hardware and software. Our strategy is to use the BSCI measure as the 
most reliable observation (as recommended by the data collectors). We then build our synthetic measure 
using the QICE stocks if  the BSCI observation is missing or equal to zero and the QICE is different 
from zero. We finally use the FAR if  both QICE and BSCI are missing and/or equal to zero and the FAR 
is not.
In order to keep track o f  the possible measurement error introduced using this procedure, we introduce 
in all the IT regressions a dummy that identifies the provenience o f the observation for both the 
hardware and the software stocks. These dummies and their interactions with the IT coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero. A small portion o f the firms included in our dataset responded to more 
than one survey. We use some o f this overlapping sample to get a better understanding o f  the 
measurement error in the data. By comparing the reports from the same establishments we calculate that 
there is much more measurement error for software than for hardware, which is one reason why we 
currently focus on hardware. We did not find any evidence that the measurement error for IT capital was 
different for US firms than other firms.
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A3 DEFINITION OF I.T. INTENSIVE USING INDUSTRIES
We focus on “IT intensive” sectors that are defined to be those that use IT intensively and are not 
producers o f information or communication technologies. The definitions of IT usage and IT producers 
are based on O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003) who base their definitions on Kevin Stiroh (2002). They 
use US data to calculate the capital service flows and define IT use intensity as the ratio o f IT capital 
services to total capital services. IT intensive using sectors are those where (a) the industries has above 
median IT capital service flows to total capital service flows and (b) the industry is not an IT producing 
industry. All industries are based on ISIC Revision 3.
A4 CLEANING
We used standard procedures to clean the ABI and the IT data. First, we dropped all observations with 
negative value added and/or capital stock. Secondly we dropped the top and bottom percentile o f the 
distribution o f  the growth of employment and gross value added. Thirdly, we dropped extreme values o f  
total capital stock per employee and gross value added per employee. This step of the cleaning 
procedure was performed on the overall ABI sample. We applied a similar cleaning procedure also to 
our across surveys IT variables. We dropped the top and bottom percentiles o f the ratio o f the IT capital 
(and expenditure) relative to gross value added4.
A5 DEFINITION OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND UK MULTINATIONALS 
The country o f ownership o f  a foreign firm operating in the UK is provided in the ABI and is based on 
information from Dun and Bradstreet’s Global “Who Owns Whom" database. Dun and Bradstreet 
define the nationality o f an establishment by the country o f residence o f the global ultimate parent, i.e. 
the topmost company o f a world-wide hierarchical relationship identified “bottom-to-top” using any 
company which owns more than 50% o f the control (voting stock, ownership shares) o f another 
business entity. UK Multinationals are identified via the matching o f the ABI with the Annual Foreign 
Direct Investment (AFDI) register made by Criscuolo and Martin (2004). The AFDI identifies the 
population o f UK firms which are engaging in or receiving foreign direct investment (FDI)5. Each 
establishment in the ABI that is owned by a firm which appears in the AFDI register can consequently 
be defined as a multinational. UK multinationals are thus UK-owned firms which appear in the AFDI.
A6 TAKEOVERS
The identification o f takeovers consists o f three basic steps. First, for all the available years (1980-2003 
for manufacturing and 1997-2003 for services) we use all the raw ABI data (including “non-selected” 
establishments where we know employment but not output or capital). We thus create a register file that 
allows us to keep track o f the whole history o f  each firm, and exploit the uniqueness o f the reporting 
unit reference number (RUREF) to correct for obvious reporting problems (i.e. establishments that 
disappear in one year, and appear again after some time). Second, for each establishment we keep track 
o f changes in the foreign ownership information and the enterprise group reference number (this is a 
collection o f RUREFs owned by a single group) to identify foreign and domestic takeovers6. Third, to 
control for measurement error in the takeover identification, we drop from the sample some ambiguous 
establishment observations: (a) establishments that are subject to more than three takeovers during their 
history; (b) for the establishments with two or three takeovers, we dropped observations where a time 
period could be simultaneously as “pre” and “post” takeover. We use up to three years prior to the 
takeovers in the “pre-takeover” regressions and up to three years after the takeover in the “post 
takeover” regressions. The year when the takeover occurred is dropped because it is unclear when in the 
year the establishment switched.
4 The results o f  the regression are qualitatively similar if  the IT data are cleaned using the ratio o f  
investments per employee or stocks per employee.
5 The working definition o f Foreign Direct Investment for this purpose is that the investment must give 
the investing firm a significant amount o f control over the recipient firm. The ONS considers this to be 
the case if  the investment gives the investor a share o f at least ten per cent o f the recipient firm's capital.
6 Foreign takeovers are observed if  a firm experiences a change in the foreign ownership marker. 
Domestic takeovers are observed if  a UK firm changes its enterprise reference number. See Griffith et al 
(2004) for more details on the methodology.
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A7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Panel A o f Table A2 gives some descriptive statistics for our key variables. Note that median 
employment in the establishment is 238 which are larger than the ABI median because the IT surveys 
tend to focus on the larger establishments. Average IT stock is just over £ lm  ($2m) and value added per 
worker is just under £40,000 ($80,000). Labor accounts for 31% o f revenues and materials 58% on 
average. IT capital is estimated at 1% of revenues (non-IT capital is 10%).
Panel B o f Table A3 breaks down mean values o f the IT capital - output ratio and ln(IT capital) by 
ownership type and whether or not the sector is IT intensive. Unsurprisingly, across all establishments 
the IT capital-output ratio is much higher in the IT intensive industries compared to other sectors (3% 
compared to 2%). More interestingly, US multinationals have a higher IT capital-output ratio than non- 
US multinationals only in the IT intensive sectors (4% compared to 3%). In the other sectors US and 
non-US multinationals have a similar IT-output ratio (3% in each). The levels o f  IT capital show much 
higher values for US establishments than non-US multinationals (especially in the IT intensive sectors).
A8 ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Table A3 contains alternative econometric estimates o f the production function allowing for endogenous 
factor inputs. First, in column (1) we present results using the Blundell- Bond (1998) system GMM 
estimator. We have to restrict the sample to firms where we have at least four continuous years o f  
information on all variables which, given our short time series and sampling frame, severely reduces the 
sample size (this is also the reason why we use all sectors, not just the IT intensive sectors). Even on 
this sub-sample we are still able to identify a significant interaction effect between IT capital and the US 
dummy variable. The coefficient on IT for US firms is significantly different from the IT coefficient on 
non-US firms at the 10% level. The structural model o f firm behaviour underlying the Olley-Pakes 
(1996) approach is not consistent with simply including interactions, so instead we estimate the 
production function separately for the three ownership types separately: US multinationals in column 
(2), non-US multinationals in column (3) and UK domestic firms in column (4). The IT coefficient is 
twice as large for US multinationals as it is for non-US multinationals, which is consistent with our 
earlier findings. The standard errors are also large, however, due to the smaller sample size, so we are 
not able to reject the null that the coefficients are the same.
Table A4 estimates takeover regressions as a function of lagged covariates. The sample is o f those 
establishments who were at some point taken over by another firm. In columns (1) and (2) the 
dependent variable is equal to one if the establishment was taken over by a US multinational and zero 
otherwise (i.e. if  it was taken over by a non-US multi-national or a domestic UK firm). In columns (3) 
and (4) we drop the takeovers by UK domestic firms so that the dependent variable is equal to one if  the 
establishment was taken over by a US multinational and zero otherwise (i.e. if  it was taken over by a 
non-US multinational). Columns (1) and (3) examine whether more IT intensive establishments were 
more likely to be taken over by a US multinational. Columns (2) and (4) examine whether 
establishments which were growing more IT intensive were more likely to be taken over by a US 
multinational. There seems to be no significant correlation between lagged IT levels or growth and the 
probability o f being taken over by a US firm.
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Table A1 - Breakdown of the Industrial Sectors by IT Usage
IT Intensive Sectors
Manufacturing Services
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying o f  fur 51 Wholesale trades
22 Printing and publishing 52 Retail trade
29 Machinery and equipment 71 Renting o f machinery and equipment
31 Manufacture o f  Electrical Machinery and73 Research and development 
Apparatus n.e.c. excludes 313 (insulated wire)
33 Precision and optical instruments, excluding 
331 (scientific instruments)
351 Building and repairing o f ships and boats
353 Aircraft and spacecraft
352+359 Railroad equipment 
equipment
36-37 miscellaneous manufacturing
and transport 
and recycling
)ther Sector?
Manufacturing
15-16 Food drink and tobacco 
17 Textiles
IT
producing
sector?
No
No
Services IT
producing
sector?
50 Sale, maintenance and repair o f motorNo 
vehicles
55 Hotels and catering No
19 Leather and footwear No 60 Inland transport No
20 Wood No 61 Water transport No
21 Pulp and paper No 62 Air transport No
23 Mineral oil refining, coke andNo 
nuclear
24 Chemicals No
63 Supporting transport services, travelNo 
agencies
64 Communications Yes
25 Rubber and plastics No 70 Real estate No
26 Non-metallic mineral products No 72 Computer services and related activity Yes
27 Basic metals No 741-743 Professional business services No
28 Fabricated metal products No 749 Other business activities n.e.c. No
30 Office machinery Yes
313 Insulated wire Yes Other sectors
321 Electronic valves and tubes Yes 10-14 Mining and quarrying No
322 Telecom equipment Yes 50-41 Utilities No
323 Radio and TV receivers Yes 45 Construction No
331 Scientific instruments Yes
34 Motor vehicles
Notes: See text for definitions. IT intensive sectors are those that have above median IT capital flows as 
a proportion o f  total capital flows and are not IT producing sectors.
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Table A2 - Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: All Establishments
Variable Frequency Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Employment 7121 811.10 238.00 4052.77
Gross Output 7121 87966.38 20916.48 456896.10
Value Added 7121 29787.61 7052.00 167798.70
IT Capital 7121 1030.60 77.44 10820.69
ln(IT Capital) 7121 4.46 4.35 2.03
Value Added per worker 7121 40.43 29.53 55.19
Gross Output per worker 7121 124.74 86.03 136.55
Materials per worker 7121 82.38 47.23 103.52
Non-IT Capital per worker 7121 85.28 48.56 112.54
IT Capital per worker 7121 0.96 0.34 2.08
IT expenditure per worker 7121 0.41 0.14 0.89
Material costs as a share of revenues 7121 0.57 0.60 0.23
Employment costs as a share of revenues 7121 0.83 0.64 0.86
Non-IT Capital as a share of revenues 7121 0.30 0.26 0.20
IT Capital as a share o f revenues 7121 0.010 0.004 0.018
Age 7121 8.38 5.00 6.74
Multigroup dummy (i.e. is establishment part of 
larger group?) 7121 0.53 1.00 0.50
Panel B: Breakdown by Ownership Status and Sector
IT  Capital over gross output 
(C/Q)
L n(IT  Capital)
All
IT Using 
Intensive Other All
IT Using 
Intensive Other
sectors Sectors Sectors sectors Sectors Sectors
All firms Mean 0.03 0.03 0.02 4.46 4.78 4.27
St. Deviation 0.04 0.04 0.04 2.03 2.06 1.99
Observations 7121 2703 4418 7121 2703 4418
US Multinationals Mean 0.04 0.04 0.03 5.57 5.69 5.46
St. Deviation 0.05 0.05 0.04 2.00 1.94 2.05
Observations 569 260 309 569 260 309
Other Multinationals Mean 0.03 0.03 0.03 5.18 5.34 5.07
St. Deviation 0.04 0.04 0.04 1.96 1.99 1.93
Observations 2119 853 1266 2119 853 1266
UK domestic Mean 0.02 0.03 0.02 3.98 4.33 3.79
St. Deviation 0.04 0.04 0.03 1.91 1.99 1.83
Observations 4433 1590 2843 4433 1590 2843
Notes: All monetary amounts are in sterling in year 2001 prices. Total stocks are constructed as 
described in the Appendix. All variables in units o f 1,000s except ratios and employment.
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Table A3 - Olley Pakes and GMM results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All
establishment US Other Domestic UK
Sample s multinationals multinationals establishments
Estimation Method GMM Olley Pakes Olley Pakes Olley Pakes
Sectors All sectors IT Using IT Using IT Using
Intensive Sectors Intensive Sectors Intensive Sectors
Dependent Variable Ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q)
USA*ln(C) 0.1176* _ _ .
USA ownership*IT capital (0.0642)
MNE*ln(C) 0.0092 - - -
Non-US multinational *IT capital (0.0418)
Ln(C) 0.0793*** 0.0758** 0.0343** 0.0468***
IT capital (0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0171) (0.0116)
Ln(M) 0.4641*** 0.5874*** 0.6514*** 0.6293***
Materials (0.0560) (0.0312) (0.0187) (0.0267)
Ln(K) 0.2052*** 0.0713 0.1017*** 0 .1110***
Non-IT Capital (0.0532) (0.0674) (0.0285) (0.0270)
Ln(L) 0.2264*** 0.1843*** 0.2046*** 02145***
Labor (0.0728) (0.0337) (0.0139) (0.0173)
Observations 1074 615 2022 3692
First order serial correlation, p value 0 .0 1 0 0 - _ _
Second order serial correlation, p
value 0.3480
Sargan-Hansen, p-value 0.4570 - - -
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all 
columns is the log o f gross output. The time period is 1995-2003. All variables are expressed in 
deviations from the year-specific three digit industry mean. Column (1) is estimated using System- 
GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). One step GMM results reported. In column (1) instruments are all 
establishment level factor inputs lagged t-2 and before (when available) in the differenced equation (i.e. 
mt-2, lt-2 ,kt-2,ct-2, qt-2, USAt-2, MNEt-2. (USA*c)t-2, (MNE*c) t-2,qt-2,) and lagged differences in the levels 
equation (Amt-i, Alt-), Aku, Acn, AUSAt-i, AMNEm, A(USA*c)t-i, A(MNE*c)m,). Serial correlation tests 
are LM tests o f  the first differenced residuals (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). Sargan-Hansen Test o f  
instrument validity is a test o f the over-identification. “Test USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C)” is test o f  whether 
the coefficient on USA*ln(C) is significantly different from the coefficient on MNE*ln(C), etc. 
Columns (2)-(4) are estimated using Olley Pakes (1996). We use a fourth order series expansion to 
approximate the phi function. Standard errors in Olley-Pakes are bootstrapped (clustered at the 
establishment level) with 200 replications. All columns include age, region dummies and a dummy 
taking value one if  the establishment belongs to a multi-firm enterprise group as additional controls.
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Table A4 - Non Random Selection of UK Takeovers Compared to Other 
Takeovers?
Dependent Variable = 1 if  
establishment taken over by 
US firm, = 0 for all other 
takeovers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US Takeover=l US Takeover=l US Takeover=l US Takeover=l
Sample All takeovers All takeovers
All except 
domestic 
takeovers
All except 
domestic 
takeovers
ln(C/L)t-i 0.0029 - -0.0003 -
(0.0095) (0.0365)
Aln(C)t-i - -0.0236 - -0.0876
(0.0246) (0.0714)
ln(L)t-i 0.0140 0.0108 -0.0183 -0.0222
(0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0377) (0.0379)
In(K/L)t-i 0.0108 0.0109 -0.0174 -0.0346
(0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0645) (0.0650)
In(Q/L)t-i 0.0236 0.0270 0.0333 0.0580
(0.0269) (0.0263) (0.0860) (0.0843)
Age -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0014
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0085) (0.0087)
Observations 563 563 190 190
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all 
columns is a dummy taking value 1 i f  the establishment is taken over by a US Multinational and zero 
otherwise. Takeovers by UK firms (“domestics”) are excluded in columns (3)-(4). The time period is 
1995-2003. All columns include two digit industry dummies, region and year dummies. The estimation 
method in all columns is by a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets under coefficients are 
robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Chapter III: The Effects of Big-Box Entry on Mom and Pop Stores
I. Introduction
“Big-boxes” - large stores located in the periphery of cities - are a major feature of the 
modem retail sector. They are associated with significant improvements in the 
efficiency of the retail industry1, and have channelled the expansion of global retail 
chains such as Wal-Mart. However, their effect on local communities is controversial. 
While consumers may benefit from lower prices, greater convenience and product 
variety offered by big-boxes2, “mom and pops” retailers -  small stand-alone retail 
firms, typically located in central areas - are believed to suffer from their competition.
Since mom and pops stores are perceived to contribute to the vitality of town 
centres and to provide valuable local shopping facilities, several OECD countries have 
attempted to protect them introducing tight entry regulations against big-boxes3. These 
policies have recently been criticised for their possible implications on the productivity
1 The role o f store size for the productivity o f retail firms is analysed in Oi (1993), Basker et al (2007), 
Holmes (2002) and Ellickson (2007). Holmes (2006) discusses the complementary relationship between 
store size, Information Technologies (IT) and in-house distribution systems. Haskel and Sadun (2007) 
find a significant and positive association between store size and chain productivity using UK Census 
data.
2 Ellickson (2007) describes the explosion in product variety associated with the emergence o f  large 
stores in the U.S., which grew from 14,145 in 1980 to 21,949 in 1994 to over 30,000 by 2004. Basker 
(2007) discusses the price effects generated by the entry o f Wal-Mart stores across U.S. cities.
3 See Pilat (1997) for a concise description o f entry regulations across OECD countries.
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and the competitiveness of the industry, since the retail activity is characterised by 
significant economies of scale4.
Perhaps surprisingly, the literature has never analysed a more fundamental 
question i.e., whether restricting the entry of big-boxes does effectively shield mom 
and pop stores from the competition of retail chains. In this chapter, we argue that 
blocking the entry of big-boxes may paradoxically harm mom and pop stores. Key to 
the story is the fact that big-boxes are typically opened by large retail chains, which 
are able to choose between different store sizes and locations. Therefore, chains may 
react to the introduction of entry constraints on big-boxes changing the characteristics 
of their new stores, rather than by simply reducing their overall openings. In this 
setting, the counterfactual to big-box entry is not a market with no entrants, but with 
different entrants. In the specific case where chains decide to open small and central 
stores instead of big-boxes, entry regulations may increase the competitive pressures 
faced by mom and pop stores and accelerate their decline and exit.
These mechanisms are investigated in the framework of the UK retail sector, 
where in 1996, after the laissez-faire approach of the Thatcher era, a planning reform 
introduced new restrictions on the opening of stores above 2,500 square meters. The 
appearance of the new regulations reduced dramatically big-box entry. More 
interestingly, the reforms also induced a change in the size and location of stores 
opened by retail chains, which began to shift their activity towards smaller stores in 
central areas. Both phenomena are illustrated in Figure la  (ODPM, 2004), which 
shows that after 1996 the number of out-of-town stores openings fell considerably, 
while the number of central and smaller food stores increased, after a period of relative 
stability in the early 1990s. The aggregate data also shows that the intensification of 
chain stores in central areas is associated with a decline of mom and pop stores. The 
employment growth of stand-alone retailers - i.e. retail firms consisting of a single
4 Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Van Ark et al. (2002) discuss the negative effects o f  retail entry 
regulations across Europe and OECD countries. The implications of entry regulations for the UK retail 
sector are discussed in McKinsey (1998) and Blanchard (2003). Haskel et al (2007), use comparable 
Census data to analyse the structure o f the retail industry across the UK, Japan and the US. They show 
that more regulated environments are associated with smaller retail outlets and lower productivity.
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retail establishment - fell from an annual average of -1% between 1989 and 1996 to 
-3% between 1998 and 2004, after the new regulatory constraints were introduced 
(Figure lb).
The planning reforms delegated to local government bodies (Local Authorities) 
the concession of planning grants, which were essential prerequisites for the 
construction of big-boxes. Local Authorities were encouraged to follow the general 
guidelines which constrained the entry of big-boxes, but could make their planning 
decisions in a regime of almost complete independence from the central government. 
Therefore, the restrictiveness of the new entry regulations effectively varied within and 
across Local Authorities. We exploit this setting to examine the effects of planning 
grants on independent retailers across and within Local Authorities.
The analysis is based on a novel dataset, which combines information on the 
population of retail stores with an exhaustive list of the planning decisions made by 
302 English Local Authorities, observed between 1998 and 2004. We rely on an 
instrumental variable approach to isolate the variation in planning grants determined 
by entry regulation, from that determined by local demand conditions. The instruments 
exploit the fact that the concession of planning grants was effectively managed by 
locally elected politicians. Empirically, we use the political composition of the 
planning boards to predict the the restrictiveness of entry regulation at the local level. 
In particular, we document that planning grants decrease with increases in the share of 
Conservative councillors in the Local Authority, even controlling for the time varying 
socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate, and looking both across and within 
planning boards over time. This is consistent with the considerable political weight of 
middle-class homeowners and small retailers in the Conservative party.
In line with the aggregated stylized facts, we show that in Local Authorities 
where more big-boxes were allowed to enter, mom and pops stores experienced higher 
rates of employment growth. These results hold both with OLS and when using 
changes in local political composition as an instrument to deal with the endogeneity of 
big-box entry. We decompose the effects of planning grants across the different
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margins of adjustments (entry, exit and incumbents), and show that the reduction in the 
exit margin drives most of the positive grants’ effect. According to the estimates, the 
sharp decline in big-box entry - which followed the 1996 reform - accounts for about 
8% of the decline experienced by independent retailers between 1998 and 2004.
The strategy used to identify the causal effects of the planning grants follows 
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), who studied the role of entry regulations in the French 
retail sector. The main difference with this paper and Bertrand and Kramarz is that, 
while they look at the implications of entry regulations for total retail employment, we 
focus on the relationship between the regulation of big-box entry and mom and pop 
stores. By doing this, we address explicitly the concerns over the effects of big-boxes 
on independent retailers, which is one of the key motivations behind the existence of 
the regulatory constraints. Moreover, by breaking down the regulatory impact along 
the different margins of adjustment, we characterise more precisely the mechanisms 
through which entry regulations have an effect of retail jobs.
The broad theme of the paper is related to the growing literature looking at the 
competitive effects of Wal-Mart and K-Mart stores on local competitors across U.S. 
counties, such as Basker (2002), Neumark et al. (2005) and Jia (2006)5. In the U.S., 
entry regulations are often advocated as a tool to protect traditional mom and pops 
retailers from the competitive effects of big-boxes6. In this paper we show that entry 
regulations may actually fail to safeguard the survival of small retailers, when retail 
chains can choose among alternative store investments.
The paper is also related to the growing literature on the investment decisions 
of large retail chains. Holmes (2006) looks at the location decision of Wal-Mart across
5 Basker (2005) finds that Wal-Mart is associated with an overall positive effect on retail employment 
immediately after entry (+100 jobs), which is halved after five years, when some small and medium 
retail establishments close. However, using a different IV approach and Wal-Mart entry data, Neumark 
et al. (2005) find a negative effect (-2% to -4%) on total retail employment and on payrolls per worker 
(-3.5%). Jia (2006) looks at the effect o f Wal-Mart and Kmart entry on small discount retailers using a 
fully structural approach. She finds that Wal-Mart expansion from the late 1980s to the late 1990s 
explains about fifty to seventy percent o f the net negative change in the number o f  small discount 
retailers.
6 http://walmartwatch.com/battlemart/go/cat/zoning_regulations
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the US, and rationalizes the gradual diffusion from the Bentonville, Arkansas (the 
location of Wal-Mart’s company headquarters) in light of significant economies of 
densities at the firm level. Beresteanu and Ellickson (2006), Aguirregabiria and 
Vicentini (2006) and Aguirregabiria, Mira and Roman (2007) provide formal 
treatments of the investment decisions of oligopolistic, multi-store retail firms. 
However, none of these papers model explicitly the within -chain choice between 
large and small retail outlets.
Finally, Smith (2006) combines a random households survey with a dataset of 
store characteristics to analyse the consequences of the regulations introduced in the 
UK retail sector on consumer and producer welfare. He concludes that the regulations 
of 1993 imposed suboptimal store characteristics on both consumers and firms, forcing 
them to focus on small instead of middle-sized stores. With respect to Smith, in this 
paper we add that the entry regulations were also responsible for the acceleration in the 
decline of small retailers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
basic features of the English planning regime and the 1996 reform. Section III focuses 
on the econometric modelling. Section IV introduces the instrumentation strategy. 
Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes.
II. Entry Regulation in the UK
In the UK, new developments need to comply with environmental and urban
design considerations, which are described in general planning guidelines. While the 
broad characteristics of the planning regime have remained fairly constant, the attitude 
vis-a-vis big-box stores significantly changed over time. Until the late 1980s, the 
liberalising (and, to some extent, centralising) efforts of Mrs Thatcher’s government 
were characterised by a laissez faire approach towards large retail stores, which 
coincided with a strong wave of retail decentralisation, and a significant increase in 
big-box openings. Planning policies registered a drastic change from the early 1990’s
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onwards7, driven by the concern that big box were draining activities away from town 
centers. In order to “sustain and enhance the vitality and viability of town centers”, 
new entry regulations were introduced in 1993 and, more significantly, in 1996.
The first important aspect of the reforms is that they introduced specific criteria 
of admissibility for retail developments over 2,500 square meters, especially if located 
outside town centers. These were the “sequential test” (1993), i.e. proof that the 
proposed out of town developments could not be created in alternative in-town or 
edge- of-town locations and the “test of need” (introduced in 1996 and reinforced in 
1999), to prove that new retail developments are “needed” in the area.
The second, key innovation introduced by the reforms is that they considerably 
increased the discretionary power of Local Authorities8 in the implementation of the 
planning guidelines. With the new planning regime, Local Authorities became directly 
responsible for the interpretation of the planning guidelines and, most importantly, for 
the selection of the large stores that could enter the area under their jurisdiction. This 
implied that number of applications granted by Local Authorities became a function of 
both local demand conditions, which generated the number of potential entrants in the 
market, and the activity of locally elected politicians9, which determined the extent to 
which central entry regulations were binding in the Local Authority and, therefore, the 
selection of the actual entrants.
7 The UK Competition Commission (2000) notes that “the policy has significantly evolved from a 
position in which out-of-centre development was acceptable to one in which it should be seen as a last 
resort”.
8 Local Authorities represent the lowest level o f  local government in the UK. Their boundaries coincide 
with well-defined socio-geographic entities (a town, or a city and its surroundings), with the major 
exception o f London, which is subdivided into 32 Boroughs. In some areas there is a county council 
responsible for some services within a county, with several district councils responsible for other 
services, including planning. The units analyzed in this paper are district councils. There is a total o f 434 
Local Authorities across the UK, o f which 354 only in England.
9 The Barker review (2006) reports that, on average, 96% o f  retail applications for stores above 1,000 
square meters between 2005 and 2006 were decided by elected politicians.
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Overall, the reforms introduced significant monetary and non-monetary costs 
in the application process10. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the new entry regulations reduced 
the number of big-box openings. This is illustrated in Figure 2a, where we plot the 
number of grants for large retail stores over time. We can see that planning grants - 
which we consider to be a consistent proxy of big-box entry - fall dramatically in the 
period 1996-2003, compared to the period 1993-1995.
However, the fall in big-boxes did not coincide with a reduction in the total 
number of new stores, but simply with a change in their size and location. In 
particular, the reform induced the major retail chains to move away from large retail 
outlets and to open small stores in central areas. Griffith and Harmgart (2005) show 
that, since the late 1990s, the top four UK retail chains substantially increased the 
number of small convenience stores opened in central locations relative to investments 
in large stores located in peripheral areas. Figure 2b (taken from Haskel and Sadun, 
2007) plots the size distribution of stores belonging to national UK chains in the 
periods 1997/98 and 2002/2003 to study the store distribution of retail chains over 
time. The histograms show that, over the relatively short time period of four years, the 
median size of a store belonging to a large supermarket chain fell from 75 to 56 
employees.
We look in closer detail at the evolution of planning grants using the 
applications database maintained by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) 
- the institution in charge of overseeing planning matters in England, which keeps a 
record of all applications received and planning grants made by the English Local 
Authorities. We had access to the list of all retail applications processed between 1993
10 The Barker review (2006) reports that applications for large retail stores cost an average o f £70,000. 
In a recent inquiry conducted on the UK Grocery market, the Competition Commission (2000) reports 
an average cost o f £50,000. The CC also reports that application delays for the major supermarkets 
could vary from a minimum o f 4 months to a maximum o f 24 months.
and 2003, classified by type of development (major of minor applications), relevant 
Local Authority, and year11.
The focus is on grants for stores above 1,000 square meters -  major application 
in the planning jargon -  a category which includes big-boxes12. Overall, planning 
grants for big-boxes are a fairly rare phenomenon. On average, a Local Authority 
approves only 2.5 large stores openings per year (or 0.022 applications per ‘000 
people) and 22% of the sample is represented by Local Authorities that have granted 
zero applications in a given year. These figures, however, hide a lot of heterogeneity 
across Local Authorities. This is apparent from Figure 3, where we map all English 
Local Authorities according to the average number of major planning applications they 
granted between 1993 and 2003. Grants also vary within Local Authorities over time, 
and Local Authority fixed effects and time dummies explain only 48% of grants’ 
variance.
We refer to Section IV for a closer analysis of the role of elected politicians in 
the planning process, while we explore the correlation between planning grants and 
basic demand variables in Table 1. Grants for big-boxes are more likely where the 
fraction or urban areas is higher, and in densely populated Local Authorities. Grants 
are also more likely in areas with a younger population, and with lower average 
incomes and a lower percentage of college graduates. This reflects the fact that large 
stores -  which focus their activity on the convenience of their offer -  tend to target
11 The ODPM data does not provide the exact location o f the development within a Local Authority, or 
the brand name o f  the applicant. This lack o f information constraints the empirical analysis to Local 
Authority aggregates, and requires the assumption that Local Authorities behave as fairly independent 
markets. Therefore, we exclude from the analysis Local Authorities for which the independence 
assumption is obviously inappropriate -  such as the 32 small Local Authorities (Boroughs) representing 
London. Moreover, we exclude from the sample Local Authorities with a population o f  more than 
400,000 people, whose complexity is not likely to be captured by the aggregated data. This corresponds 
to the exclusion o f all Local Authorities in the 99th percentile o f the distribution o f  population across 
Local Authorities. The Local Authorities o f  Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester and 
Sheffield are dropped from the sample as a consequence o f the selection.
12 Tesco -  the leading supermarket chain in the UK -  classifies large and medium stores as follows: 
Hypermarkets, 64,000 (5946 square meters); Superstores, 31,000 square feet (2880 square meters); 
Metro, 11,800 square feet (1096 square meters). Small convenience stores (Express) are on average 
2,100 square feet (195 square meters). www.tescocorporate.com/images/Tesco%20PLC%2030- 
mar-05.pdf.
89
price sensitive consumers. The correlation with local demand conditions suggests that 
simple OLS regression may provide a biased estimate of the effect of planning grants 
on independent retailers, and therefore the need to find a suitable identification 
strategy.
III. Econometric Modeling
The specification starts from a primitive model, where the employment of independent 
retailers is a function on the number of big-boxes active in the same Local Authority:
where e m p p  is the natural logarithm of independent stores’ employment in Local 
Authority j at time t; bbp is the number of big-boxes working in Local Authority j at 
time t; fit are year fixed effects; Xp is a vector of time-varying Local Authority 
characteristics; and e p  is an error term. We assume that e p  can be decomposed in a 
constant and a time-varying component, such that e p  = a j + p p . To control for the a j  -  
fixed factors that might affect the level of the retail employment aggregates in the 
Local Authorities - we estimate equation (III. 1) using a first difference transformation.,
Note that that, in each period, the change in the number of big-boxes working in a 
Local Authority can be expressed in net entry terms, i.e. Abbp=bb_entryjrbb_exitp. 
Under the reasonable assumption that big-boxes have negligible exit (i.e. 
bb_exitp-i~Q), we can express the growth of independents’ employment as a function 
of the number of big-boxes entering the Local Authority:
A e m p j t= 6  bb_entryp+yAXp+Af}t+App (III.3)
empp=0 bbp+yXp+fi+ep (III.l)
i.e.:
Aempp=6 Abbp+yAXjt+Afit+Aep (HI-2)
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The opening of a big-box requires a planning grant (Section II). Moreover, since the 
planning process entails non-trivial (monetary and non-monetary) costs, planning 
grants are almost inevitably transformed into actual stores. Therefore, the number of 
big-boxes entering a Local Authority at time t will be closely related to the number of 
planning applications for large stores granted by the Local Planning Authority, some 
time before the actual construction and opening of the store. In other words, defining 
as s  the amount of time that is needed to create a big-box from the moment the 
planning application has been granted, bb_entryjt=grantSjt-s. This leads to equation (III. 
4), which represents the benchmark specification of this paper:
A e m p j t= 6  grantsp-s+ y A X jt+ A fit + A p Jt (III.4)
Since no further licenses are needed once the planning application is obtained, s  
essentially corresponds to a construction lag13. Although the precise delay will vary 
from case to case, official government reports and the assumptions made by retail 
developers suggest an average construction delay between one and two years14.
Data on retail employment by store type and location is drawn from previously 
untapped data files of the UK Census (Interdepartmental Business Register, IDBR)15. 
This source provides information on the exact location and employment of the 
population of retail stores active in the UK, for each year between 1998 and 2004. We 
focus on stores classified under the industry code “Non-specialized retail” (SIC 521), a
13 Betrand and Kramarz (2002), using a similar methodology for the French retail sector, allow for a 
four year period lag between a granted application and an actual entry o f a store. In their case the longer 
lag is justified by the need to obtain a licence to run the store after the planning application has been 
granted. We include robustness checks to verify the sensitivity o f this timing assumption.
14 ODPM (2004) and DTI (2004). Similar construction lags have been estimated by the specialist 
magazine “The Builder”, which reports in a cost model date April 1993 and average construction lag o f  
40 weeks. http://www.building.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=l 13&storycode=1025793.
15 This is a major difference with respect to Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), where retail region-time
specific employment aggregates were drawn from the French Labour Force Survey. Using store level 
data is clearly needed in this context, since the focus is on specific type o f retailers rather than broad 
employment aggregates.
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sector which best describes the activity of big-boxes16 and represents 60% of total 
retail employment in the UK.
In all regressions, we include year dummies to capture aggregate economic 
shocks that might affect independents’ employment. Local Authorities have very little 
discretion in setting their own policy, with the notable exception of planning matters. 
For this reason, the year dummies should control for most of the other policy changes 
that might have occurred over the period under study such as, for example, minimum 
wage policies17. We also include regressors to control for demand differences across 
Local Authorities, such as their degree of urbanization, age and income profile. We 
test the robustness of the main results with respect to the inclusion of additional 
controls for time-varying socioeconomic characteristics of the Local Authorities (such 
as the industry composition, average skills and population growth).
Finally, all regressions are weighted by the share of English population in the 
Local Authority to ensure representativeness. Standard errors are clustered at the Local 
Authority level to control for heteroskedasticity autocorrelation patterns of unknown 
form (Bertrand et al, 2004). Table A.l in the Appendix provides the basic summary 
statistics for the variables included in the sample.
IV. Using Local Political Power for Identification
A major problem in the estimation of equation (III.4) relates to the endogeneity of big- 
box entry. As discussed in Basker (2005) and Jia (2006), the very same unobserved 
time-varying factors that influence the growth of independent stores, are likely to play 
a significant role in determining the number of big-boxes opening in a market, and 
therefore the number of planning applications submitted to the relevant Local 
Authority.
17 The minimum wage was introduced on a national basis in the UK in 1999. For more details see 
Draca, Machin and Van Reenen (2006).
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As discussed in Section II, UK planning reforms delegated to locally elected 
councilors the implementation of the entry regulations. This generates a link between 
political power in the Local Authority and planning grants, which we exploit for the 
identification of the effects of planning grants. In doing this, we follow a methodology 
similar to Bertrand and Kramarz (2002). In the baseline IV regression, we use the 
shares of the political parties elected in the Local Authority to instrument for big-box 
entry. This is a valid IV strategy under the assumptions that a) the planning behavior of 
local politicians can be described by their party affiliation, and b) the changes in the 
political composition of the Local Authorities are exogenous to the Aptp shocks 
affecting independents. We discuss the plausibility of these assumptions below.
IV.A. Right Wing Parties andBig-Box Entry
More than any other party in the UK, Conservatives have traditionally been associated 
with a strong opposition towards new retail developments, also defined as Nimby-ism 
(Not in My Backyard).18 This opposition has been justified with concerns on the 
potential environmental impact of big-boxes19. However, this also clearly reflected the 
political weight of middle-class homeowners and small retailers in the Conservative 
party, which feared the competition of big-boxes, or their effect on the value of their 
properties20.
,8This view is broadly confirmed by the results o f a recent survey commissioned by the Saint 
Consulting (a private group focusing on planning issues). The survey shows that the majority o f  people 
opposing new developments in their local areas voted Conservative. Moreover, Conservative others 
tended to oppose convenience food stores and supermarkets more than any other party, http:// 
www.saintconsulting.ca/
19 Greed (2000) reports that the Nimby-istic attitude o f Conservative politicians in the early 1990s 
reflected the need to capture the Green vote, since at the time 15% o f  voters were voting Green and this 
was seen as a serious threat to retaining a Conservative majority.
20 For example, according to the British Election Study, in the 2001 general election small business 
owners (including retailers) were three times more likely to vote Conservative than any o f  the two other 
major party. Small business owners accounted for 5.85% o f  all Conservative votes, against the 1.84% o f  
Labour and 1.91% o f  Liberal Democrat votes. The British Election Study follows the “Goldthorpe- 
Heath” classification, which provides a total o f eleven different socio-economic cells. The cell “Small 
proprietors, with Employment” is the one including independent retailers and where the difference 
between the Conservatives and the other parties is starkest.
93
We analyse the relevance of the Conservative party for planning grants 
combining the ODPM applications database with the British Local Election Database21 
(BLED), which provides information at the candidate level on all local elections that 
have taken place in the UK between the late 19th century and 2003. For the purposes of 
this paper, the data has been aggregated at the Local Authority level, and the sample 
constrained to the period 1993-2003 and to the 302 English Local Authorities that are 
at the base of the results presented in the econometric section.
We look at the relationship between Conservative and retail planning grants in 
Table 2. In column 1 we show the correlation between number of retail applications 
granted by the Local Authority and a dummy for Conservatives absolute majorities in 
the council, controlling for year dummies. The correlation is indeed very strong, with 
a coefficient of 0.70, significant at the 1% level. Further analysis shows that even the 
relative majority dummy and the share of Conservative seats are associated with more 
restrictive planning outcomes (columns 2 and 3).22
A possible worry is that the negative correlation between grants and 
Conservatives could be driven by the unobserved demand characteristics of the 
Conservative electorate. Therefore, in column 4 we repeat the estimation including 
some basic demand variables that were found to be significantly associated with retail 
grants in Table I23. Including these extra controls lowers the point estimate of the 
Conservative share to 1.55 (standard error 0.42), but does not reduce its significance 
level, which remains at the 1%. A further concern is that the correlation between 
planning outcomes and Conservatives could be driven by unobserved trends at the 
Local Authority level. Columns 5 and 6 repeat the estimation including, respectively, 
regional fixed effects interacted with a year trends, and Local Authority fixed effects24.
21 The election data are presented in the Appendix.
22 The omitted category in column 3 is the share o f seats going to all other parties.
23 Conservative majorities are more likely in areas with higher median hourly wages and college 
graduates, while they are less likely in areas with higher manufacturing and mining employment shares.
24 We can use Local Authorities fixed effects since elections are rather frequent. In about half o f the 
sample, a third o f the council is elected every year. In the other Local Authorities elections take place 
every four years.
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In both cases the point estimate is lower in absolute value (coefficient -1.10, standard 
error 0.53), but still significant at the 5% level. Finally, in column 7 we repeat the 
estimation controlling for the other political parties25. The coefficient on the 
Conservative share actually rises, and remains significant at the 5% level (coefficient 
-1.51, standard error 0.72).
IV. B. Exogeneity o f  political outcomes
A crucial issue for the validity of the IV approach is whether we can consider the 
changes in the political composition of the Local Authorities to be exogenous to the 
unobserved App ‘s driving employment growth of independent retailers26.
The first concern is that changes in the political composition of the local 
council could be directly determined by the employment growth of mom and pop 
stores at the time of big-box entry. Note, however, that the instrumentation strategy 
exploits changes in the political composition at the time the grant was given, which is 
typically some time before the actual entry of the store (in most specifications we 
assume a 2 year delay). Therefore, for a bias to exist we would need the voters to base 
their political preferences on the basis of mom and pops’ employment growth at least 
two years after the elections. We believe that this possibility is unlikely.
The second concern is that the political outcomes and the drivers of retail 
employment -  and in particular that of independent retailers - could be driven by a 
common unobserved factor. For example, changes in the socio-economic 
characteristics of the electorate could result in variations both in political outcomes 
and shopping preferences. To address this concern we will show robustness checks 
where we control for the time varying socioeconomic characteristics of the Local 
Authorities (including income, industry composition and average educational 
qualifications attained by the local population).
25 The omitted category is the share o f seats going to the Labour party.
26 We focus on the changes in the political composition, as the levels are controlled for by the first 
difference transformation.
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Finally, a bias would arise in the IV estimates if the councillors could affect the 
retail sector via alternative channels. In fact, Local Authorities could set and collect a 
local property tax on non-residential property (known as the UK business rate) only 
until 1990. The Central government decided to take this tax setting power away from 
Local Authorities as it was acknowledged this was taxation without representation. 
Planning was the only area of responsibility of Local Authorities that could affect 
businesses directly during the sample (Duranton et al, 2006).
V. Big-Box Entry and Mom and Pop Stores
V.A. Main results
In Table 3 we examine the effects of planning grants on retail employment. Before 
focusing on mom and pop stores, we start by looking at the relationship between 
grants and the employment growth of all stores classified in “Non Specialised retail”. 
We start with the estimation of equation III.4 by OLS, regressing total employment 
growth on lagged planning grants, including as additional controls only a set of year 
dummies. Column 1 shows that grants are strongly associated with positive total 
employment growth, with a coefficient of 0.0019 (standard error of 0.0005). This 
result is in line with previous studies, which have documented - using different 
techniques and samples -  the positive employment effects from more lenient 
regulatory approaches in the retail sector across French (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002) 
and Italian regions (Viviano, 2006).
The key innovation of this paper, however, is to analyse whether the effects of 
entry regulations are heterogeneous across different types of retail firms. We look at 
this issue in columns 2 and 3, where we analyse the employment growth of stores 
belonging to retail chains separately from independent retailers. Column 2 shows a 
very strong and positive association between planning grants and chains’ employment 
growth (coefficient 0.0019, standard error 0.0006). This finding is consistent with the 
idea that grants proxy for big-boxes, which are mostly opened by retail chains. The
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interesting fact to notice, however, is that grants have a positive and significant 
association with the employment growth of independent retailers. The coefficient on 
lagged planning grants is 0.0012, significant at the 5% level (standard error 0.0006).
In this simple specification, a possible worry is that the positive coefficient on 
planning grants may reflect spurious demand effects. However, in column 4 we see 
that the positive effect of big-boxes is virtually unchanged (coefficient 0.0015, 
standard error 0.0006). once we include as additional regressor the employment 
growth of chain stores, which proxies for the generalized growth of retail 
employment27, and controls for income (as proxied by the log median hourly wage), 
demographic (percentage of people below 15 years) and urban (% of urban and village 
areas) characteristics28. Finally, the OLS coefficient is robust to the introduction of 
regional-specific trends in the employment growth of independent retailers, which 
could potentially be correlated with big-box entry. In fact, the coefficient of big box in 
column 5, where we include a full set on local authority fixed effects and their 
respective interaction interacted with a time trend, is still significant and of similar 
magnitude (0.0072, standard error 0.0021).
So far, we have described the OLS results as mere associations, since they may 
potentially suffer of the simultaneity biases described in section IV. In order to infer 
something on the causality of the relationship between planning grants and 
independents, we turn to the IV estimates. In particular, we exploit the variation in the 
composition of the Local Authorities -  which are in charge of making planning 
decisions -  to predict planning grants for a large retail store. Column 6 presents the 
estimates of the first stage, where we regress the number of planning grants given at 
time t-2 on the share of Conservative seats in the Local Authority at time t-2, together 
with rest of regressors included in the specification of column 5. In line with the
27 The employment growth o f  chain stores appears with a negative (albeit insignificant) coefficient 
(-0.0200, standard error 0.0196).
28 Income and urban characteristics are positively but not significantly correlated with independents’ 
growth, in line with the idea that these stores thrive in densely populated areas. The percentage of young 
people is negatively and significantly correlated with independents’ growth, possibly reflecting 
(including a more detailed description o f  the age profiles did not substantially change this result).
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results of Table 2 -  which referred to the whole planning sample, spanning from 1993 
to 2003 -  a higher share of Conservative seats in the Local Authority is negatively and 
significantly correlated with fewer planning grants, and therefore with lower big-box 
entry.
The power of the political instrument is confirmed by the Kleibergen-Paap 
statistic (the equivalent to the Cragg Donald test with non i.i.d errors), which is well 
beyond the threshold suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) to identify weak 
instruments problems. More importantly, the 2SLS estimates of the coefficient on big- 
box entry shown in column 7 are positive, significant at the 5% level (coefficient 
0.0079, standard error 0.0040). Although the IV estimates are substantially higher than 
the OLS results, the Hausman test shows that the differences between the OLS and the 
IV estimates of column 5 are not statistically significant.
V.B Robustness checks on IV  estimates
We now turn to Table 4 to assess the stability of the IV results to a series of different 
robustness checks. Before discussing the additional results, in the first column of Table 
4 we report the baseline specification, which corresponds to the one reported in Table 
3, column 5.
The first check relates to the concern that the (lagged) political instruments 
could be correlated with the same unobserved shocks driving the employment growth 
of independent stores. In particular, the existence of unobserved factors, positively 
correlated with independents’ growth, and negatively correlated with the share of 
Conservatives, would be enough to generate a positive bias in the IV estimates. To 
address this concern, column 2 reports the result of a regression where we include as 
additional controls variables proxying for the socio-economic characteristics of the 
Local Authority (these include population growth, proportion of skilled people, 
proportion of people employed in retail, manufacturing and mining). None of the
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extra controls are significant in the second stage, and the coefficient on large stores 
remains significant at the 10% level (coefficient 0.0072, standard error 0.0037).
Another critique regards the timing assumption adopted to translate planning 
grants into proxies for big-box entry. To test the sensitivity of the results with respect 
to the assumption that only the grants accepted in t-2 enter at time t, in column 3 we 
look at the relationship between independents’ growth and the number of planning 
grants conceded between t-2 and t-4 . The coefficient on this new entry measure 
remains positive and significant, and of similar magnitude with respect to the baseline 
estimates (coefficient 0.0022, standard error 0.0013). As a further check on the timing 
assumption, in column 4 we look at the relationship between the level of 
independents’ employment, and the stock of retail major applications granted between 
1993 (the first year of the planning data sample) and t-2, including in the regression a 
full set of Local Authorities dummies. The coefficient on planning grants remains 
positive and significant at the 10% level (coefficient 0.0040, standard error 0.0024). 
This is the case even when we estimate the regression using two years averages to 
reduce the possible impact of measurement error in both the entry and the employment 
variables (coefficient 0.0082, standard error 0.0040).
In column 6, we re-estimate the baseline specification of column 1 using a 
different instrument set, which includes not only the share of Conservative seats, but 
also the shares of all the other parties’ seats. Including all the other parties does not 
contribute much to the first stage, and the Kleibergen-Paap statistics on weak 
instruments drops below the critical value for a 20% maximal bias in the size of the 
IV estimates. However, the coefficient on large stores remains positive and significant, 
despite a slight drop with respect to column 1 (coefficient 0.0056 standard error 
0.0032).
Finally, in column 7 we run a placebo regression to check that the planning 
variables are not proxying for other economic shocks affecting the Local Authorities. 
In particular, we look at the IV estimate of the grants’ effect on the growth of 
manufacturing employment. This exercise shows that the effect of planning grants on
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the growth of manufacturing employment is insignificant (coefficient -0.004, standard 
error 0.006). This finding mitigates the concern that planning grants might capture 
something beyond the entry of a large retail store.
VC. Margins o f  adjustment
Although the effects of planning grants are consistently positive between chains and 
independents, they may nonetheless be heterogeneous within independents. For 
example, since very small comer stores are typically chosen for “top-up” shopping, 
they might be less vulnerable to big boxes’ competition compared to large stand-alone 
supermarkets. Moreover, the effects of big box may vary across entering, exiting and 
incumbent stores. We explore these hypotheses looking at the effect of planning grants 
independents of different sizes, and across different margins of adjustment. In 
particular, we use the employment growth decomposition of Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1992) to analyze individually the growth contributions of entrants, exitors and 
(expanding or contracting) incumbents.
The Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) method calculates the employment growth 
rate of independent stores within each Local Authority j at time t as a weighted 
average of all the k individual stores’ growth, i.e.:
where e p k  is the size of store k at time t in Local Authority j, i.e. the simple average of 
the store employment at time t and t-1; E j t  represents the aggregate employment of all 
independent stores in the Local Authority at time t; g,tk is the time t growth rate of 
store s in Local Authority j, i.e. the change in establishment employment from t-1 to t, 
divided by Qpk. This growth rate is symmetric about zero, and it lies in the closed 
interval [-2,2], with deaths (births) taking value of -2 (2). By construction, total
(V.i)
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employment growth rate is the sum of the contributions to employment growth from 
entrants, exitors and incumbents, i.e. g//, = Entry - Exit + Incumbents Expansion - 
Incumbent Contraction. Furthermore, in order to study the heterogeneity hypothesis 
across different size classes, independent stores are classified according to their 
employment with respect to the employment median of independent stores (two 
employees).
This generates a total of fifteen different growth rates - five components (total 
growth, entry, exit, incumbents’ expansion and contraction) for three different samples 
(all stores, stores with less than two people and stores with more than two people). We 
regress each growth component for each sub-sample against the planning grants 
variable, using the same baseline IV specification on column 5, Table 3. The results of 
this exercise are reported in Table 5, where the regressions are divided between all 
independents (panel A), independents below two employees (panel B) and 
independents above two employees (panel C). Overall, the positive effect of planning 
grants is mostly accounted for by a reduction of the exit component of independents’. 
In particular, the coefficient on the exit regression accounts for more than a 100% of 
the overall positive coefficient of large stores entry (coefficient -0.0158, standard error 
0.0077). Independent stores with more than two employees account for most of the 
aggregate independents dynamics. Panel C shows that the effect of planning grants on 
the overall growth of independent stores with more than two employees is about twice 
the size of the one for smaller independents, i.e. the coefficient (standard error) are
0.0142 (0.0091) vs. 0.0017 (0.0032). An additional grant is associated with a 1.6% 
reduction in the exit component for larger independent stores (Panel C, column 3), 
compared to the 0.18% reduction estimated for small independent stores.
V.D. Magnitudes
Overall, the IV estimates confirm the result found with the simple OLS, i.e. big-box 
entry is associated with a positive effect on independents’ growth. In order to evaluate 
the magnitude of the estimates, we look at the employment growth of independent 
retailers between 1998 and 2004, and see how much of it can be accounted for by the
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change in the number of planning grants between 1996 and 2002, to take into account 
the 2 year delay between obtaining the planning grant and starting the retail activity 
assumed in the baseline regressions. Between 1998 and 2004, the employment of 
independent retailers declined at an average yearly rate of 3% per annum, while on 
average 0.44 fewer planning applications were granted every year. According to the 
IV coefficient in Table 3, column 8, the estimated impact of the decline in planning 
grants is a yearly decline of 0.34% (0.44*0.0079*100) in independent stores’ 
employment. Therefore, the decline in big-boxes accounts for roughly 8% of the actual 
decline in the employment of independent stores between 1998 and 2004, which is non 
negligible.
VI. Conclusions
This paper investigates the effects of entry regulations against big-boxes on mom and 
pop stores. The results show that regulating the entry of big-boxes may actually harm 
employment of mom and pop stores. Key to the story is the ability of retail chains -  
which are the main drivers behind the diffusion of big-boxes -  to substitute between 
stores of different types. This implies that the net effect of entry regulations depends 
on the competitive pressures arising from the stores opened by retail chains instead of 
big-boxes.
We investigate these mechanisms in the UK retail sector, where the constraints 
imposed on big-boxes show an exceptional degree of variation. We show that the 
introduction of entry regulations significantly reduced the number of big-box openings 
in the UK. However, this did not coincide with a reduction in the total number of new 
stores, but simply with a change in their size and location. In particular, the reform 
induced the major retail chains to move away from large retail outlets and to open 
small stores in central areas. The evolution of independents’ employment in the post 
reform period suggests that, paradoxically, the increase in the competitive pressures 
generated by the smaller chain stores have been so strong for independents, to offset 
the possible benefits arising from the reduction in big-box entry.
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Exploiting the differential restrictiveness of the planning reforms within the 
UK, we look at the effects of entry regulations at the Local Authority level. More 
specifically, we study the relationship between the employment of independent stores 
and the number of big-boxes obtaining a planning grant. The analysis is based on a 
unique dataset, which combines information on the population of retail stores with an 
exhaustive list of the planning decisions made by 302 English Local Authorities, 
observed between 1998 and 2004. We rely on an instrumental variable approach to 
isolate the variation in planning grants determined by entry regulation from that arising 
from local demand conditions. In particular, we exploit the fact that locally elected 
politicians managed the majority of retail grants for big-boxes. This introduced a link 
between the political composition of the Local Authorities and planning grants
In line with the aggregated stylized facts, we show that big-box entry - as 
proxied by planning grants - coincided with a higher employment growth of 
independent retailers. The positive effect of planning grants is found with both simple 
OLS estimates and IV regressions, where the grants are instrumented by the political 
composition of the local boards. According to the estimates, the sharp decline in big- 
box entry - which followed the 1996 reform -accounts for about 8% of the decline 
experienced by independent retailers between 1998 and 2004.
This paper argues that entry regulations against big-boxes may paradoxically 
harm on mom and pop stores. Due to data limitations, the estimates presented in this 
paper do not distinguish between the short and long run effects of entry regulations, 
nor do they look at the impact of the planning grants for central versus peripheral 
independents. These are clearly important issues to address, as they help qualifying the 
mechanisms generating the regulatory effects. Furthermore, although the discussion 
has mainly been focused on independent retailers, the IV strategy presented in the 
paper can be effectively employed to study the causal impact of big-boxes on equally 
interesting outcomes, such as wages, traffic and pollution. We leave these topics for 
future research.
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Figure l.a The location of new food stores after the 1996 
English planning reform
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Notes: The graph plots from the number of openings of in 
and out-of-centre foodstores as recorded by the Institute for 
Grocery Retailing. Source: ODPM, 2004
Figure l.b The employment growth rate of independent 
retailers after the 1996 English planning reform
S
ChainsIndependents
Notes: the bars represent the average employment growth of 
stand alone retail establishments in England between 1989 and 
1996 and 1996 and 2003. Sources: Business Monitor (1976- 
1996), ABI (1998-2003)
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Figure 2 .a Grants for Large Retail Stores over time
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Notes: The graph reports the lowess estimate (bandwidth 0.8) of 
the number of major retail applications granted across 305 
English Local Authorities, observed between 1993 and 2003. The 
graph plots deviations from Local Authority means
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Figure 2.b Average store size of UK retail fin* ever tira
1997 a n d  1998
in
100 200 
Store size distribution (based on employment)
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Store size distribution (based on employment)
Note: Figures are histograms of shop employment for each shop within a 
national supermarket chain in 1997/8 (top panel) and 2002/3 (bottom 
panel). Vertical lines mark the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the 
distribution. A national chain operates 10 + UK regions. SIC521 is 
“non-specialised stores”, mostly supermarkets. Source: Haskel and 
Sadun (2007).
Figure 3: Average Number of Planning Grants Across English Local Authorities
(1993-2003)
Ranges
S(3.27, 15.36) (2.00, 3.27) (1.18, 2.00) (0.00, 1.18)
Notes: The map shows the average yearly number of planning grants given by 354 different English 
Local Authorities between 1993 and 2004. Source: ODPM.
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Table 1 - Planning Grants - Basic Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Grantst Grantst Grantst Grantst Grantst Grantst
In(Pop) 2.3836*** -
Log population (0.3121)
%Urban - 2.1425*** -
Percentage urban areas (0.3779)
% Young - - 40.3867***
Percentage people below 15 years (9.1412)
Ln(W) - - - -0.2321
Log median hourly wages (0.7065)
% College - -12.010***
Percentage people with a college (3.3061)
degree
%RetaiI -
Percentage employed in retail
%Manuf - - - - -
Percentage employed in 
manufacturing
%Mining -
Percentage employed in mining
Observations_____________3318 3318_____3318 3318 3318
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent 
variable in all columns is the number of major retail applications (above 1,000 square 
meters) granted by Local Authorities. The time period is 1993-2003. All estimates are 
based on 302 English Local Authorities. Errors are clustered at the Local Authority 
Level to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form in the 
residuals. Sources: ODPM, Census 2001, LFS, ASHE
29.9469***
(6.3283)
3.8144
(2.4484)
-38.2354*
(21.1807)
3318
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Table 2 - Political Power and Planning Grants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Grantst Grantst Grantst Grantst Grantst Grantst Grantst
Abs Maj Con -0 .7200* * *
Dummy Conservative Absolute (0 .1854)
Majority
Rel Maj Con - -0 .7875* * * . - . _ _
Dummy Conservative Relative (0 .1924)
Majority
Sha_CON - - -2 .0683*** - 1 .5528* * * - 1.1353* * * - 1. 1010** - 1.5184**
Share of seats won by (0 .5225) (0 .4201) (0 .4165) (0 .5321) (0 .7244)
Conservative Party
Sha_LD - - - - - - -0.6717
Share of seats won by Liberal (0 .6920)
Democrats
Sha_Other - - - - - - -0.6495
Share of seats won by Other (0 .4315)
Parties
Observations 3318 3318 3318 3318 3318 3318 3318
Controls - - a a a a
Region FJL*year no no no no yes yes yes
Local Authority FJE. no no no no no yes yes
Omitted group Other Other All other All other All other All other Labour
absolute parties’ parties’ parties’ parties’ parties’ party’s
majorities relative shares shares shares shares share
and no majorities
absolute
majorities
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent 
variable in all columns is the number of major retail applications (above 1,000 square meters) 
granted by Local Authorities. The time period is 1993-2003. All estimates are based on 302 
English Local Authorities. Errors are clustered at the Local Authority Level to control for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form in the residuals. All columns control 
for year dummies. Control "a" includes the log of population, the percentage of urban areas, 
log median hourly wage, percentage of people below 15 years, percentage of people with a 
college degree (NSV 3 or 4), percentage of people employed in retail, manufacturing and 
mining industries. Columns (4) and (5) include regional fixed effects interacted with a year 
trend, column (6) includes Local Authority fixed effects. Sources: ODPM, BLED, Census 
2001, LFS, ASHE.
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Table 3 - Employment Effects of Big-Boxes- Main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent
Variable Aln(empt) Aln(empt) Aln(empt) Aln(empt) Abi(empt) Grantst-2 Aln(empt)
Type of 
Stores
All Chains Indep. Indep. Indep. - Indep.
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Method First Second
Stage Stage
GrantSt-2 0.0019*** 0.0019*** o o o to * * 0.0015** 0.0037* - 0.0079**
Big-box grants in 
t-2
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0040)
Share
Conservativ
e Party t-2 - - - - - -2.7088*** -
Share of (0.6181)
Conservative
seats in t-2
Observations 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815
A dditional
C ontrols no no no a a a a
Local
A uthority no no no no yes no no
FJE.*year
H ausm an test
(Ho: IV =O LS - - - - - - 0.996
col 5), pvalue
K leibergen-Paap rk  W ald F  statistic (10% M axim al Size C ritical V alue=1638)
- - - - - - 19J205
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The time period is 
1998-2004. All estimates are based on 302 Local Authorities. The dependent variable in 
column (1) is the employment growth of all stores classified in "Non specialized retail". The 
dependent variable in column (2) is the employment growth of chain stores classified in "Non 
specialized retail" . The dependent variable in columns (3) to (6) and (8) is the the 
employment growth of independent (i.e. stand alone) stores classified in "Non specialized 
retail". The dependent variable in column (7) is the number of planning grants for major retail 
applications at time t-2. Columns (1) to (6) are estimated by OLS. Column (7) represents the 
first stage regression of the 2SLS estimates shown in column (8). All columns include year 
dummies. Control "a" includes the employment growth rate of retail chains, the percentage of 
urban and village areas, the percentage o f people below 15 years and the log of the median 
hourly wages in the Local Authority. Column (6) includes a full set o f Local Authorities 
dummies, interacted with a time trend. All regressions are weighted by the share of 
population in the Local Authority. Errors are clustered at the Local Authority Level to control 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation o f unknown form in the residuals. The Kleiberg- 
Paap statistics is used instead of the Cragg Donald weak instrument test when errors are non 
i.i.d. Data sources: IDBR, ODPM, BLED, Census 2001, ASHE.
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Table 4 - Robustness Checks on IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Aln(empi) Aln(empt) ALn(empt) Aln(empt) Aln(empt) Aln(empt) Aln(empt)
Type of stores Indep. Indep. Indep. Indep. Indep. Indep. All
Industry 521 521 521 521 521 521 Manuf
G rants^ 0.0079** 0.0072* - - - 0.0056* -0.0040
Major retail grants in t-2 (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0060)
Cum ulative Grantst-2 - - 0.0040* - - - -
Sum of major retail grants, between (0.0024)
1993 and t-2
Sum Grantsi-2 - - - 0.0022* - - -
Sum of major retail grants between (0.0013)
t-4 and t-2
Average G rants^ - - - - 0.0082** - -
Major retail grants in t-2 ,2 years (0.0040)
average
Observations 1815 1815 2105 1808 909 1815 1815
Additional Controls a b a a a a a
Parties included as instruments
Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. All Cons.
Hausman test (Ho: IV=OLS), p-value
0.996 0.984 - 0.983 - 0.999 -
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (10% Maximal Size Critical Value=1638)
19.205 21.149 23.932 19.783 18.967 6519 19.205
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The time period is 1998-2004. 
All estimates are based on 302 Local Authorities. The dependent variable in column (1) is the 
employment growth o f all stores classified in "Non specialized retail". The dependent variable in 
columns (1), (2) and (3)-(7) is employment growth of independent (i.e. stand alone) stores classified in 
"Non specialized retail". The dependent variable in column (3) is the log of independents' employment. 
In column (5) all variables are transformed in 2 year averages. All columns are estimated by 2SLS. The 
instrument in all columns except (6) is the share of Conservative seats in the Local Authority. Column 
(6) includes as additional instruments the share of Labour, Liberal Democrats and Independents seats. 
All columns include year dummies. Control "a" includes the employment growth rate of retail chains, 
percentage of urban and village areas, the percentage of people below 15 years and the log o f median 
hourly wages in the Local Authority. Control "b" includes the variables listed in "a", in addition to the 
share of employment in retail, manufacturing and real estate industries, the percentage o f people with a 
college degree or above (NSV 3 and above) and population growth. Column (3) includes a full set of 
Local Authorities dummies. All regressions are weighted by the share of population in the Local 
Authority. Errors are clustered at the Local Authority Level to control for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form in the residuals. The Kleiberg-Paap statistics is used instead of the 
Cragg Donald weak instrument test when errors are non i.i.d. Data sources: IDBR, ODPM, BLED, 
Census 2001, ASHE, LFS.
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Table 5 - Margins of Adjustment
A. All Independent Stores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable DH growtht DH growtht DH growtht DH growtht DH growtht
Growth Components All Entry Exit
Expanding
Incumbents
Contracting
Incumbents
Grantst-2 0.0079** -0.0045 -0.0158** 0.0020 -0.0002
Major retail grants in t-2 (0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0077) (0.0017) (0.0014)
B. Independents with less than or two employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable DH growthi DH growtht DH growtht DH growtht DH growtht
Growth Components All Entry Exit
Expanding
Incumbents
Contracting
Incumbents
Grantst-2 0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0018 0.0006 0.0004
Major retail grants in t-2 (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0007) (0.0006)
C. Independents with more than two employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable DH growtht DH growtht DH growtht DH growtht DH growtht
Growth Components All Entry Exit
Expanding
Incumbents
Contracting
Incumbents
Grantst-2 0.0142 -0.0054 -0.0160** -0.0003 -0.0008
Major retail grants in t-2 (0.0091) (0.0046) (0.0067) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The time period is 1998-2004. 
All estimates are based on 302 English Local Authorities and 1815 observations. The dependent 
variables are the different components of employment growth, computed using the Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992) formula. Each cell reports the result a different regression o f each growth 
component on the variable Grants(t-2). All coefficients are estimated by 2SLS, using as instrument for 
Grants(t-2) the share o f Conservative seats in t-2. All regressions include as additional controls year 
dummies, the employment growth rate of retail chains, the percentage of urban and village areas, the 
percentage o f people below 15 years and the log of median hourly wages in the Local Authority. All 
regressions are weighted by the share o f population in the Local Authority. Errors are clustered at the 
Local Authority Level to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation o f unknown form in the 
residuals. The Kleiberg-Paap statistics is used instead of the Cragg Donald weak instrument test when 
errors are non i.i.d. Data sources: IDBR, ODPM, BLED, Census 2001, ASHE, LFS.
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Appendix: Data and Additional Results
LA UK Census Data
The data on independent retailers is drawn from the Inter Departmental Business Register 
(IDBR), which is at the base o f  most surveys run by the UK Census. The business register is 
compiled using a combination o f  tax records on VAT and PAYE, including information lodged 
at Companies House and Dun and Bradstreet. The IDBR captures two broad measures. First, it 
measures the structure o f  ownership o f  businesses using three aggregation categories: Local 
Units, Enterprises and Enterprise Groups. A Local Unit is a single mailing address, so this is 
best thought o f  a store. An Enterprise is a chain o f  local units/shops under common ownership. 
An Enterprise Group is a group o f  enterprises under common ownership. Second, the IDBR 
holds turnover and employment data for both stores and firms. This is based mostly on tax 
data (plus old records from previous inquiries) -  although generally the turnover data is 
deemed to be imprecise The Annual Register Inquiry (ARI) is designed to maintain the 
business structure information on the IDBR. It began operation in July 1999 and is sent to 
large enterprises (over 100 employees) every year, to enterprises with 20-99 employees every 
four years and to smaller enterprises on an ad hoc basis. The ARI currently covers around
68,000 enterprises, consisting o f  about 400,000 local units. It asks each enterprise for 
employment, industry activity and the structure o f  the enterprise, including having to report 
employment o f  its local units. The first available year for the retail sample is 1997. However, 
this data is deemed to be imprecise and is therefore the analysis starts in 1998. The 
geographical location o f  the stores is obtained matching a five digit postcode with a dataset o f  
geographical coordinates. I exclude from the sample stores that become part o f  retail chain at 
some point o f  their life. This is done to minimize measurement error in the independent store 
tag.
LB ODPM Applications Database
The data on major planning applications and grants were obtained from the Office o f  the 
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) -  recently relabelled as the department for “Communities and 
Local Government”. The ODPM is the main institution in charge o f  overseeing planning 
issues in England. For this purpose, the department keeps detailed records o f  all the planning 
activity taking place across the country. The data used in this analysis was obtained upon a 
simple telephonic request. It includes all major (above lOOOsqm) and minor applications 
submitted and approved across all English Local Authorities between 1993 and 2003, 
classified under the category “Retail, distribution and servicing”. The data is anonymized and 
available only at the Local Authority-year level.
l.C British Local Elections Database
The British Local Elections Database (BLED) is a unique source o f  information o f  local 
election results in Great Britain. It contains more than 150,000 individual election results since 
the 1973 wholesale local reorganization. The results are provided at the candidate level, and 
can be aggregated at the ward and at the Local Authority level via geographical identifiers29.
The aggregation is simplified by the fact that there is no element o f  proportional 
representation, i.e. the candidates to receive the most votes in the elections win. The term o f  a 
councillor is usually four years. Councils may be elected wholly, every four years, or Tjy 
thirds', where a third o f  the councillors get elected each year, with one year with no elections.
29 Councils are divided into electoral divisions - known in district councils as 'wards’, and in county 
councils as 'electoral divisions'. Each ward can return one or more members - multi-member wards are 
quite common. There is no requirement for the size o f wards to be the same within a district, so one 
ward can return one member and another ward can return two. Metropolitan borough wards must return 
a multiple o f three councillors, whilst until the Local Government Act 2003 multiple-member county 
electoral divisions were forbidden.
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The variable used in the baseline regressions is the share o f  seats won by each party in the 
elections. In councils where the election takes place every four years, this variable coincides 
with the overall share o f  seats controlled in the council. In councils that elect a third o f  their 
councillors every year, this variable will only be proportional to the total share o f  seats in the 
council. The results are virtually identical using an estimate o f  the council composition. The 
only difference is that the sample is smaller, since for some Local Authorities -  which have 
experienced discrete jumps in the number o f  councillors - the estimate is particularly noisy.
1.D Additional Data
The core retail data is complemented by additional sources (Census 1991 and 2001, 
Annual Survey o f  Hours and Earnings), which provide basic information on socio-economic 
characteristics - such as population, income and retail land prices - proxying for demand 
characteristics. As discussed in section III, time unvarying characteristics are primarily 
controlled for by Local Authority fixed effects or by first differenced transformations.
2. The British Local Government
The structure o f  local governments in England has experienced several changes over time. In 
1974, a two-tier administrative structure o f  (shire) counties and non-metropolitan districts was 
set up across the whole o f  England and Wales, except for the Isles o f  Scilly, Greater London 
and the six metropolitan counties. Council functions were divided according to the level at 
which they could be practised most efficiently. In consequence, counties took on functions 
including education, transport, strategic planning, fire services, consumer protection, refuse 
disposal, smallholdings, social services and libraries, whereas the districts had responsibility 
for local planning, housing, local highways, building, environmental health, refuse collection  
and cemeteries. Responsibility for recreation and cultural matters was divided between the two 
tiers.
Following the Local Government Reorganisation in the 1990s major changes were 
implemented, such as the introduction o f  Unitary Authorities, single-tier administrations with 
responsibility for all areas o f local government. Between 1995 and 1998 these were 
established in a number o f  areas across the country, especially in medium-sized urban areas, 
whilst other areas retained a two-tier structure. There are currently 46 unitary authorities in 
England, and 34 shire counties split into 239 (non-metropolitan) districts. London and the 
metropolitan counties retained their own structure.
3. Summary Statistics
Table A .l shows the basic summary statistics for the sample o f  305 English Local Authorities 
that are used in the econometric analysis. The average population o f  a Local Authority is about
130,000 people, or 10 people per hectare. Total average employment (i.e. independents and 
chains) in “Non-specialized retail” (SIC 521) is 2,742 people, divided between 123 stores or 
100 retail firms. On average the sector has positive employment growth (3% per annum). The 
overall picture hides significant heterogeneity between independent retailers and chains. 
Independent retailers account for about 62% o f all the stores, but only 10% o f  employment. 
Independents are characterized by much smaller stores (3 vs. 56 employees per store for 
chains). Table A.2 provides some information on employment dynamics for both independents 
and chains, using the employment growth rate developed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) 
defined in Section II.A. There are significant differences in employment growth rates, with 
independents shrinking at an annual rate o f  -3% and retail chains expanding at an annual rate 
o f +4%. The table also shows that entry and exit play a crucial role for the dynamics o f  both 
independents and chains. Averaging between independents and chains, about 76% o f  job  
creation is accounted by births and 80% o f  job destruction in accounted by deaths30.
30 This picture is consistent with the dynamics o f the US retail sector reported by Foster, Haltiwanger 
and Krizan (2006).
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Table A.l - Summary Statistics
Mean Median Sd
Local Authority 
Characteristics
Population
Population Density (person per ht) 
Total Employment
Number of retail stores (SIC 521 only) 
Number of retail firms (SIC 521 only)
129993
9.5
2742
123
100
107450
4.5
2276
97
79
93805
10.8
2101
97
75
Independent Stores 
(SIC 521 only)
Total Independent Employment in LA 274 217 215
Number of stores in LA 77 58 67
Chains
Total Chain Employment in LA 2452 2023 1923
(SIC 521 only) Number of stores in LA 44 37 32
Entry of Large Stores Average yearly grants for large stores 2.6 2 3.2
Notes: The table reports averages taken on a sample of 305 English Local Authorities, observed 
between 1998 and 2004. The data refers to the population of retail stores classified under the SIC code 
521 (Non Specialized retail”. Independent stores are firms with a single retail outlet. Chains are firms 
with multiple outlets. Sources: IDBR, Census 2001, ODPM.
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Chapter IV: The Effects of Entry Regulations on Retail Productivity1
I. Introduction
In Chapter III we showed that a series of planning reforms introduced in the UK 
economy over the 1990s had a major effect on the investment decisions of large retail 
chains, inducing a substitution between “big-box” stores with smaller chain outlets 
located in central areas.
A crucial question is whether the regulatory-induced shift towards a smaller 
scale of retail activity had a significant impact on the productivity of the UK retail 
sector. Several authors emphasise the importance of scale economies for the activity of 
retail firms. Oi (1998), for example, discusses the role of fixed inputs such as parking 
and advertisement as sources of economies of scale at the store level. Others, like 
Holmes (2002) and Basker et al (2007) discuss the complementarity between store size 
with investments in bar codes and integrated distribution networks and, more generally, 
with the ability of retail chains to coordinate the activity of multiple stores.
In order to evaluate the productivity impact of the planning reforms, we use 
several micro data sets drawn from the UK Census, which provide detailed firm and 
store level information for a large sample of chains active in the UK, observed between
1 This chapter draws on joint work with Jonathan Haskel.
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1997 and 2003. We use this detailed information to analyse the relationship between the 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of retail chains and the typology of stores they own - as 
summarized by the median and the variance of their stores’ distribution.
The analysis shows a consistent and statistically significant association between 
chain TFP and median store size, even once we control for a full set of firm level fixed 
effects. Interestingly, the relation is particularly strong in the Non-Specialised retail 
(SIC 521, supermarkets), the industry which accounts for most of the movement 
towards small stores in the aftermath of the reform.
The coefficients suggest that the fall in within-chain shop sizes lowered annual 
TFP growth in retailing by 0.4%. This is, about 40% of the post-1995 slowdown in UK 
retail TFP growth of about 1% (as documented by Basu et al, 2003). This finding 
suggests that the introduction of tight planning regulations had a significant impact on 
the productivity of the UK retail sector, constraining the entry of high TFP outlets.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we document the data sources and 
some basic characteristics of the retail industry. In Section III we present the 
econometric modelling to study the role of store size of chains’ TFP. Section IV shows 
the econometric results regarding the relationship between firm size and productivity. 
Section V concludes.
II. Data
II. A Data Sources
Our empirical analysis is based on micro data on retail firms and stores drawn from the 
official UK Office of National Statistics business surveys. These are the micro data 
underlying the UK National Accounts.
We use productivity data at the firm level drawn from the Annual Business 
Inquiry (ABI). The ABI is the main survey used in the UK to generate input and output 
measures for the national accounts. The ABI covers production, construction and some 
service sectors, but not public services, defence and agriculture. Firms are required to 
provide details on turnover (total and broken down in retail and non-retail components,
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and by commodity sold), expenditures (employment costs, total materials and taxes), 
work in progress, and capital expenditures (separately for acquisitions and disposals). 
Retailing firms, in particular, answer sections related to import or export of services and 
on the use of E-Commerce and employment, with further data on part-timers.2 Since the 
ABI is covered by the Statistics of Trade Act, 1947, firms are obliged by law to provide 
data if they get a form. To reduce compliance costs however, only firms above a certain 
employment threshold (currently 2503) are all sent an ABI form every year. Smaller 
reporting units are sampled by size-region-industry bands.4
For each chain in our sample, we combine the productivity data at the firm level 
with a variable which summarises the size characteristics of the stores they own to 
examine how the TFP implications of different stores’ distributions. For this purpose, 
we draw information on the population of retail stores active in the UK from the 
Interdepartmental Business Register (the IDBR). This business register is compiled 
using a combination of tax records on VAT and PAYE, information lodged at 
Companies House, Dun and Bradstreet data and data from other surveys. The IDBR 
provides information on the location and employment of each retail store existing in the 
UK. Each store comes with a numeric identifier which can be found also in the ABI 
data. This allows us to determine whether the store is part of a retail chain and, if so, to 
identify the chain it belongs to.
2 The total number o f  questions that is asked vary between long and short format survey forms, with the 
long format being sent only to firms above a certain employment level. The main difference between the 
two types of formats is that in long format firms are required to provide a finer detail o f the broad sections 
defined above. For instance, in the long format firms break down their disposals and acquisitions 
information about 20 different items, whereas in the short format they only report the aggregate values. 
Also, in the long format, firms answer on questions such as the total number o f sites and the amount o f  
squared metres they consist of.
3 The threshold was lower in the past. See Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2002) for more details.
4 The employment size bands are 1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, the regions are England and Wales 
combined, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Within England and Wales industries are stratified at 4 digit 
level, NI is at two digit level and Scotland is at a hybrid 2/3/4 digit level (oversampling in Scotland and 
NI is by arrangement with local executives). See Partington (2001).
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II.B The Shift towards Small Stores in the Data
In Chapter III we illustrated the details of a series of planning reforms introduced by the 
UK Government over the 90s to slow down the diffusion of large and peripheral large 
stores. We argued that the planning reform induced retail chains to substitute large and 
peripheral stores (big-boxes) with smaller store formats. In this section, we use the 
detailed level of disaggregation provided by the Census data to analyse the changes in 
stores’ distribution in the immediate aftermath of the planning reforms (1997-2003).
We consider seven sub-industries within the retail sector (from 521, “Non 
Specialised retail”, to 527, “Repair Stores”). Table 1 shows the average sub-industry 
employment for 1997/8 and 2002/3. Table 1 also reveals the importance of the industry 
521 “Non Specialized retail”, where supermarkets are usually classified. “Non 
specialized retail” is also the most concentrated sub-industry, with a 15 firm 
concentration ratio of about 40%.
In Table 2 we look at firm heterogeneity, by dividing the sample of stores 
according to the type of retail firm that owns them. For this purpose, we define three 
types of retail firms: “stand-alone” stores, which are single owned shops, “small 
chains”, which are chains of stores operating in at most nine out of the eleven UK 
regions and “large chains”, operating in at least ten UK regions.
Looking at “Non Specialized Retail” first, the top row shows the share of 
employment has fallen fractionally in stand-alone stores, fallen more in small chains 
and risen in large chains. The same is true in terms of shops, with a particularly sharp 
fall in the share of stand-alone shops. The general pattern is repeated in all sectors, with 
the exception of Food and Pharmaceutical, where the employment share of stand alone 
shops has fallen only fractionally and the share of large chains has remained 
substantially flat (in Food).
In Table 3 we explore in more detail within-firm store distributions to analyse 
the importance of small stores across the different industries, by looking at the fraction 
of shops below the median size of the chain in the base period (the average size between
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1997 and 1998)5. We restrict our analysis to stores belonging to chains (i.e. multi stores 
firms), and we distinguish once more between small and large chains. Moreover, in 
order to focus on the main retail sub-industries, we look separately at “Non Specialised 
Retail”, “Food” and “Other Specialized Retail”, while we group the rest of the 
industries together. This analysis shows that the increase of small stores is most 
pronounced in “Non Specialised Retail”, as it is apparent from the fall o f store size at 
the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the store distribution6. Median store size has fallen 
from employing 72 persons to 57, whilst the size at the 75th percentile has fallen from 
141 persons to 117 persons. For other industries there is much less change. Median 
sizes have hardly changed at all, although there has been a slight decline in the 75th 
percentile for large chains.7
III. Empirical Model
In order to test the role of store size for the productivity of retail chains we use a simple 
Cobb-Douglas production function8 of the following form, for retail chain i:
6 We can calculate two versions o f this statistic. We can simply take all S stores, regardless o f firm, and 
compute the median or other size, giving one measure for all stores. Or, we can take all stores, allocate 
them to their firm, and calculate a particular percentile, say the median for each o f the F firms, and finally 
take the average o f this figure, say the median, over the F firms. This second method is used in the Tables 
and corresponds to the regression where we need a median per firm. The first method is used to construct 
the first figure.
7 As a matter o f  information, our regression sample is not quite this picture, since with fixed effects we 
use firms who are present in at least two periods. But the changes are similar, namely a fall in shop sizes 
for supermarkets and little change elsewhere).
8 Notice that the total number o f stores is included in the capital stock K. Moreover, the specification 
abstract from possible complementarities between the share o f  large stores and other inputs.
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where Q is gross output, Z are the standard inputs of production (capital, labour and 
material) and A is TFP at the firm level. We express firm level TFP as a weighted 
average of large and small stores efficiency, where the weights are represented by the 
share of large store production over total chain output. Formally:
(IIL2) la An = y \(S u )+ fX it+uit
where cp(Su) is a function that measures the share of large stores in the total production 
of the retail chain i at time t. The X’s are other observable factors influencing 
productivity such as the geographical extension of the chain (regional or national), the 
ownership status of the chain (domestic or multinational), firm age, region etc. We 
estimate (III. 1) using firm level panel data by OLS, and OLS with fixed effects9. The 
estimation of equation (III. 1) presents some conceptual issues10. We address these 
questions below.
III. A Measuring Retailing Output and the Relation between Output and Inputs 
The literature argues that the right output concept when considering productivity of a 
retailer is not the goods it sells, but the bundle of retailing services it offers, which 
surround the sales of the goods11. Betancourt (2004, p.l9ff) defines these services as 
ambience, product assortment, accessibility of location, assurance of delivery, and 
information12. In an ideal setting, we would need the prices and quantities of these
9 The econometric issues involved are discussed in, for example, Griliches and Mairesse (1986).
10 This question is discussed in, for example, Betancourt (2002), Oi (1981) and Triplett and Bosworth 
(2003).
11 This follows from the generic argument that retailers offer fundamentally intermediation activities in 
the same way that a business who transports shoes from A to B does not produce the shoes, but the bundle 
o f transport services surrounding the shoes.
12 Consider the example o f a shoe seller, where the measured output is sales o f shoes. A partial list o f the 
inputs might be the following. First, the bought-in shoes themselves and second the shop (assuming it 
has a location). Third, the factors enabling a transaction to be made (staff to open the shop and take the 
money, cash tills, heating and lighting etc.) and fourth the bundle o f distribution services surrounding the 
sale of shoes in the shop; the location o f the shop, the ambience in the shop (e.g. the lighting, design, 
quality o f the staff), the reputation o f the shop for e.g. accepting returned goods etc.
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attributes to measure retail output. However, since services are typically not priced 
directly, the main challenge is to recover their value from observable data, which is 
typically on overall revenues and various input expenditures.
In order to do this, we need a theory of how the various inputs and outputs in 
retailing are related. Let us denote this real bundle of services under the vector D. 
Define PQ as sales of goods at retail price P, PwQw as the value of goods purchased for 
resale at the wholesale price Pw, other intermediate inputs used in retailing (lighting, 
electricity etc.) as PmM and primary factors labour and capital as PxX. Our data are 
typically values of sales, PQ, and values of expenditures on measured inputs, PwQw , 
PmM and PxX. We define three output measures: sales=PQ, gross margins PgmQgm  
=PQ-PwQw and value added PvQv =PQ-PwQw -PmM.
The most general form of a production function describing Q would be
where A is the TFP parameter. An important question is what are the properties of 
PgmQgm = P Q -P w Q w , or more accurately, what are the marginal product properties of 
(III.3) observable from PgmQgm? This question parallels the question in the production 
function literature on gross output versus value added, where it is shown that the extent 
to which the properties of the gross output production function are recoverable from the 
value added production function if either a) Q takes a special functional form so that the 
ratio of Qw to Q is fixed (either technologically, or that relative factor prices do not 
change) or b) that Qw is separable from the other inputs so that (III.3) can be written as:
As Triplett and Bosworth (2004) point out, separability means that the elasticity 
of substitution between D, M or X and Qw is zero, or that retailers choose Qw and then 
choose to allocate M and X independently of the choice of Qw. As Oi (2000) and
(III.3) Q=AF(D,Qw,M,X)
(HI-4) Q=F(A(D,M,X)Qw)
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Triplett and Bosworth (2004) point out, the separability assumption is increasingly 
unlikely in retailing13, and TFP growth calculated from (IIL3) will not give the same 
information as (III.4). Therefore, we base our production function estimates on gross 
output and not margins.
III.B Measuring Inputs
To obtain a measure of the share of large stores we have to take a number of steps. 
Since our main dataset does not contain information on the square footage of retail 
stores, we use employment at the store level to approximate for the average size of a 
store. We proxy for the share of large stores belonging to retail chain i using moments 
drawn from its stores’ distribution. For example, everything else equal, the size 
distribution of the j stores belonging to the chain that opens a new large store will shift 
to the right. The main measures that we use are median store employment and -  
symmetrically - the fraction of stores that are below the median observed at the 
beginning at the sample.
We specify the Z variables in (III.l), as the usual production function arguments 
of capital, employment and material use (our dependent variable will be gross output). 
The measure of capital here is build up via the perpetual inventory method using data on 
investment in plant, buildings and machinery. This does not by any means measure 
capital in the firm since much of the effective retailing capital stock is due to factors 
like, for example, floor area. In addition, the investment data is at the firm level and not 
the shop level so that the acquisition of pre-existing shops (takeovers) will not show up 
as investment. Thus, our shop size variables may be picking up aspects of the mis- 
measured capital stock.
Betancourt (2004) argues that sales of a retail store are affected by distribution 
services such as ambience, product assortment, accessibility of location, assurance of 
delivery and information. Like other studies, we do not have detailed measures of these
°  For example, bikes used to be sold fully assembled, whereas now they are sold flat packed giving 
customers the choice to assemble the bikes themselves or have the shop do it.
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factors. We include industry dummies to control for any common regional and industry 
level of distribution services. Thus, for example, we do not compare food retailers with 
second-hand car dealers but compare within 4-digit industries. Moreover, we enter a 
dummy for whether the shop is part of a national chain or not, which should 
additionally control for ambience-type effects. Finally, we also enter fixed firm effects 
so that we are comparing changes in sales, controlling for other things, rather than 
levels: to the extent that factors such as ambience and location convenience remain 
fixed, this should be controlled for.
III.C Identification
Our primary objective is to estimate the coefficient on cp, the variable summarizing the 
typical size of the stores belonging to the chain. In doing this, our identification 
assumption is the share of small stores is primarily determined by the regulatory shock, 
to which firms react with different speed of adjustment.
If this condition holds, i.e. the factors driving of cp are orthogonal to firm 
characteristics, then the estimated coefficients are unbiased. If, however, this 
orthogonality condition fails, our OLS estimates will be biased. Consider the case where 
better managers both raise productivity and employment, a partial explanation as to why 
large firms are more productive. This would tend to make OLS estimates of productivity 
and store size overstated14. To control for this type of biases we use fixed effects, thus 
the impact of cp will be biased only if changes in unobserved managerial skill cause both 
changes in cp and changes in TFP.
A second problem arises from the fact that we do not have firm-specific output 
or input prices, rather four-digit industry prices. The consequences of this for production 
function estimation are explored in e.g. Klette and Griliches who point out that omission
14 There is likely measurement error in the reporting o f store employment as well. If it is classical then 
that would potentially bias the effect toward zero. Whether it is classical is not clear however, since we 
might assume that measurement error is greater the more stores that a firm has and the more new stores a 
firm opens (since to some extent the ONS checking procedures and forms are based on previously 
recorded store numbers).
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of firm-specific output prices, under the assumption that demand is Dixit-Stiglitz 
introduces a term in (pi-pi) in the error term, so that cross-sectional comparisons of TFP 
reflect both differences in technology but also prices deviations. Similarly, if there 
input prices are firm-specific then the error term also contains a term in -yz{p^-pF) for 
the Z’th input and cross-sectional comparisons of TFP reflect also the ability of firms to 
source inputs cheaper than others (such firms will have higher measured TFP). With 
fixed effects, we induce a bias to the extent that deviations in within firm scale 
measures from the mean are correlated with deviations of output prices net of input- 
elasticity weighted deviations of input prices. The direction or magnitude of this bias is 
not clear. In the levels, it seems reasonable to assume that larger firms can source 
cheaper inputs, giving them higher measured TFP. Since this level effect is controlled 
for, bias would occur to the extent that changes in <p are correlated with changes in - 
yz(piz -pF), i.e. any effect of median size (as an example of an (p measure) on measured 
TFP would be biased upwards if firms with rising median sizes were achieving higher 
input price gaps. We might imagine that more monopolistic firms would be able to 
achieve higher input price gaps, and that this might be more likely in large firms. 
However, in the data we see that large retail firms have registered, in fact, falls in 
median store size, which would induce a negative correlation between median size and 
price gaps. This, in turn, would imply that we underestimate the coefficient on median 
store size.
An additional problem is that large stores are likely to differ in terms of product 
mix. For example, smaller stores in large chains often carry high value product mixes, 
and that they do not feature special offers in the way that large stores do. In order to 
work out the possible bias for our estimates, we suppose that a) small stores only sell 
high value goods and b) large stores offer high and low price baskets of goods, c) large 
stores can sell high value goods only at a discounted price. The basket offered by large 
stores is then: B l= P h (1 -s)Q h + P lQ l whereas the basket offered by small stores is Bs= 
PhQh. Denote the number of stores in a chain as N , with 5 the fraction of small stores, 
in which case the firm level basket, which is what we measure, B f= N ((1 - 8 )B l+  8B s).
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Under this scenario, in the cross-section there will be a correlation between the fraction 
of small stores and the revenues from full price high-margin goods. If these revenues 
are higher15 then this would likely raise overall revenues, at the margin. This works in 
the opposite direction to what we have found.
Finally, possible biases in the OLS estimates may arise since our productivity 
data is at the chain -  and not at the store - level. We postulate a log-linear relation 
between firm-level outputs and inputs, and within-firm measures of input distributions. 
However, the log of firm-level output or input is different from the sum of the logs of 
outputs or inputs. Therefore, we have to be careful that the within-firm measures do not 
appear just due to aggregation. To examine this issue, we consider a simple case where 
each shop j  within a firm has a Cobb-Douglas relation of the form Qj=Nj°K/. We only 
observe Qi=Xj Qj, Kj=Sj Kj, Ni=Lj Nj but for each chain i we do observe the Njs V jE i. 
Let us start by assuming that Q, Y and N are log- normally distributed within the firm. 
Making use of the relation that for a log-normally distributed variable log(£j Xj)= Xj 
(log Xj) + a2iogx/2, where o2j0gx is the standard deviation of logX, we can write the firm- 
level (which is what we observe) relation between inputs and outputs as
InQ, = Y " IntA ^+y* ln(K,) + i ( a , ; fff. -y  " o j ^  -y  )
Following these steps, equation (III.l) becomes:
(III-5)
1 (  \
In Qu = YS<P{S„) + ^  yz In Z„ + -  a 2i^Cl -  yV io.z, + f  Xu + h„
Z = KfJ,M Z = KJV,M
This shows that the relation between observed log firm output and observed log firm 
inputs in (III.l) has an extra term in it, namely the within-firm variance of log output net 
of the sum of the output elasticity weighted within-firm variances of log inputs. Eq. III.5
15 It would seem reasonable that they are higher i.e. the demand at these stores is sufficiently inelastic so 
revenue is large even with the lack o f sale prices, since this would cover higher land rents at such stores 
who are e.g. in centres o f town, or in stations and airports where presumably space is priced at a 
premium.
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shows that the use of logs does indeed induce a relation between log output and within 
firm input distributions. It is important to note however, that the induced term is not, 
even in this simple case, a simple dispersion measure of one of the inputs, such as the 
median or standard deviation, but is rather the gap between the dispersion of output and 
the (weighted) sum of dispersion of inputs. The bias to cp depends upon the correlation 
between this and the gap term (with fixed effects, strictly between changes in cp and 
changes in the gap). Working out the sign of this correlation is not simple. Observed 
heterogeneity in cp, for example, might generate positive or negative gap, depending on 
its relative effect on output, compared to that on the other inputs16
III. C Additional Controls
In all regressions, we clustered standard errors at the chain level to control correlations 
of unknown form in the residuals. We also include a set of time and regional dummies, 
plus controls for the multinational status of the firm, the nationality of its major 
shareholder, its age, and the region of location of the central headquarters. Since larger 
chains also tend to have larger store sizes, we also include a dummy for whether the 
firm is a national chain or not (the omitted category is a regional chain).
16 As a matter o f data, we only have within-firm data on N and so can only investigate the correlation 
between log median shop size for each firm and a 2iogN (the variance o f shop sizes within firms). This is 
0.20, significant at the 1% level. Finally, note this equation above is derived when the inputs are log 
linear and the output elasticities in the store-level production function do not vary across stores in a chain. 
In the more general case, one still obtains a relation being the gap between the dispersion o f output and 
the output-elasticity weighted dispersion o f  inputs. In the constant output elasticity case with just one 
input X Albuquerque (2003) shows the equivalent o f the last term on the right-hand side o f (9) to be 
L(Y)-y L(X) where L(Y)=ln(Y/Y), Y and Y equal the arithmetic mean and geometric mean o f Y, across 
the stores within the chain j  (similarly for X), and y is the output elasticity o f  X. In the case o f the log­
normal distribution the relation between the arithmetic and geometric mean implies the expression 
becomes that in (9). See Alburquerque (2003, expression (4)) for a generalisation o f this: with more 
factors the term involves additional output-elasticity weighted terms, and with varying ys across stores 
within a chain, additional terms in the covariance o f the log level o f inputs (relative to the chain average) 
and the store-specific y (relative to the chain average). These aggregation results are also consistent with 
Lewbel (1992) results on scale-invariance.
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IV. Store Size and Chain Productivity
IV. A Main Results
Table 4 sets out our key result, which is the positive and significant relationship 
between the average size of chains’ stores and their TFP. The underlying data in Table 4 
comprises only retail chains, i.e. multi store firms, for a total of 7,469 observations 
between 1997 and 2003.
Column 1 sets out the estimation of the production function outlined in equation 
(5). The coefficient on employment, capital and materials are all statistically significant 
and of expected magnitude. The results also show a (statistically insignificant) positive 
TFP advantage to being a national chain (the omitted category being regional chains). 
Column 2 repeats the regression of column 1, including a full set of firm level fixed 
effects, primarily to control for the unobserved characteristics of retail chains, including 
services and distribution infrastructures. In the fixed effects specification, the 
coefficients on the inputs are lower, in line with the well-known exacerbation of 
measurement error with fixed effects. The national chain dummy indicates a 
(statistically significant) positive TFP advantage, relative to regional chains, of about 
7%.
Column 3 reports the main regression of the paper, where we add to the standard 
inputs of production the log of the median size of stores belonging to the chains. The 
variable median store size is positive and significant, suggesting that a 1% increase in 
median store size is associated with 0.02% increase in firm level TFP. In order to check 
the robustness of this finding to the use of alternative measures of store size, in columns 
4 and 5 we use the share of stores with employment below the (firm specific) median 
store size at the beginning of the sample period as a proxy for the presence of large 
stores within the chain. We express this variable both in frequency and employment 
terms in columns 4 and 5, respectively. Both variables are significantly negative 
(respectively -0.069 and -0.0641). This suggests that an increase in the number of stores 
below the beginning of period median is associated with lower overall firm productivity.
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Overall, our results suggest that, controlling for overall firm size, fixed effects 
and other inputs, within-firm store sizes have a statistically significant association with 
firm productivity. Firms with smaller within-firm store sizes (measured either as median 
size or fraction of small firms) are associated with lower productivity.
To explore the role of industry heterogeneity, we run separate regressions for each 
three-digit SIC industries. This enables us to decompose better the effects on 
productivity, given that the shift towards small stores appears to be heterogeneous 
across sectors. We consider sectors 521, 522 and 524 -  which are the largest industries 
in terms of employment -  individually, and we amalgamate the remaining sectors 
together due to small sample problems. The top row of Table 5 reports the coefficient on 
log median store size for each 3-digit sector17. The second and third rows of Table 5 
report the coefficients estimated on the variable “fraction of small shops” using, 
respectively, the shares measured in employment and frequency terms. The table 
suggests that the results shown in Table 4 are mainly driven by “Non specialised 
retail” (SIC521) and “Other specialised retail” (SIC524), which together represent 86% 
of total retail employment and 92% of total retail value added. For supermarkets 
(SIC521), there is a strong positive effect from median size, with no significant effect 
from the fraction of small shops. For “Specialised Retail” (SIC524), there is also a 
strong positive effect from median size, and a negative effect from the fraction of small 
shops. The other sectors have no particularly statistically significant effect.
1V.B Robustness Checks
In Table 6 we set out some robustness checks on the sample of Table 3. Column 1 and 2 
of Table 6 show the benchmark specification for, respectively, median store 
employment and percentages of small stores. To explore whether the correlation 
between TFP and median store size captures some unobserved effects due to the 
distribution network of retail chains, in columns 3 and 4 we run the baseline regression
17 In these regressions we include all the other controls reported in Table 4.
128
controlling for vertical integration. For this purpose, we use a dummy which takes value 
1 if some of the establishments belonging to the firm are classified in Wholesale (SIC 
51), or if the firm belongs to a larger enterprise group which owns other firms whose 
main SIC code is Wholesale18. The coefficient on the vertical integration variable is 
positive and significant. However, this does not compromise the significance of the 
coefficients on the size variables, which remain virtually unchanged.
We also explored whether the median store size effect is just a reflection of the 
notion that serving more small stores involves more transport and, to the extent that 
there might be congestion involved, lower productivity. The result of this exercise is 
shown in column 5, where we entered transport costs (ln_T) separately to input costs. 
In the data, the fraction of transport costs are positively correlated with the fraction of 
small stores, but the regression table shows that the coefficient on small stores is hardly 
altered19.
In a final check, we tried an IV type approach to the baseline specification of 
Table 4, column 3. Our strategy consists in using initial (i.e. the median store size in the 
first year the firm is observed) median size as an instrument for subsequent median 
size20. The rationale behind the instrument is that the response to the exogenous change 
in planning regulation (which raised the cost of opening larger shops) might have 
differed according to the stores distribution that firms had in the pre-regulatory 
environment. For example, firms with initially larger stores might have faced higher 
adjustment costs in changing stores’ distribution (i.e. opening smaller stores) in 
subsequent periods. This is consistent with the evidence that “big-box” retailers such as 
ASDAAVal-Mart had significant problems in adjusting their store strategies to the new
18 The results are robust if  we use only the first part o f the definition, i.e. a firm is vertically integrated if  
its main SIC code is Retail (SIC 52) but some o f its establishments are classified in Wholesale (SIC 51).
19 We did not find any evidence o f complementarity between store size and transport costs either.
20 Since we control for fixed effects, this effectively uses initial median size as an instrument for 
subsequent changes in median size, where initial median size is measured as the median size o f the shops 
within the chain in the first period the chain is observed and the sample is all observations excluding the 
first period the chain is observed.
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planning regime after the 1996 reform (Competition Commission, 2000, Griffith and 
Harmgart, 2005).
The sample used in this exercise is of 2,353 observations. In the first stage the 
coefficient on initial median store size is -0.0006 (significant at the 1% level), 
suggesting that, indeed, firms with larger stores in the initial period experienced smaller 
changes in stores size. The F test prescribed by Stock and Staiger (1998) in the first 
stage regression is 36, which is well beyond the Stock and Yogo threshold of 16. The 
IV coefficient of log median size is 0.144 (se=0.06), both larger than the OLS with fixed 
effects (coefficient=0.013, se=0.014) and more precisely estimated.
Discounting the bias from weak instruments, the IV results may be upward 
biased due to a correlation between the instrument and unobservable variables. A second 
possibility is that IV is unbiased, but OLS/LSDV is downward biased, due to the 
negative correlation between omitted factors causing chain productivity and median 
store size. Third, OLS/LSDV might be downward biased due to measurement error in 
the changes in median store size, which is corrected when in the IV regressions. Finally, 
it is possible that there are heterogeneous coefficients and that IV has identified the 
local marginal effect arising from initially big firms, for whom there might have been a 
very severe penalty to becoming small.
1V.C Economic Significance o f  the Results
Our results show a statistically significant association between chain productivity and 
variables measuring the relevance of large shops for retail chains. To judge the 
economic significance of these findings, we proceed in Table 7 to consider the effect of 
changes in median employment for the overall productivity of the retail sector.
First, we measure average TFP growth using the retail data in our sample. Table 
7 shows the results for the four industries and for the total sectors, where the total sector 
results are the employment-weighted numbers using the employment weights in row 2. 
Row 3 shows TFP growth for each firm, using the change in log output less the cost-
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share weighted change in log input,21 weighted by the fraction of employment in the 
firm in the relevant SIC for each year. The figures in row 3 are the sums of this for each 
SIC and the total column the weighted sum (of each number in row 3, weighted by the 
industry employment shares in row 2).22 Row 3 shows annual TFP growth rates of 
-0.28% in supermarkets, 0.10% in food, 0.56% in pharmaceutical and 0.84% in the rest. 
The overall productivity growth rate for retailing is, on our sample, 0.07%23. 
Interestingly, the sector with the greatest fall in the median store size has had the lowest 
TFP growth.
Row 4 of Table 7 shows the coefficient on log median employment size from the 
earlier regression. Rows 5 and 6 show the median employment in each industry for our 
sample in 1997/8 and 2002/3. As we saw in Table 3, in the regression sample median 
employment has fallen in “Supermarkets” and risen slightly elsewhere. The seventh 
row shows the predicted effect from the actual change times the coefficient. In 
supermarkets, the predicted effect is to lower annual Aln7F.P by 0.64% per year. In 
SIC524 and “Rest (524)” the effect is to raise it by 0.55% per year and the effect is 
small and negative in SIC522 (due to the negative coefficient in Table 5).
The final two rows of Table 7 set out two counterfactuals. Row 8 imagines there 
was no reduction in median store size in supermarkets (but other sectors were 
unaffected). Given the supermarkets are so much larger than other industries, this 
seems to be the counter-factual of immediate interest, since it is likely that only for
21 The factor cost shares were for employment the share o f gross output accounted for by labour costs, for 
materials the share accounted for by purchases o f materials and for capital the remaining share. An 
alternative is to use the implied output elasticities from the regressions instead o f  the factor cost shares. 
In the light o f  the possible biases to the elasticities we used the actual factor cost shares,which also eases 
comparison with aggregate figures.
22 Strictly speaking the TFP growth rates should be Domar weighted but we ignore this here: there are few 
sales by each retailer to the other and employment is somewhat better measured than output.
23 Basu et al (2003) report UK gross output industry level TFP growth rates, 1995-2000 for retail trade, o f  
-0.58%. Timmer and Inklaar (2005) report, for the period 1995-2002, a TFP growth o f +0.24%. Our TFP 
estimates might different from Basu et al and Timmer et al for a number o f  reasins. First, our TFP growth 
rates are calculated for the sample o f chains included in the regressions, and thus omit small shops (as we 
show below however, chains account for 96% o f  value added in retailing). Moreover, the chains in the 
sample had to survive at least two periods to be included in the sample. Thus it misses, to some extent, 
the industry productivity gains from entry and exit o f new firms.
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supermarkets would store size regulation be binding. However, for completeness, row 9 
shows no change in any median store size in all industries.
Comparing rows 8 and 9 with the actual case in row 2, in row 8, TFP growth is 
raised in supermarkets (by the amount shown in row 7) and unaffected elsewhere. In 
row 9, it is raised in supermarkets, but slightly lowered elsewhere. This exercise 
suggests that, in the absence of changes in store sizes in supermarkets, productivity 
growth would have been 0.44% per annum rather than the actual 0.07% per annum (see 
the total columns in row 3 and row 9)24. Thus, we estimate an implied slowdown in 
TFP growth due to changes in store sizes of (0.27-0.07)=0.37 per annum. This number 
corresponds to about 39% (0.37/0.96) of the slowdown in TFP growth documented by 
Basu et al (2003) for the whole retail industry.25 Since UK retailing by itself accounts 
for 173rd of the UK (private sector) economy-wide TFP deceleration, our estimates 
imply that regulation in retailing accounts for 13% (l/3rd of 39%) of the UK economy- 
wide TFP deceleration between 1995 and 2003.
V. Conclusion
In the mid-1990s, the UK government introduced a series of planning regulations, 
which constrained the entry of large retail stores. Retail chains reacted to the new 
policies substituting large stores with small and central retail outlets. We argue that the 
shift towards small retail formats induced by the regulations had a strong, negative 
effect on the productivity of retail chains.
24 In the scenario where median store size o f frozen at the beginning o f  the period values in all sectors, 
even though productivity growth falls for the non-supermarket sectors, supermarkets are large enough 
that overall productivity growth still rises. Note however, that since median store sizes rose in 
“Pharmaceuticals” and “Rest”, keeping median store sizes at their initial level lowers TFP growth
25 The 0.96 figure corresponds to the movement form 0.38% per annum between 1990 and 1995, to 
-0.58% per annum between 1995 and 2000. Another way to think o f  our data is relative to the US, 
although the counter-factual is not as clear without knowing what happened in the US to store sizes for 
large chains in supermarkets. Timmer and Inklaar suggest that US retail TFP growth is about 7 times and 
2 times respectively that in the UK. Our data here suggests that with change in median shop sizes, UK  
TFP growth would have been about 3 times greater. Therefore, our results over-explain the Timmer/ 
Inklaar figures.
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Consistently with this hypothesis, we provide evidence of a positive and 
significant relationship between chain TFP and variables measuring the size of chains’ 
stores. Our results suggest the fall in shop sizes lowered TFP growth by about 0.4% per 
annum, about 40% of the post-1995 slowdown in UK retail TFP growth. Given that the 
slowdown in retailing alone accounts for about l/3rd of the entire slowdown registered 
by the UK market sector TFP growth between 1995 and 2003, we argue that entry 
regulations accounted for about 13% of the UK economy wide TFP slowdown.
In Chapter V we analyse the role of store size on chains’ TFP in the US and 
Japan, finding comparable results. A simple explanation of the store size effect might be 
that the correlation is generated by pure economies of scale at the store level. A more 
complex channel involves complementarities between store size, shared information 
across stores and other inputs, such as, for example, IT investments. We plan to study 
these transmission channels in future work.
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Figure 1. Changes in the store Distribution of National Supermarket Chains
1997 and 1998
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Notes: Figures are histograms of shop employment for each shop within a national supermarket chain in 
1997/8 (top panel) and 2002/3 (bottom panel). Vertical lines mark the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles o f 
the distribution. A national chain operates in at least 10 of the 11 UK regions. SIC521 is “non-specialised 
stores”, mostly supermarkets. Source: ARD data at ONS.
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SIC
Retail
Industry
Sectors
Notes
521
522
Retail sales in non-specialised stores 
covering e.g. food, beverages or tobacco 
Food, beverages, tobacco in specialised 
stores
Includes supermarkets and department stores
523 Pharm and medical goods, cosmetic and 
toilet articles
Includes chemists
524 Other retail sales of new goods in 
specialised stores
Includes sales o f textiles, clothing, shoes, furniture, 
elect appliances, hardware, books, newspapers and 
stationary, cameras, office supplies, computers. 
Clothing is biggest area
525 Second-hand Mostly second-hand books, second-hand goods and 
antiques
526 Not in stores Mostly mail order and stalls and markets
527 Repair Repair o f  personal goods, boots and shoes, watches 
and clocks
Table 1. Summary Statistics by Three Digit Industries
Total employment Stores Cr 15
sic3 1998-1999 2002-2003 1998-1999 2002-2003 1998-1999 2002-2003
521 Supermarkets 876905 1100000 14853 18552 43.2% 45.0%
522 Food, Bev, Tob 94692 78763 13266 10957 2.9% 2.0%
523 Pharmaceutical 70483 65324 6975 7031 3.2% 2.4%
524 Other 521455 705689 48455 53369 10.5% 13.2%
525 Second-hand 2917 3878 819 1469 0.1% 0.1%
526 Not in store 49016 43838 1100 835 2.5% 1.8%
527 Repair 4340 6691 953 958 0.2% 0.3%
Notes: The table reports averages taken on the population o f retail stores active in the UK. Crl 5 is the 
concentration ratio calculated over the top 15 retail firms in the sample.
Table 2: Share of Employment in Stand Alone Stores, Small and Large Chains.
Employment Shares 
Stand Alone Shops Small Chains Large Chains
1998-1999 2002-2003 1998-1999 2002-2003 1998-1999 2002-2003
Supermarkets 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.18 0.63 0.70
Food, Bev, Tob 0.62 0.60 0.28 0.29 0.11 0.11
Pharmaceutical 0.33 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.43 0.45
Other 0.36 0.33 0.25 0.21 0.40 0.46
Second-hand 0.85 0.79 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.11
Not in store 0.42 0.50 0.47 0.30 0.11 0.20
Repair 0.74 0.75 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.16
Store Shares
Stand Alone Shops 
1998-1999 2002-2003
Small Chains 
1998-1999 2002-2003
Large Chains 
1998-1999 2002-2003
Supermarkets 0.72 0.66 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.23
Food, Bev, Tob 0.79 0.76 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.07
Pharmaceutical 0.47 0.44 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.30
Other 0.61 0.62 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.20
Second-hand 0.88 0.79 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.12
Not in store 0.89 0.94 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02
Repair 0.80 0.87 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.09
Notes: Stand-alone are retail firms comprising o f a single store. Small Chains are multi-store firms
operating in at most nine (out o f the UK’s 11) regions. Large Chains are shops belonging to firms in 
which are active in at least 10 o f  all 11 regions. Source: Authors’ calculations from ARD
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Table 3: Store Distributions, Small and Large Chains
Small Chains
P25 Median P75 Standard
Deviation
Percentage
Small
Percentage
Small
98-99 02-03 98-99 02-03 98-99 02-03 98-99 02-03
(emp 
weighted) 
98-99 02-03 98-99 02-03
521 12.17 14.98 25.22 29.27 64.29 64.07 25.22 29.27 0.40 0.39 0.59 0.53
522 3.82 4.25 6.28 6.75 12.38 11.75 6.28 6.75 0.43 0.40 0.61 0.55
524 3.89 4.43 6.46 7.54 11.98 14.02 6.46 7.54 0.44 0.40 0.61 0.55
Rest 4.81 5.28 9.47 9.20 27.01 21.08 9.47 9.20 0.48 0.45 0.63 0.58
Large Chains
P25 Median P75 Standard
Deviation
Percentage
Small
Percentage
Small
98-99 02-03 98-99 02-03 98-99 02-03 98-99 02-03
(emp 
weighted) 
98-99 02-03 98-99 02-03
521 31.14 22.51 72.45 56.82 140.52 117.52 72.45 56.82 0.43 0.51 0.61 0.67
522 3.94 3.94 6.09 5.93 8.77 9.04 6.09 5.93 0.52 0.41 0.65 0.54
524 6.72 7.54 11.58 13.44 23.22 29.36 11.58 13.44 0.37 0.30 0.57 0.47
Rest 4.85 4.96 8.83 8.58 27.04 19.50 8.83 8.58 0.37 0.35 0.60 0.52
Notes: The table summarises the characteristics of the store distribution o f  small and large retail chains. 
Small Chains are multi-store firms operating in at most nine (out o f the UK’s 11) regions. Large Chains 
are shops belonging to firms in which are active in at least 10 o f  all 11 regions. Percentage small is the 
fraction o f shops below the median size of the chain in the base period (1997 and 1998).
Source: Authors’ calculations from ARD
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Table 4: Productivity and Chains’ Stores Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable ln(GO) ln(GO) In (GO) ln(GO) ln(GO)
Fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES
In(N) 0.2279*** 0.2793*** 0.2770*** 0.2746*** 0.2749***
Ln(EmpIoyment) (0.0101) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0274)
ln(K) 0.0955*** 0.0555*** 0.0535*** 0.0527*** 0.0530***
In(Capital) (0.0082) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0143)
ln(M) 0.6581*** 0.5024*** 0.5026*** 0.5026*** 0.5023***
ln(Materia!s) (0.0150) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0403)
Nat Chain 0.0030 0.0727*** 0.0728*** 0.0708*** 0.0730***
National Chain dummy (0.0127) (0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0251)
ln(median emp)
ln(Stores median employment)
0.0261***
(0.0095)
'
Pct_N_smaIl
Percentage of small stores
- - - -0.0712***
(0.0193)
-
Pctem psm al l
Percentage of employment in small stores
- - - - -0.0669***
(0.0198)
Observations 7469 7469 7469 7469 7469
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The time period is 1997-2003. 
The dependent variable in all columns is the log o f gross output. All columns include year dummies and 
controls for region, age, multinational and multi-group status. All columns except 1 include firm level 
fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the reporting unit level to correct for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity o f unknown form. National Chains are firms which are active in at least 10 o f all 
11 regions. P ctem p sm all and Pct N small are defined, respectively, as the share o f employment and 
the share o f  stores below firm level median employment in the first year the firm is observed.
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Table 5: Industry Breakdown
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln(GO) ln(GO) In(GO) ln(GO)
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Sector 521 522 524 Rest
ln(median emp)
In (Stores median employment)
0.0394***
(0.0106)
-0.0187
(0.0320)
0.0379***
(0.0142)
0.0022
(0.0156)
Pctem psmal l
Percentage of employment in small stores
-0.0355
(0.0252)
-0.0496
(0.0520)
-0.0654***
(0.0232)
-0.0258
(0.0438)
Pct_N_small
Percentage of small stores
0.0189
(0.0259)
-0.0876
(0.0649)
-0.0623**
(0.0298)
-0.0623
(0.0491)
Observations 1109 998 4292 1070
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The time period is 1997-2003. 
Each line corresponds to a different regression. The dependent variable in all columns is the log o f gross 
output. All columns include year dummies and controls for capital, employment, materials, region, age, 
multinational and multi-group status. All columns include firm level fixed effects. Standard errors in 
brackets clustered at the reporting unit level to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form. National Chains are firms active in at least 10 of all 11 UK regions. Pct emp small and 
Pct N small are defined, respectively, as the share o f employment and the share o f  stores below firm 
level median employment in the first year the firm is observed.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable ln(GO) In(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO)
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
ln(N) 0.2770*** 0.2746*** 0.2763*** 0.2737*** 0.2324***
Ln(Employment) (0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0277) (0.0274) (0.0302)
ln(K) 0.0535*** 0.0527*** 0.0532*** 0.0523*** 0.0624***
In(Capital) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0117)
ln(M) 0.5026*** 0.5026*** 0.5022*** 0.5021*** 0.5865***
ln(Materials) (0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0404) (0.0402) (0.0433)
Nat Chain 0.0728*** 0.0708*** 0.0726*** 0.0705*** 0.0295
National Chain dummy (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0206)
ln(median emp) 
ln(Stores median 
employment)
0.0261***
(0.0095)
“ 0.0263***
(0.0096)
Pct_N_smalI
Percentage of small stores
- -0.0712***
(0.0193)
“ -0.0731***
(0.0194)
-0.0573***
(0.0222)
v t
Vertical Integration Dnmmy
- - 0.0213**
(0.0106)
0.0235**
(0.0106)
-
ln_T
ln(Transport costs)
- - - - 0.0030
(0.0030)
Observations 7469 7469 7469 7469 5248
Notes:* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The time period is 1997-2003. 
The dependent variable in all columns is the log o f  gross output. All columns include year dummies and 
controls for region, age, multinational and multi-group status. All columns include firm level fixed 
effects. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the reporting unit level to correct for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity o f unknown form. National Chains are firms active in at least 10 o f  all 11 UK regions. 
Pct emp small and Pct N small are defined, respectively, as the share of employment and the share o f  
stores below firm level median employment in the first year the firm is observed. The vertical integration 
dummy takes value 1 if  the firm has establishments active in wholesale (SIC51)
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Table 7 - Growth Accounting
1 SIC 521 522 524 Rest Total
2 Industry weight 58.17% 3.25% 33.19% 5.38%
3 Weighted TFP growth -0.28% 0.10% 0.56% 0.84% 0.07%
4 Coefficient on log median employ 0.0394 -0.0197 0.0379 0.0022
5 Median employ, 1997/8 58.5 6.9 12.3 9.5
6 Median employ, 2002/3 49.7 7.3 14.2 10.0
7 Coefficient * change in median employ 
Counterfactuals:
-0.64% -0.10% 0.54% 0.01%
8 TFP growth, no change in med emp in 521 0.36% 0.10% 0.56% 0.84% 0.44%
9 TFP growth, no change in med emp all inds 0.36% 0.20% 0.02% 0.83% 0.27%
Notes: Data are for SICs shown with total the employment weighted sum o f the rows, using employment 
weights in Row 2. Row 4 is coefficient on median employment from Table 5. Growth rates are average 
annual growth rates between 1997 and 2003. Numbers in row 7 do not correspond exactly to row 4 *(row 
6 -  row 5) due to rounding in rows 5 and 6. Rows 8 is row 3 less row 7 for SIC521 and row 3 otherwise, 
row 8 is row 3 less row 9.
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Chapter V: Retail Market Structure and Dynamics: Comparison of
Japan, the UK and the US1
I. Introduction
Recent years have seen a revival in studying the economics of retailing. The emergence 
of large chains and allegations of possible market dominance have spurred interest on 
the IO side. The treatment of workers has been the subject of interest for labor 
economists. The stellar productivity performance of US retailing, and disappointing EU 
and Japanese performance have been studied by productivity economists.
On the productivity side, there are at least two broad hypotheses of interest. 
First, to the extent that productivity is affected by technology, there is renewed interest 
in economies of scale and scope in retailing. For example, it is suggested that smaller 
stores might be below minimum efficient scale, or that large retail chains can 
experiment with methods of selling, supply and HR practices and then transfer this 
knowledge across stores. In the UK, a major recent development has been the opening 
of many small stores by large chain retailers, which might lose economies of scale at 
each small store and scope. Second, recent work suggests that productivity growth is a 
function not only of technology and other shocks, but how firms and markets respond to 
these shocks. For example, a recent literature stresses the role of firm and establishment 
turnover in reallocating resources from less to more efficient producers -  Foster,
1 This chapter draws from joint work with J. Haskel, R. Jarmin and K. Motohashi.
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Haltiwanger and Krizan (2003), Haskel and Sadun (2005) and Matsuura and Motohashi 
(2005). This suggests investigating the dynamics of competition and sorting, which 
might be affected by regulation: restrictions on opening hours in Germany, on out of 
town building in the UK, on zoning in the US.
Micro level data on stores and chains can be used to describe within-industry 
dynamics, and the role of firm and store size for. Furthermore, cross-country data is 
needed to take into account the fact that the institutions shaping the retail industry vary 
across countries. Therefore, we assemble comparable cross country micro data on 
market structure and dynamics to see how they might help explain differences in the 
productivity performance of the retail sectors in Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.
We use a common research protocol applied to confidential micro data on retail 
firms and establishments for all three countries. The source of the data is that collected 
by national statistical offices in compiling the national accounts and other official 
statistics. The operational problem is that the data we use cannot leave the national 
statistical offices where they are collected and processed. This prevents us from pooling 
the micro data together. Instead, we perform our analysis on comparable and disclosable 
aggregations of the micro records, or in similar empirical exercises conducted at the 
firm or establishment level within each country for the 1997 to 2002 period. To the best 
of our knowledge, whilst there are micro studies on individual countries, this is the first 
paper to attempt a cross-country study for retailing using comparable micro data.
Our main findings are as follows. First, regarding statics, Japan has a relatively 
large number (per head of the population) of small stores (10 per head), with the US 
many fewer (4) and the UK in between (5). The US has bigger stores all round (average 
sizes are 13 in the US, 9 in the UK and 6 in Japan), so that small single unit shops are 
small in all countries, but the biggest single unit shops are largest in the US. Finally, 
chains, or multi-unit stores, are bigger in the US at all points in the size distribution of 
stores within the chain.
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We also have some interesting findings regarding within-chain store sizes. 
Between the mid-1990s and early-2000s, the median store size in a US non-specialized 
store chain rose from about 140 to 155 employees. In the UK, it fell from about 80 to 
40. Japan is dominated by continuing stores and chains with little chum. In the US and 
the UK there has been a long run fall in shares of mom-and-pop stores. We also look at 
changes of market shares over 5 years for chains in the US and the UK. The major 
difference is that there is very substantial chum in the US around entrants and initially 
small chains. In the US, such firms either gain market share or exit. In the UK, they are 
much more likely to stick where they are, typically in the bottom of the market share 
distribution and not exit.
Finally, to understand the possible implications for productivity, we look 
econometrically at whether chain productivity is lowered by having more small stores 
within the chain, for given overall chain employment. The same regression in both the 
US and the UK reveals a consistent answer, namely a positive and statistically 
significant association between chain productivity and median within-chain store size. 
To the extent this is causal, this suggests that the UK trend to smaller stores within 
chains would have lowered UK retailing productivity and the US trend to larger will 
have raised it.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets out some overall 
productivity data to help motivate what we do. Section three sets out our data, section 
four our findings on statics and dynamics. Section five looks at chain productivity and 
within chain store size and section six concludes.
II. International productivity differences
To help motivate our investigation, we review retail sector productivity differences 
across Japan, the UK and US in both levels and growth rates. In Table 1, we show 
results from Timmer and Ypma (2006) on labor productivity (measured in terms of 
gross value added per person engaged) for the three countries between 1980 to 2002. 
First, note that both British and Japanese retailers are less productive than US retailers,
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and that the differential is growing over time. Second, while the U.S. exhibits a 
remarkable acceleration in productivity growth post 1995, in the U.K. retail sector the 
growth of productivity did not experience any major improvements, while the Japanese 
retail sector experienced negative productivity growth (Motohashi, 2002; Stiroh, 2003; 
and Dorns, Jarmin and Klimek, 2004),
A variety of factors may underlie the differences in productivity levels and 
growth rates across the three countries. Differences in the regulatory and business 
environment (McKinsey, 1998) may restrict retailers, especially in Japan, from building 
stores and/or distribution networks that allow them to benefit from the same scale and 
scope economies as U.S. retailers enjoy. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006) focus 
on the role of entry, exit and reallocation in driving industry level retail productivity 
growth in the U.S. In particular, they stress the role of large national retail chains that 
open new stores that replace smaller less efficient non-chain stores. Jarmin, Klimek and 
Miranda (2005) demonstrate the restructuring of retail markets -  increasing dominance 
of larger national retail chains at the expense of small mom-and-pop shops -  has been 
occurring for many decades and clearly predates the use of IT.
III. Data
Given the prevalence in retailing of multi-unit shops under common ownership it is 
useful to start with some nomenclature. We define a retailing entity at a single 
geographical address as a “store”. A group of retail stores under single ownership is a 
“chain”. A “firm” may be a single store, or a chain, depending on context, see below. 
Some country-specific issues are set out below.
III. A Japan
Data on the Japanese retail sector comes from the Retail and Wholesale Census (RWC) 
conducted by the Research and Statistics Department, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). This census survey covers all establishments 
in wholesale and retail trade. This survey started in 1952, and has been conducted every
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3 or 5 years. The latest data available are from 2002. At this point, we do not yet have 
firm identifiers for Japan so in what follows we can carry out store-level analysis but 
not chain-level.
III.B UK
The UK business data come from multiple sources. The main source is the business 
register, called the Interdepartmental Business Register (the IDBR). This is compiled 
using a combination of tax records (on value added and payroll tax), information lodged 
at Companies House, Dun and Bradstreet data and data from other surveys. The IDBR 
tries to capture two broad measures. First, it tries to measure the structure of ownership 
of businesses using three aggregation categories: local units (LUs), enterprises and 
enterprise groups. A local unit is a single mailing address, which in the retailing context 
is a store. An enterprise is a chain of local units/stores under common ownership (e.g. a 
chain of supermarkets). An enterprise group is a group of enterprises under common 
ownership (e.g. a chain of supermarkets who also own a chain of garden centers). The 
second part of data provided by the IDBR is on turnover and employment2.
Retail firms are required to provide details on turnover (total and broken down 
in retail and non-retail components, and by commodity sold), expenditures 
(employment costs, total materials and taxes), work in progress, and capital
2 Output information on the IDBR comes from Value Added Tax (VAT) records if  the original source o f  
business information was VAT data. Employment information comes from payroll tax data (called Pay As 
You Eam, PAYE) if  that is the source o f the original inclusion. If a single-local unit enterprise is large 
enough to pay VAT (the threshold was £52,000 in 2000/01) it would have turnover information at the 
enterprise and local unit level. On the other hand, if  it does not operate a PAYE scheme, it will have no 
employment information. For the multi-local unit enterprise, no turnover information will be available for 
local units, since most multi-local unit enterprises do not pay VAT at the local unit level. I f  the PAYE 
scheme is operated at the local unit level, it would have independent employment data. There are two 
other ways in which more employment and output data are gathered. The first is i f  the business is 
included Annual Register Inquiry and the second if  it is included in the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). 
The Annual Register Inquiry (ARI) is designed to maintain the business structure information on the 
IDBR (Jones, 2000, p.51). The ARI currently covers around 68,000 enterprises, consisting o f about 
400,000 local units. It asks each enterprise for employment, industry activity and the structure o f the 
enterprise. Most importantly for our work, it asks for employment o f an enterprise’s stores (local units). 
The ABI is the official ONS business survey, based on the IDBR, to ask for inputs and outputs and so 
generate value added for the national accounts (the Annual Respondents Database, ARD, consists o f the 
panel micro-level information obtained from successive cross-sections o f  the ABI). The ABI is not a 
Census o f all local units. This is in two regards: aggregation and partial sampling. Regarding aggregation, 
enterprises normally report on all their local units jointly. This is called a “reporting unit” (RU) but is 
typically an enterprise; for convenience we shall call it a firm.
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expenditures (separately for acquisitions and disposals). Also, in the long format, firms 
answer on questions such as the total number of sites and the amount of squared meters 
they consist of. Other reported data at the RU level are total employment, wages and 
input costs and investment. The investment data are used to build up a capital stock 
database using the perpetual inventory method.
Usable UK retailing microdata is available for all year 1997-2003. Before 1997, 
the data are simply not available in electronic form. Since 1997 was the first year 
available, the data are quite noisy and so we will typically either begin our UK analysis 
in 1998 or average the 1997 and 1998 data.
III. C US
Data for US. retailers come from four sources. First, basic establishment (retail store or 
local unit) and firm (enterprise group in the UK context) demographic information is 
taken from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) maintained by the Census 
Bureau’s Center for Economic Studies (Jarmin and Miranda [2002]). The LBD contains 
information for the entire universe of private business establishments with paid 
employees and is sourced from the Census Bureau’s Business Register and is available 
annually from 1975 to the present. The LBD does not contain sufficient information to 
permit computation of productivity. Establishment data on retail sales are available 
from the quinquennial Census of Retail Trade conducted for reference years ending in 2 
and 7. Given the availability of data from the other two countries, our focus here will 
be on 1997 and 2002. Unfortunately, the Census of Retail Trade does not inquire about 
gross margins, nor does it collect information about intermediate inputs, capital stocks 
or investment. The Business Expenditures Survey (BES) is conducted as part of the 
quinquennial Economic Censuses and collects information on purchases of intermediate 
inputs and services for the retail sector. However, the survey utilizes a hybrid reporting 
unit that roughly corresponds to a line of business within a firm. Linking micro records 
from the BES to the LBD or Census of Retail trade is feasible but subject to error as 
discussed in Dorns, Jarmin and Klimek (2004). Finally firm level information on book
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values of capital stocks and capital expenditures is available at the firm level from the 
Annual Capital Expenditures Survey.
III.D Further data issues
In retailing there are a number of definitional issues that arise. First, on the definition of 
a chain, note that some firms change chain status between the base and final year. We 
use the final year to assign chain status. Second, in both the UK and the US data, a 
vertically integrated firm’s stores are assigned to the industry they operate in (e.g. if 
local unit A is a supermarket and local unit B is a distribution centre, they have different 
industry codes). Thus we define the local unit according to the industry it is in and the 
firm according to the industry that the majority of local units are in. Third, there is a 
slight complication since a firm might have a number of stores in, say retailing, making 
it a chain in retailing, but only one local unit in say, wholesaling, making is a non-chain 
in wholesaling. We defined the firm as a chain if it was a chain in any of its industries. 
Fourth, in the UK and US data, a small number of stores have an employment of zero. 
We dropped these stores. Finally, we classify the data to ISIC industry definitions.
IV. Basic Facts on Retail Market Structure and Dynamics
IV. A Market structure and size distribution
Table 1 shows the basic structure of the retail trade sector for each country as of 2002. 
A number of features are worth noting. First, Japan has many more retail stores per 
person than does the UK or the US Second, US establishments and firms are on 
average the largest and Japanese establishments are the smallest. Third, the US also has 
the highest proportion of retail stores owned by multi location retail chains.
Table 2 focuses on non-specialized stores (ISIC 521). These data are of interest 
since they include large supermarkets and general merchandise stores, which have been 
the focus of much interest and in practice account for a large share of total retailing 
employment. The data here are employment-weighted, that is they are computed by (a) 
computing the average store size within all chains and (b) computing the median of that
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average, weighted by overall chain employment. This makes the data (in the UK at 
least) somewhat sensitive to very large chains, but also more representative of what the 
typical retail consumer or employee would encounter.
The data show a rise in all at all points in the distribution in the US, but a fall in 
the median and 10th percentile size in the UK. The rise in size in the UK at the 90th 
percentile is due to a very large 90th percentile point in 2003. If the UK data are not 
weighted, they show falling sizes at all points in the distribution and a less noisy pattern 
(due to the omission of very large weights on some high employment stores). UK 
results also show a decline at all points if weighted by the number of stores in the firm 
rather than total employment. Regarding weighting and US numbers, the unweighted 
numbers trend upwards for chain stores if restricted to those firms in NAICS 445110 
(Supermarkets) that were classified as “national” chains in both 1997 and 2002. 
However, if one takes the medians for those national in 1997 and separately for those 
national in 2002, median store size falls. This is due to the fact that newly ’’national” 
chains are smaller, thus reducing the median by a compositional effect.
IVB Dynamics
Having looked at the size distribution we turn now to dynamics. We look at a number 
of different dynamic measures: entry, exit, employment growth and transitions. Our 
main interest is to see if transitions look different across countries.
IV.B. 1 Births and deaths
We show establishment birth and death rates for the retail sector as a whole for each 
country in Table 3. We report both establishment and employment weighted results and 
use the birth and death rate measure as in Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996).
Some interesting results emerge. In the U.S. and the U.K, establishment 
weighted birth and death rates are higher than employment weighted rates. This reflects
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that fact that larger establishments are less likely to have birth and death events, so that 
market chum is largely concentrated among smaller units. In Japan, this holds for death 
rates, but not for birth rates indicating relatively high entry for larger establishments and 
exit rates for smaller retail stores that are comparable to those in the U.S. and U.K.
More information on the average size of establishment births and deaths is given 
in Table 5. The first and last rows of the table provide the average number of employees 
at retail stores in the beginning and end of the 1997 to 2002 period for which we have 
comparable data at the micro level. The average size of retail establishments is 
increasing in all three countries. But we see a much larger role for new establishments 
in increasing the average retail store size in Japan, where new establishments are even 
larger than surviving establishments. In the U.S., new retail stores are slightly larger 
than exiting stores but are much smaller than continuing retail stores. In addition, 
continuing retail establishments exhibit substantial growth in the U.S. (nearly 47%), 
much more moderate growth in the U.K. (6%) and negligible growth in Japan (3%)
Table 4 suggests that the entry and exit of retail stores play a different role in 
changing the structure of retail markets across the three countries. In the U.S. market 
chum is characterized by many small units entering. Exits are also small, and there is 
substantial growth for continuers. In Japan and the U.K, we see that entrants are large 
relative to the average store size for the sector as a whole. More work is needed to 
confirm, but these patterns are suggestive that churning in the U.S. is consistent with 
market experimentation and selection, whereas churning in Japan and the U.K. is simply 
to replace less efficient mom-and-pops with large chain stores based on models first 
tested in the U.S. or elsewhere.
To compare retail sector chum across the three countries more systematically, we 
employ cell based regressions of the cross sectional dispersion of establishment and 
firm growth rates. To do this we proceed as follows. First, in the micro data we follow 
Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006) and for each store or chain, we 
compute employment growth between 1997 (1998 for the UK) and 2002 as:
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(x,i -  Xu -  s)
y» =
((xu + X , t - s ) /  2) (IV. 1)
where x is employment. This has the advantage of using data on birth and death in the 
computation of employment growth rates. However, since we cannot use micro data we 
then aggregate these data into cells, defined by country, 3-digit ISIC, size class (8 size 
band classes) and single/multi-unit status groupings. We then calculate the average for 
each cell and the standard deviation of y\t for all observations within the cell. Our 
objective to then compare formally how much cross-country difference there is. To do 
this, we then run the following regression, where the left hand side is the standard 
deviation of employment growth rates for cell i, country j in time t
sd (y),j, = Pm + Puk + y  d* SIZEBANDk iJt + fiMULTI + X,+Xr +eil
(IV.2)
and the right hand side consists of our main variables of interest, namely country 
dummies for Japan and the UK (the omitted country is the US). We also include other 
controls (8 size band dummies, a single/multi-unit status, 3 digit ISIC dummies).
Results from establishment and firm level regressions using both the full and 
continuers only samples are shown in Table 5. The first column shows the 
establishment results when growth rates are computed for births and deaths as well as 
continuers. Our main interest is on the country dummies. Here we see that the Japanese 
retail sector exhibits dramatically less chum at the establishment level than either the 
U.S. or the U.K. Perhaps unexpectedly, the cross sectional dispersion of establishment 
growth rates is higher in the U.K. than in the U.S. Interestingly, however this is 
reversed when we consider only continuing establishments, where the standard 
deviation of employment growth is less than in the US, but more than Japan. One 
possibility is that there are some data error problems with large UK retail chains that 
have undergone mergers and acquisitions which can generate spurious entry and exit.
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This would be particularly noticeable at the establishment level, since the chains operate 
many stores.
Column 2 and 4 show regressions where the micro unit of observation is the 
firm, defined as all retail stores operating under common ownership and control within 
a 3-digit ISIC code, and so the cells are the standard deviation of firm growth. We can 
only compare the U.K. and the U.S. since we currently do not have longitudinally 
linked firm level data for Japan. It is interesting to note that the difference in dispersion 
is much larger when looking only at continuing firms, where the standard deviation of 
growth rates for the U.S. retail sector is 7.8% greater than in the U.K. This is relative to 
a mean standard deviation of continuing firm growth rates of 60.4%. This compares to 
a 6.1% differential that is relative to a mean standard deviation of growth rates for all 
firms of 145.2%. Again, this may be partly due to errors in the U.K. data.
IV.B.2 Dynamics using transition matrices
We now study dynamics using transition matrices. Our method is as follows. We take 
firm employment for 1998 and 2002 in the UK and 1997 and 2002 in the US (so far we 
can only do this for the US and UK). There are nO and nl firms in the beginning and 
final cross sections, respectively, for which we compute employment based market 
shares within 3-digit ISIC industries. Thus, in the initial year we have nO market shares, 
and in the final year we have n l. We then rank all the firms in each year and allocate 
each firm to a market share quintile (we tried deciles but cell sizes were too small). We 
deal with entry and exit as follows: if any firm was not present in the initial year but 
was in the final year, i.e. an entrant, we allocate them to a “birth” group in the initial 
year and they migrate to whichever group they’re observed in for the final year. 
Likewise for exitors, in the final year they’re classified as a death with the initial year 
classification being what they were last observed in. Therefore, every firm in the data 
set, including entrants and exitors, will have two markers from 1 to 6 in both the base 
and final year. We then tabulate the base against the final year, which gives us the
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numbers in each cell. We can then express this as a fraction of the total number of firms 
over the period, i.e. the sum of continuers, entrants and exitors.
The results for the transition matrix of market shares are set out in Table 6. Each 
cell is the fraction of the total number of firms. The top row shows the final year 
market share quintiles where of the firms who entered after the initial year. The first 
column shows the initial year market share quintiles of the firms who exited before the 
final year. Moving to the rows and columns 1 to 5 which refer to the stayers, the 
diagonal elements show the fractions of the total remaining in the same quintile over the 
years. The upper off diagonal elements show the fraction of the total moving upwards 
and the lower-off diagonal the fraction of the total moving downwards. The sums of 
these three groups are shown as well.
The matrices suggest that in comparing the US and the UK, there is (a) overall 
more “fluidity” in the US and that (b) this is concentrated in the small market share US 
firms being able to become large market share firms. First, the sum of the diagonal 
elements in the UK (27%) exceeds that of the US (21%), suggesting that UK firms are 
more likely to stick in their market shares. Second, looking at the elements themselves, 
it is apparent that the high market share firms in the US and UK are both equally likely 
to keep their market position. The reason that UK diagonal sum is higher is because the 
low market share firms are more likely to remain low market share in the UK. Third, 
the proportion of firms moving up the distribution in the UK and US is about the same, 
whereas the proportion moving down is less in the UK (38% of US firms move up, 36% 
of UK, 41% of US firms move down, 37%of UK). Thus, market selection of poorly 
performing firms seems less pronounced in the UK (market selection in the sense of 
firms moving down the distribution but still remaining in business). Fourth, the top row 
suggests that entrants in the US are more likely to progress into the top quintile of 
market share whereas in the UK they are more likely to remain in lower quartiles.
We now analyse in Table 7 how employment grows by the employment share 
quintiles. This enables us to see whether employment growth is in the firms who stay in 
the top quintiles, in those who are rising up the distribution etc. To do this, we took all
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employment in 1997 and assigned it to quintiles of the market share distribution in 1997 
and 2002. Thus, for exitors we assigned, just as we did above, each exitor to its five 
market share quintile and calculated five total employment numbers. For firms who 
remained in quintile 1, we calculated the total employment in 1997 of those firms, 
likewise for other quintiles. We then did the same for employment in 2002: e.g. for 
firms who remained in quintile 1, we calculated the total employment in 2002 of those 
firms. We then calculated employment growth numbers for each quintile and also the 
employment growth rates (using the DHS formula).
An important feature of the data for each country is that employment change, 
positive or negative is concentrated in births and deaths. The single exception to this is 
the large increases in employment at firms that are in the top employment quintile in 
both the initial and final periods. Comparing the US and UK, we again get a picture of 
increased dynamism at the bottom in the US. Looking at the employment growth 
numbers, great part of employment growth is accounted for in both countries by 
entrants who get to the top and stayers who remain at the top. Looking at the 
employment growth rate numbers, the top stayers on the diagonal have similar growth 
rates. However, in the UK it is notable that the middle stayers on the diagonal have 
been contracting, whereas the lowest diagonal quintile has been growing. This contrasts 
with the US where the lowest diagonal quintile has been falling with growth in the other 
quintiles.
V. Impact of Structure and Dynamics on Retail Productivity
Given the evidence presented on scale and on market chum for the three
countries, we now want to see how this impacts the productivity differences that 
motivate the paper. There are at least two ways to do this. First, we might consider that 
store size matters for economies of scale at the store level, but also for economies of 
scope for chains. The former is due to the kind of fixed cost effects discussed in Oi 
(1992). The latter might be due to the idea that large chains use organizational capital 
across stores (an economy of scope). When they leam how to use bigger stores, they
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gain a scope economy when opening additional large stores. But if they open a small 
store they might not be able to use that knowledge as effectively.
Second, we would like to see how differences in retail market dynamics across 
the countries affect productivity growth. The usual method is to try decompositions as 
in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002) (FHK) and compare them across countries. 
The problem here is that productivity can only be computed at the firm level for the UK, 
as is TFP for US retailers. Receipts per worker (crude proxy for labor productivity) can 
be constructed for U.S. establishments. But most of the data needed for compute 
productivity are at the firm level. This and the short time period would reduce the 
effectiveness of FHK type decompositions in examining the impact of retail market 
dynamics on productivity.
Therefore we confine ourselves here to study scale issues. We do this following 
the methodology exposed in Chapter IV, by running the following regression for chain c 
in year t,
In f t, = y, In Na + y2 In MEDSIZE,, + y,CHAINTYPEa + A, + A, + ea
where Q is sales of the chain, with total employment N, CHAINTYPE is a dummy 
indicating a national or sub national chain (not essential), and the other terms are fixed 
effects for the industry and year. The crucial variable is MEDSIZE, some measure of 
the within-chain employment distribution. Our experiments suggested that log median 
size of the within-chain store seemed to give the most robust findings. We also looked 
at the fraction of within-chain stores who are small, where small is defined as the 
fraction of shops below the median size of the chain in the base period (1997-8). We 
also looked at regressions with fixed effects and obtained similar results. The results 
using log median size (logMSS) are set out in Table 8. The table shows that the 
coefficient on logMSS is positive and significant for the UK and both US data sets 
using long and short time periods. This positive association between store size and
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chain productivity is consistent with the idea that a move to smaller-sized stores within 
chains lowers measured productivity.
A number of points are worth making. First, these are of course associations in 
the data and should not be interpreted causally (although it might be interesting to use 
US logMSS in like regions as an instrument for UK logMSS and vice versa). Second, 
due to data availability we do not have current Japanese data or data on other inputs. 
Third, measured productivity in retailing might change due to changing assortment and 
ambience rather than changes in physical outputs per person (Betancourt 2004). Fourth, 
it is of interest that the coefficient varies between the UK and US, being higher in the 
UK. One possibility is that UK chains, whose median size is smaller, have a greater 
marginal effect on productivity.
VI. Conclusion
This paper uses internationally comparable microdata to document features of the retail 
sectors in Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. We study store and chain 
sizes, entry, exit and market share transitions. Our main findings are of the relative 
dominance of small single stores in Japan and large chains in the US. For example, in 
2002, stores per 1000 of the population are 4 in the US, 6 in the UK and 10 in Japan. 
Chains account for 39% of US retail stores, 32% in the UK and 26% Japan. The US 
also seems to have larger chum of stores and, relative to the UK, an increased 
propensity of chains to show “up or out” behavior: low market share chains either gain 
market share or exit. Of all US chains in 1997, 21% are in the same market share 
ranking 5 years later and 27% in the UK, 41% in the US have moved down or exited 
and 37% in the UK. Of entrants, 27% of US entrants are in the bottom market share 
quintile 5 years later, but 46% of UK entrants.
We have also seen increases in the median size of stores in non-specialized store 
chains in the US, but decreases in the UK. Between 1998/9 and 2002/3, the median 
store size in a US food chain rose from about 140 to 155 employees. In the UK, it fell 
from about 80 to 40. Our econometric work suggests a positive and statistically
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significant association between chain productivity and median within-chain store size. 
To the extent this is causal, this suggests that the UK trend to smaller stores within 
chains would have lowered UK retailing productivity and the US trend to larger will 
have raised it.
There are clearly a number of areas to explore further. First, on data, we 
currently have somewhat incomplete Japanese data, and there are always data problems 
in ensuring comparability across countries. Second, it would be of interest to explore 
more how competition from large chains has affected single stores in different countries.
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Figure 1: Retail Sector Gross Value Added per person engaged.
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Notes: The graph shows the evolution of labour productivity (gross value added per person engaged over 
time, 1997=100), across the US, UK and Japan. Source: Timmer and Ypma (2006)
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Table 1. Retail Market Structure, year=2002
Japan US U.K
Number of Establishments 1,273,904 1,114,637 334,627
Establishments per 1,000 
people
10.03 3.94 5.64
Number of Firms n.a. 717,553 241,634
Single Unit Establishments 839,993 685,044 228,189
Multi Unit Establishments 326,167 429,593 106,438
Total Employment 7,146,228 14,647,675 2,984,376
Average Establishment 
Employment 6.13 13.14 8.92
Average Firm Employment n.a. 20.41 12.35
Notes: The table refers to the population o f retail establishments in Japan, the US and the UK in 2002.
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Table 2. Store distributions, Non-specialized Retail Chains (ISIC 521)
1998/9 2002/3
US 90th F 233 282
Median r 142 152
10th w 79 82
1998/9 2002/3
UK 90th 343 374
Median 61 43
10th 22 18
Notes: columns are averages of 1998/9 and 2002/3 data. Data are calculated by (a) computing the average 
store size within all chains and (b) computing the median of that average, weighted by overall chain 
employment.
Table 3. Basic Results on Dynamics
DHS Establishm ent birth and death rates
Japan US UK
% o f Establishments 
Death Rate 34.89% 40.85% 37.53%
Birth Rate 17.14% 40.14% 35.68%
Employment weighted 
Death Rate 28.30% 26.19% 31.57%
Birth Rate 25.24% 27.99% 32.78%
Notes: The table is calculated over the population o f  retail stores in 2002 and 1997 (1998 for the UK). 
Death and birth rates are calculated using the Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) formula.
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Table 4. Beginning and End Year Average Establishment Size 
Births, Deaths and Continuers (1997-2002)
Average Establishment Size
Japan US UK
avg. employment of all establishments in year 1 5.02 12.51 7.97
avg. emp o f estabs in both years (continuers) yearl 5.47 15.59 8.74
avg. emp o f estabs in both years (continuers) year2 5.63 22.90 9.32
avg. emp o f estabs in year 1 but not year 2 (deaths) 4.55 8.22 6.71
avg. emp o f establs in year 2 but not in yearl (births) 8.26 8.94 8.19
avg. employment o f all establishments in year 2 6.32 13.14 8.92
Notes: The table refers to the population of retail establishments in Japan, the US and the UK in 1997 
(1998 for the UK) and 2002.
161
Table 5. Growth rates by Size Bands and Industry, UK and US
Dependent Variable: standard deviation of employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AH Continuing Continuing
Establishments All Firms Establishments firms
Multi-Unit 0.023* -0 179*** -0.03*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.007) (0.014)
Emp<2 0.38*** 0.217*** 0.007 -0.122***
(0.039) (0.046) (0.024) (0.042)
2<=Emp<5 0.203*** 0.122*** 0.02* 0.006
(0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.022)
5<=Emp<10 0.196*** 0.049*** 0.051*** -0.025*
(0.024) (0.025) (0.012) (0.019)
10<=Emp<25 0.174*** 0.037** 0.07*** -0.056***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.016)
25<=Emp<50 0.133*** 0.039** 0.067*** -0.047***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.012) (0.017)
50<=Emp<75 0.082*** -0.0002 0.048*** -0.073***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.013) (0.02)
75<=Emp<100 0.08*** -0.002 0.034*** -0.075***
(0.03) (0.033) (0.015) (0.024)
Emp>=100 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Dummy Japan -0.927*** NA -0.246*** NA
(0.016) (NA) (0.008) (NA)
Dummy UK 0.044*** -0.061*** -0.047*** -0.078***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Dummy US omitted omitted omitted omitted
Observations 351 279 333 260
3 Digit ISIC Controls yes yes yes yes
Notes:* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all 
columns is the standard deviation o f employment growth between 1997 (1998 for the UK) and 2002. The 
unit o f observatio is a size band within an ISIC 3 retail sector.
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Table 6. Transition Matrices, Market Share
Firm Size Class Transition Matrices 
% of Firms
UK - 2002 Size Quintile (based on Employment)
1998 Size Quintile (based 
Employment)
Deaths
on
1 2 3 4 5 j1997 Total
Births 0.00% 10.99% 4.50% 3.09% 2.94% 2.61% 24.13%
1 10.08% 8.09% 1.31% 0.91% 0.74% 0.30% 21.42%
2 6.81% 2.20% 4.74% 1.75% 1.28% 43.00% 17.21%
3 3.91% 0.66% 1.09% 3.19% 2.60% 73.00% 12.17%
4 3.40% 0.38% 0.63% 1.48% 3.88% 1.64% 11.41%
5 3.91% 0.19% 0.21% 0.45% 1.53% 7.37% 13.66%
2002 Total 28.11% 22.50% 12.48% 10.87% 12.96% 13.07% 100.00%
US - 2002 Size Quintile (based on Employment)
1998 Size Quintile (based on 
Employment)
Deaths 1 2 3 4 5 1997 Total
Births 0.00% 8.55% 7.16% 6.34% 5.61% 4.55% 32.21%
1 9.45% 2.48% 0.99% 0.34% 0.16% 0.06% 13.49%
2 7.36% 1.31% 3.19% 1.27% 0.33% 0.10% 13.56%
3 6.30% 0.50% 1.49% 3.67% 1.44% 0.22% 13.62%
4 5.54% 0.25% 0.37% 1.42% 4.56% 1.42% 13.56%
5 5.01% 0.10% 0.12% 0.24% 1.17% 6.94% 13.57%
2002 Total 33.65% 13.19% 13.34% 13.27% 13.28% 13.28% 100.00%
Notes: The table refers to the population o f retail firms between 1998 and 2002 in the UK and 1997 and 
2002 in the US. The numbers represent the percentage o f retail firms moving across the different portions 
o f the employment distribution.
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Table 7 Transition Matrices, Employment
Firm Size Class Transition Matrices 
Change in Absolute Number of Jobs
UK - 2002 Size Quintile (based on Employment)
1998 Size Quintile (based on 
Employment)
Deaths 1 2 3 4 5 1997 Total
Births 0
1 -33,895
2 -46,503
3 -39,209
4 -52,095
5 -654,502
40,924
855
-3,258
-3,276
-3,713
-5,128
30,496
4,539
-134
-3,731
-4,598
-5,246
28,513
5,103
5,725
-1,658
-6,730
-8,854
44,228
7,965
10,686
9,374
-383
-19,688
468,148
8,235
10,166
16,386
22,465
401,612
612,309
-7,198
-23,318
-22,114
-45,294
-291,806
2002 Total -826,204 26,404 21,326 22,459 51,582 927,012 222,579
US - 2002 Size Quintile (based on Employment)
1998 Size Quintile (based on 
Employment)
Deaths 1 2 3 4 5 1997 Total
Births 0
1 -151,718
2 -215,932
3 -295,697
4 -466,117
5 -2,462,301
99,991
347
-11,144
-11,678
-12,374
-14,390
183,998
12,221
2,430
-12,921
-12,254
-17,518
263,666
10,187
18,802
7,777
-19,047
-21,803
407,240
8,246
14,793
33,658
19,583
-60,297
1,288,299
6,894
14,301
21,823
86,002
1,802,537
2,243,194
-113,823
-176,750
-257,038
-404,207
-773,772
2002 Total -3,591,765 50,752 155,956 259,582 423,223 3,219,856 517,604
Notes: The table refers to the population o f retail firms between 1998 and 2002 in the UK and 1997 and 
2002 in the US. The numbers represent the change in the number o f jobs associated with retail firms 
moving across the different portions o f the employment distribution.
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Table 8 Gross Output Regressions - Chain Stores Only
Dependent Variable is Log(sales)
ILK U.S.-1 U.S.-2 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. H*ror Coefficient StdL Error
log(N) 0.972 0.009 0.994 0.002 0.99 0.003
log(MSS) 0.081 0.014 0.009 0.002 0.017 0.003
Chain Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
ISIC Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.929 0.849 0.85
Observations 7478 366667 115003
Notes: U.S.-l model estimated on all available Economic Census Observations for 1977,1982,1987, 1992,1997 and 
2002. U.S.-2 moded estiamted on 1997 and 2002 data only.
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